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Abstract 
This thesis identifies the mechanisms governing the spatial changes in Korea's 
industry and labour markets by focusing upon the emergence of the country's large 
conglomerate business organisations (chaebols). As the country has distinctive 
industrial organisations, production systems, labour processes and government-
business relations, this study discusses the relevance of existing models to the Korean 
situation. It perceives the Korean economy as a system within which 'space-
organising', large business organisations interact over time with government, smaller 
firms and multinational corporations at different geographical scales. The usefulness 
of this approach is assessed using a case study of Korea's most representative 
chaebol, the Samsung Group. 
This study identifies chaebols as the dominant institutions in Korean society. 
Their growth and business strategies have been controlled by the Korean Government 
through its power to allocate capital resources. Regional dynamics of industry and 
labour, therefore, have been strongly influenced by changes in the location, industrial 
structure, production system and labour process of chaebols. With economic power 
concentrated within a few giant business groups and their major areas of operation 
restricted, unbalanced regional development has resulted. Dissatisfaction from 
residents in less-developed areas has pressured the Government to advise chaebols to 
disperse their production facilities. 
Most small and medium-sized firms are closely linked to large corporations 
through subcontracting. By forming hierarchical subcontracting systems, chaebols 
have indirectly exploited scattered, part-time, home-based, female and lower-paid 
labourers organised by subcontractors. Further, chaebols have expanded their 
business arena to encompass overseas locations in a bid to overcome the problem of a 
small domestic market, trade regulations and increased labour costs. Through their 
international business networks Korea's local and regional economies are integrated 
into the world economy. Indeed, the identification of the changing relationships of 
chaebols with both the Korean Government and smaller firms is the key to explaining 
the nation's spatial dynamics of industry and labour. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Economists ... have a hard time keeping the theoretical and the 
empirical firm apart. ... Too many students, however, want a 
realistic model of the firm for all purposes. . .. I conclude that the 
choice of the theory has to depend on the problem we have to solve 
(Machlup, 1967). 
Since the late 1950s, industrial geography has undergone a profound change in 
its research approach. The main causes of this marked shift are twofold: first, there 
has been an alteration in the focus of research with fresh concerns about modern 
corporations, industrial systems, new labour process and uneven spatial development; 
second, researchers have shifted their attention from a single and static explanation to 
a multi-factor and dynamic interpretation. In the process, the research approach used 
by industrial geographers has been refashioned. Indeed, their prime aim has been to 
develop a 'comprehensive', 'systematic', 'unified' and 'dynamic' explanatory model 
that will provide a better understanding of the real world industrial activities. 
The gap between the ideal model and existing versions is still too wide despite 
the ceaseless endeavours of industrial geographers. They do not provide clear 
answers to the following fundamental issues: (a) how arc all the different 
geographical scales (local, regional, national and international) interconnected; (b) 
how are the different types of business organisation (from global corporations to 
household workshops) linked together; (c) through what processes (or mechanisms) 
have business organisations affected the spatial changes of industry and labour 
markets; (d) how are the three different spheres of explanations (political economic, 
corporate organisational and social) bridged; and how are the existing models 
incorporated into the ideal model? This search for a comprehensive, systematic and 
dynamic model which is also 'realistic' and 'practical' must be continued. 
1 
Questions, Purposes and Issues 
In explaining the spatial dynamics of Korean industry and its labour markets, 
three fundamental questions are raised: (a) how useful are the existing models in 
explaining Korea's industrial geography; (b) what is the most important institution 
which affects all parts of Korean society; and (c) what kinds of conceptual framework 
must be developed to understand them? Quite naturally, attention is focused on 
chaebols, the large conglomerate business groups in Korea. I Indeed, they are the 
dominant institution in the Korean economy. Their fortunes are inextricably 
interrelated with the Government policies, subcontractors, labour markets and 
multinational corporations. An exploration of their interrelationships is essential to 
comprehending the Korean space economy. 
The main purpose of this study, therefore, is twofold: (a) to uncover the 
mechanisms governing the Korean space economy and to test their utility through 
case studies of chaebols (particularly, the Samsung Group); and (b) to highlight the 
chaebols' impact on spatial changes within industry and labour markets. Further, this 
study reconsiders extant models in industrial geography based on premises derived 
from advanced Western capitalist countries by shedding fresh light on Newly 
Industrialising Economies (NIEs), exemplified by South Korea (Figure 0.1).2 In 
tackling these research tasks, four fundamental issues are discussed: (a) how have the 
chaebols developed and expanded their spatial organisations; (b) what has been the 
Government's role in the growth and location of chaebol activities; (c) how have 
chaebols internationalised and what has been the resulting impact on regional 
economies; and (d) how have chaebols restructured their businesses and production 
organisations and what has been their impact on people's migration and labour market 
restructuring? 
1. As chaebol is a unique corporate organisation, which reflects Korea's economic, cultural, historical 
and political background, this study simply calls it 'chaebol' rather than relying on inadequate 
translations. Although, it is spelt differently as chaebtJl,jaebul and zaebol, this study adopts 'chaebol' 
because it is most popular. A more detailed definition of chaebol will be provided in Chapter 2. 
2. Henceforth, this study uses 'Korea' as coterminous with 'South Korea'. 
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Thesis Structure 
This thesis comprises three parts (Figure 0.2). In Part 1 (Chapter 1), attention 
is focused on: reviewing major theoretical trends of industrial geography; examining 
key issues in contemporary industrial geography; and uncovering the mechanisms 
governing the Korean space economy. As a preliminary step, the essence and 
limitations of existing approaches are examined. Then, interest is directed to the key 
issues in contemporary industrial geography. Their relevance to the Korean context is 
discussed. Finally, this chapter tries to uncover the mechanisms organising the 
Korean space economy and transforming it. This study recognises the Korean (space) 
economy as a system within which space-organising chaebols are closely 
interconnected with the Government, smaller firms and multinational corporations. 
In Part II, the usefulness of the mechanisms (or conceptual framework) 
isolated in Part I is tested by an empirical study of the chaebols. For this purpose, 
Chapter 2 reviews: the Government's influence on chaebol development, decision-
making and acquisition of economic power; their spatial organisation and 
relationships with smaller firms; and their impact on people's migration and industrial 
location. Chapter 3 broadens the perspective to an international scale. The key 
questions are: how has the growth of chaebols been affected by the introduction of 
foreign capital; how have they used the General Trading Company concept in their 
internationalisation; why and through what process have they undertaken direct 
foreign investment; and what has been the regional economic impact of this 
internationalisation? 
With this general background, an in-depth empirical case study is undertaken 
on the Samsung Group in Part III. Chapter 4 is devoted to a review of Samsung 
Group's: growth processes; business strategies; organisational restructuring; 
locational patterns; and international involvement. Attention is focused on identifying 
the way in which the Group has been transformed and has developed a corporate 
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network. Following the analysis of the Group, Chapter 5 discusses the Samsung 
Electronics Corporation (SEC). The key issues are: how has the corporation's 
behaviour been influenced by both decision-making at the Group level and the 
domestic market's oligopolistic structure; and how it has coped with changes in the 
international business environment? Based on field data, Chapter 6 discusses how 
Samsung Electronics Corporation has affected the growth of smaller firms and the 
nature of the local labour market. Attention is focused on identifying: the relationship 
between parent firms and subcontractors; the generation of dependent smaller firms 
(or off-spring); the restructuring processes of local labour markets; and the effect of 
subcontracting on regional economies. 
Data Limitations 
Chaebols have wielded enormous influence on Korean society but, 
paradoxically, very little research has been conducted on them. According to Jones 
(1987: 88-89), there were only four analytical studies in either English or Korean and 
these were both partial and exploratory in nature because of the data collection 
problems:3 
... where such data do exist, (e.g., the Bank of Korea's statistics on 
credit allocations by Jaebul [chaebol]), they are treated with a secrecy 
equivalent to that accorded the munitions industry or the KCIA budget. 
Cho, D.S. (1988), the author of the Hankug-ui Chonghab Muyog Sangsa [The general 
trading company (GTC) of Korea], like Chung, G.H. (1989) and Lee, J.Y. (1989), 
emphasised that he was dependent on Government assistance in gaining access to 
secret files and interviews. 
3. Jones' paper was originally written in July 1980 and reprinted in 1987. Only the first two of the four 
references were discussed in his paper: (a) Jones, L. and SaKong, I., 1980. Government, Business and 
Entrepreneurship in Economic Development: The Korean Case, Cambridge, Massachusetts and 
London, Harvard University Press; (b) SaKong, I., 1980. 'Kyongje songjang-kwa kyongjeryog 
chibjung [Economic growth and concentration of economic power], Hankug Kaebal Y<'Jnku [Korea 
development review], 2 (1): 2-13; (c) Jones, L., 1975, Public Enterprise and Economic Development: 
The Korean Case, Seoul, KDI Press; and (d) Lee, K.U., 1977. Sijang Kujawa Togkwaj6m Kuja [Market 
structure and regulation of monopolies], Seoul, KDI Press. 
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Even so, in-depth research on an individual business group is more difficult 
than a general research analysis of chaebols. To my knowledge, there has been no 
academic research which has undertaken a substantial case study of an individual 
chaebol. In 1988, Suwon Chamber of Commerce and Industry published a huge 
volume of research result entitled, '2,000 Nyondae-rii.l Hyanghan Suwonkwon Kaebal 
Banghyang-e Kwanhan Yongu' [Research on the development direction of Suwon 
area for the year 2,000]. Although, for example, Suwon is the city where most of 
Samsung Group's electronics-related plants are concentrated and its economy is 
heavily dependent on the Group, there have been few references to it in the Suwon 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry's research activities. Further, its office would 
not release information on Samsung's influence on Suwon city. 
Since the late 1980s, however, arguments about chaebols have been active in 
both the public sphere and in private discussion. A number of valuable studies 
(including numerous journal articles) have been published on them. Also, the 
chaebols have published their own company histories and their founders' 
autobiographies to advertise their Group activities and to mollify criticisms from the 
general public. Most articles by journalists have focused on unveiling the negative 
side of chaebols. Further, their arguments have relied on partial information. Also, 
information in company publications (company histories, annual reports and 
founders' autobiographies) have limitations. They highlight their positive 
contributions for propaganda purposes. Nevertheless, most of their company records 
are as reliable as information derived from public authorities, such as the 
parliamentary investigation committees. Such data difficulties, however, cannot 
justify shunning research into chaebols because their influence on Korean society is 
enormous and comprehending their activity is the key to understanding the nation's 
regional and socio-economic problems. Although there have been some exploratory 
studies on the geography of Korea's large business organisations (e.g., Park, S.O., 
1984, 1985 and 1990), research into chaebols is still rudimentary. 
7 
Most of the information for this study was collected during fieldwork in Korea 
(from mid March to mid August, 1990). Initially, published materials were collected. 
Samsung Group had the best collection of its history books, Founder's biography, 
annual reports, brochures and company newsletters. Apart from the fact that 
Samsung was the most representative chaebol in Korea, the relative abundance of 
published information prompted the selection of Samsung as the case study. Access 
to unpublished, internal information, however, was derived from informal 'personal 
connections' with company employees. They suggested these informal connections 
were superior to official sources. Information on Samsung Electronics Corporation's 
subcontracting companies was collected through: questionnaires, telephone surveys 
and interviews. As the response rate was poor, subcontractors belonging to 
Samsung's other electronics affiliates (Samsung Electron Devices Co.) and its rival 
business group's affiliates (Goldstar and Goldstar-Alps) were added to the survey to 
compensate for data deficiencies and to permit generalisation.4 
Research Methodology 
Korea has quite distinctive industrial organisations, corporate structures, 
production systems, labour processes and government-business relations which are 
not readily fitted into those generated in advanced capitalist countries, notably those 
in North America and Europe. 5 Some key issues in contemporary industrial 
geography, such as flexible specialisation system and its associated labour process 
organisation, have only limited relevance in a Korean context. Thus, the chaebol is a 
very unique business organisation with no parallel in other countries except in Japan's 
zaibatsu prior to the Second World War. As most of the industrial geography models 
have derived from advanced capitalist countries, some of the existing research 
4. For more detailed information on the survey of subcontractors see Chapter 6. 
5. One of the most influential researcher, Lee, K.U. (1986), on chaebols and Korean industrial 
organisation, supports this argument succuntly: ' ... with the exception of private ownership of firms, 
Korean firms were not capitalistic in the true sense of the word.' 
8 
approaches are not appropriate to the Korean case. This study develops a conceptual 
framework by simplifying the complex relationships between chaebols and smaller 
firms, MNCs and the Korean Government. 
Initially, interest is focused on empirical facts derived from an in-depth case 
study. Then, the empirical findings are applied to the existing research approaches (or 
models) to examine their utility in analysing Korea's industrial geography. This study 
tries to interconnect three distinct scales of explanation - political economy, corporate 
organisation and social structure - in a bid to unify existing approaches. As the 
chaebol's business activities are too diverse and broad to disentangle, this study 
narrows its analysis from the broader picture to specific facts about one organisation. 
In a bid to compensate for obvious data difficulties and to generalise the research 
findings this study compares Samsung with rival business groups. Following Wilde 
and Fagan's (1988: 140) advice this study conducted both extensive and intensive 
research prior to generalising its empirical findings. These findings are used to test 
existing models which, in tum, are used in further model-building. 
9 
PART I 
THEORETICAL UNDERPINNING 
CHAPTERl 
INDUSTRIAL GEOGRAPHY REVISITED 
If we are in pursuit of nothing more than information or knowledge, 
then there is some value in copying the standard formula of a 
research paper in the so-called hard sciences ... But if we are in 
pursuit of something more difficult and precious than just 
knowledge, namely understanding, then this simple didactic pattern 
has very limited value (Zelinsky, 1975: 141). 
Rapid changes in technology, labour processes and industrial organisation 
have prompted a continuous revision of research approaches in industrial geography. 
Indeed, there are signs that industrial geography has strengthened its explanatory 
power by varying its approaches to accommodate these changes. In the process, 
industrial geography has become, on the one hand, too diversified and over-specific, 
and on the other, it has become too broad and abstract. Classical location theorists 
and behaviourists have not given much attention to the way in which parts function in 
the whole system (Chisholm, 1971; Hamilton and Linge, 1979). Yet recent 
approaches - the geography of enterprise and the structuralist approach - have not 
been any more successful in explaining the way in which the 'whole system' works 
(Wood, 1981). Consequently, there has been confusion between purpose, boundary, 
methodology, and research topic and over the way in which industrial geographers 
have engaged pressing issues. 
Appreciating these difficulties, geographers have sought a unified model 
which integrates separate approaches (Dicken, 1990; Le Heron, 1990; Sayer and 
Walker; 1992; Storper, 1981; Taylor and Thrift, 1986). Of course, its ultimate aim is 
to uncover the mechanisms generating and transforming the spatial structures of 
industrial production and labour markets. Before tackling this fundamental task, 
Section 1 examines the ideas and limitations of contemporary research approaches. 
Section 2 concentrates on the key debates in contemporary industrial geography: (a) 
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industrial systems; (b) internationalisation of capital and business activities; (c) 
flexible specialisation and subcontracting; ( d) labour market segmentation and spatial 
division of labour; and (e) the integration of government in the analysis of industrial 
geography. Finally, Section 3 uncovers the mechanisms underpinning spatial changes 
in Korea's industrial production and labour markets. 
1 CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH APPROACHES 
Research approaches in industrial geography have emerged from criticising 
the limits of the old. As shown in Figure 1.1, industrial geographers until the 
geography of enterprise became a key research project were preoccupied with small 
firms (classical location analysis) and the decision-making behaviour of individual 
entrepreneurs (behavioural approach). Classical location theorists drawing on the 
work of Weber, Losch and Greenhut sought to develop pure industrial location 
theories from which they determined a firm's optimum location. I Their aim was to 
provide a normative law of industrial location rather than detailed explanations of real 
world location patterns. Heavily influenced by the neoclassical economics literature 
their emphasis has been largely deductive and normative as resource allocation, 
location and distribution were determined by 'pure' market mechanisms (King and 
Clark, 1978: 1). Drawing on Simon's (1957) ideas of decision-makers being 
'satisficers' rather than 'rational economic men', Pred (1967) criticised the unrealistic 
assumptions of the classical school and advanced the behavioural approach. Its 
perspective was that of the individual small firm. As it omitted non-economic goals, 
firm strategy and organisational structures it was not developed into a fully fledged 
theory. Nevertheless, it provided an important bridge from classical location theory 
to the geography of enterprise which is credited with being the basis of contemporary 
industrial geography. 
1. 'Classical' does not mean that the school's ideas have become a relic of the past geographical 
thought. Despite ceaseless criticisms on their usefulness, old theory is still being applied to new 
problems (Tbmqvist, 1977: 153). 
11 
Least Cost Approach 
Weber (1909) 
Demand-side Approach 
Losch (1940) 
Geography of Enterprise 
McNee (1958) 
Industrial Systems 
Approach (1976) 
Cost-Demand Integration 
Greenhut, Isard (1956) 
Smith (1966) 
Structuralist Approach 
Massey (1978) 
Figure 1.1 
Behavioural Approach 
1---'-l 
Simon (1957) 
Pred (1967) 
Political Economic 
Approach 
Major Trends in Industrial Geography 
12 
The geography of enterprise added a new dimension to industrial geography, 
illuminating the importance of corporate organisation, company regions, linkages 
between products and services and the interdependence of people and places. Its 
shortcomings, however, led to the introduction of the structuralist approach before 
attempts were made to combine them in a unified framework (Figure 1.1 ). This latter 
also seeks to incorporate the political economic approach. The geography of 
enterprise (industrial systems), structuralist and unified approaches are outlined 
before discussing the contemporary debates in industrial geography. 
1.1 The Geography of Enterprise 
In 1958, industrial geography underwent a radical shift in its philosophy and 
approach through McNee's pioneering work.2 It created two fundamental changes in 
industrial geography. One was the introduction of the corporate organisation as a 
research object. In his 'geography of enterprise' McNee shifted attention from the 
small individual firms of classical location theory to large business organisations. His 
other contribution was the introduction of systems analysis. According to McNee, the 
large corporation was the key organiser of spatial systems. 
Actually, the geography of enterprise was introduced because extant location 
theory could not answer the questions raised by examining large business 
organisations. McNee (1960: 202) argued that the attention given small individual 
firms in classical location theory should be replaced by considerations of large 
corporations, quasi-public corporations, and government agencies in totalitarian 
countries. Contrary to extant theories, enterprise analysts considered the company as 
an active entity which could both organise its operations in space and alter its 
corporate structure as desired. Thus, if Vidal de la Blache founded possibilism 
McNee created neo-possibilism. Indeed, the ideological roots of the geography of 
2. McNee, R.B., 1958. 'Functional geography of the firm, with an illustrative case study from the 
petroleum industry', Economic Geography, 34 (4): 321-337. 
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enterprise stemmed from Vidal de la Blache's 'French School'. As outlined by 
McNee (1960: 201): 'If one carries the views of Vidal de la Blache to their logical 
end and applies them to the modem urban-industrial world, it is difficult to escape the 
conclusion that the most important single institution in the urban-industrial genre de 
vie is the modern corporation.' 
By developing the 'company region' (or geography of enterprise) concept, 
McNee (1986) cemented regional studies to the analysis of corporations. Firms form 
a distinctive regional system. They have an internal nodal structure linked by 
administrative and material flows, and maintain relations not only with other 
company regions, but also with political regions. Consequently, McNee's (1958: 
322-23) effort to integrate political and social factors into the study of corporations 
added a new dimension to industrial geography illuminating the importance of spatial 
organisation, industrial regions, the linkage of products and services, and the 
interdependence of areas and people. 
The concepts of the geography of enterprise were applicable to 'the study of 
firms both large and small' but most researchers (including McNee himself) have 
concentrated on the 'very' large business organisation (Dicken, 1990: 234). Indeed, 
Hayter and Watts (1983: 157) defined the geography of enterprise as 'the study of the 
influence of the policies and structures of multiproduct, multiplant enterprises on 
changes in industrial location and on processes of regional economic development.' 
The neglect of small firms - the dominant feature of the capitalist economy - made 
the geography of enterprise crippled and blind in studies of labour problems, class and 
industrial restructuring. Taylor and Thrift's (1980, 1982b and 1983) explanatory 
dualistic (or segmented) business organisation model which comprises both small and 
large enterprises suggests how this problem could be overcome. 
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1.2 Structuralist Approach 
The end of the long post-war boom in the early 1970s generated new concerns 
among industrial geographers about social problems, such as class struggle, the 
concentration of economic power in the hands of transnational corporations and 
unbalanced regional development. As existing models (including the geography of 
enterprise) were inappropriate a new paradigm has been developed drawing ideas 
from political economy, especially from the Marxian literature. The study of industry 
(or production) for structural theorists was not merely a matter of economic relations 
but their wider social, political and ideological context (Massey, 1986: 7). Enterprise 
analysts consider technological and managerial development as the generators of 
industrial structure dynamics (such as the growth of oligopoly control, the 
reorganisation of the ownership and the deepening division of labour). Conversely, 
structural theorists look for them in the restructuring of the economic system as a 
whole and conflicts between capital and labour (Massey, 1984; Storper and Walker, 
1983; and Walker and Storper, 1981). Unlike extant approaches, structural analysts 
view 'labour' as a factor of production which is only partially 'reproducible', 'less 
mobile' and an entity of great variety. Indeed, Castells (1977) emphasises two points: 
labour availability and skill are as important as wage levels; and the level of 
organisation and workers' consciousness are equally important, as changes in the 
organisation of production may not be acceptable to the existing workforce or labour 
market (cited by Storper, 1981: 28). 
The main argument of structural analysts is that capitalists replace workers 
with machines or use lower-wage labourers to cut labour costs and increase 
productivity. This process: accelerates the standardisation of commodity production; 
decreases the number of workers for any given level of output; and decreases the 
required skill level (deskilling). The changes in demand for 'specific' labour skills 
are closely connected with macroeconomic fluctuations, organisational restructuring 
and the change of labour processes. The expansion of corporate organisation is 
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central to the spatial division of labour and exploitation of spatial inequalities 
(Massey, 1979: 237). Indeed, structural analysts assume uneven regional 
development is a prerequisite for profitable production. The combination of different 
factors and the uneven distribution of resources (including labour) underlie corporate 
spatial dynamics. The corporation's response to the uneven spatial distribution of 
production conditions has been to create a 'spatial division of labour' to raise profit 
rates (Massey, 1979: 234). 
The division of labour is reciprocal rather than a unidimensional process. 
Deskilling is proceeding in some areas and new jobs, and new skills are being created 
elsewhere to overcome falling profit rates or 'general crises'. These crises are 
generated when: capitalists replace (living) labour by machines (dead labour) to 
increase returns on investments; and productivity gains exceed the ability to consume 
which leads to goods being unsold prompting the rate of profit to fall and discourages 
investment (Johnston, 1984: 476-477). Through these processes capital is shifted 
from lower to higher profit rate segments. General crises occur when profit rates fall 
across many segments. Revival is only possible when appropriate profit rates are 
assured by the creation of new product lines and technologies. Here, the distinct 
'enterprise' and 'structuralist' approaches meet again. The two schools are not 
mutually exclusive but complementary (Storper, 1981: 18). 
The inherent usefulness of structural analysis, however, is matched by its own 
weaknesses. Although the objective of structural analysis is very laudable the model 
does not provide any clear answer to the following two fundamental questions: (a) 
which forms of development are desirable; and (b) how inequality is to be resolved 
(Wood, 1980, 1981). Another key weakness of the structural approach is its emphasis 
on the economic environment rather than on the firm itself (McNee, 1986: 353). 
Thus, its adherents regarded the firm as a simple 'respondent' to external changes in 
the capitalist system. Recognising this problem, structural analysts have stressed the 
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importance of empirical case studies (Gibson and Horvath, 1983; Massey, 1986; 
Fagan, 1990). 
1.4 Towards a Unified Approach 
Confronting the fundamental problems of the disunity in research approaches, 
industrial geographers (both enterprise analysts and structuralists) have tried to blend 
these different approaches by placing firms into their broader structural context (e.g., 
Le Heron, 1990; Dicken, 1990; Sayer and Walker, 1992). Although there has been 
some convergence from both directions, they are still separate. The two groups of 
researchers in different traditions have behaved almost as if each other did not exist 
(Dicken, 1990: 240). Revisiting the geography of enterprise almost 30 years after its 
inception McNee (1986: 348) asserted the need to unify these separate approaches: 
... much of the effort was on 'discovering the facts', using any 
concept, model, theory or whatever that appeared to lead toward that 
end. Pragmatism has its advantages, especially at first. However, 
theoretical incoherence and methodological disunity, recurrent 
complaints, follow as the night the day from a continued pragmatic 
approach. Perhaps enough 'facts' have been discovered. Perhaps it 
is time to step back, stressing theoretical coherence and consistency 
to a higher degree. 
In 1990, Peter Dicken raised this fundamental issue fervently and pleaded for 
much greater cross-fertilisation between researchers in different traditions for the 
future of industrial geography. Unlike other advocates he presented a concrete 
methodology and concept which were critical to the unification of different 
approaches (Dicken, 1990: 235): 
It will do so only if we move away from a total preoccupation with 
the large corporate enterprise, emphasize research in enterprises of 
all types and sizes and, especially, the complex interrelationships 
between them. At the same time, we must situate firms within their 
overall structural context. 
Firms are recognised as the basic unit of the capitalist economy and a major means by 
which the division of labour is organised. Like Taylor and Thrift (1983), Dicken 
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stresses the importance of organisational interconnections between firms which 
conduct diverse functions regardless of equity relations. Indeed, firms have been 
increasingly polygamous rather than monogamous. 
Further, Dicken tries to interconnect the corporate organisational structure to 
social and spatial contexts. This is essential in explaining the development of the 
spatial division of labour, geographical control centres, territorial production 
complexes and spatial production hierarchies. Actually, Dicken's idea is very simple. 
He amalgamated the enterprise analyst's 'firm' into the structuralist's 'firm's 
environment'. Finally, he tries to incorporate the political dimension - largely 
neglected in both traditions - into a unified model. The political boundaries play an 
important role in creating discontinuities of the flows of economic activities and in 
modifying comparative advantage (Dicken, 1990: 241-142). Ironically, as the 
economy has become more and more internationalised the significance of political 
influence on industrial geography analysis has increased. 
2 CONTEMPORARY ISSUES AND ARGUMENTS 
After outlining major theoretical trends in industrial geography interest shifts 
to contemporary issues and arguments. The key issues are: 
(a) industrial systems; 
(b) the internationalisation of capital and business activities; 
( c) flexible specialisation and subcontracting; 
(d) labour market segmentation and spatial division of labour; and 
(e) the integration of government in the analysis of industrial 
geography. 
Attention is focused on highlighting the basic concepts pnor to discussing them 
within a Korean context. 
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2.1 Industrial Systems 
During the 1960s, industrial systems analysis sought to improve the 
limitations of the classical approaches which were largely unrealistic, atomistic and 
unpredictable (Hamilton and Linge, 1979: 1). 3 By adopting systems analysis, 
industrial geographers could arguably provide a better interpretation of how the 
restructuring of industrial organisation in one particular area has had repercussions on 
other areas within which it has direct and indirect linkages. Recognising complexities 
of business arrangements, systems theorists analysed 'industrial systems' as a whole. 
The industrial system, according to Hamilton and Linge (1979: 6), comprises the 
operating units (or a set of economic actors), functional relationships (or linkages) 
between those units, and interactions between the units and the external environment. 
Systems analysts consider technological innovation as the primary causal factor of the 
dynamics of industrial systems. They assume that the 'invisible hand' of market 
competition continually forces new product innovation and keeps the industrial 
systems in a perpetual state of imbalance and adaptation (Storper, 1981: 21). Thomas 
and Le Heron (1975) argue that the dynamics of city systems and regional 
development has a close relationship with the spatial diffusion process of innovation 
(technological gap in the geographical space). The key components of industrial 
systems (corporate organisation, functional relationships and firm's environments) are 
detailed. 
Corporate Organisation 
A modem corporation is characterised as a multi-unit, multi-functional, multi-
locational organisation. It has been a direct challenge to the Marshallian neoclassical 
paradigm which assumes many small firms operating in free markets in which 
management and exchange are costless (Demsetz, 1988: 147). According to 
3. Formal recognition of the appropriateness of this approach came from the International 
Geographical Union in 1976 when it established a Commission on Industrial Systems. 
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Williamson (1975, 1980), the market failure (and the associated need to internalise 
transactions) is a basic precondition of the formation of large corporate organisation. 
Even though it is presupposed that all kinds of market-making activities incur costs, it 
is more efficient, under certain conditions, for a firm to create and use an internal 
market rather than to rely on external market. In pioneering the transaction cost 
theory and internalisation model, Coase ( 1937) recognises the corporation as a 
planning unit in which internal management supersedes the price mechanism and 
minimises transaction costs.4 Indeed, Casson (1983: 6) declares that 'without 
supersession of the price mechanism there would be no firms'. 
According to Casson (1982, 1983), increases in the internalisation of 
transactions are due to: 
(a) the high cost of licensing unpatentable know-how; 
(b) economies of internalising long-term contracts; 
(c) exploitation of monopolistic profits (price control); 
(d) by-passing government regulations and transfer pricing; and 
(e) improvement of quality control. 
Internalisation continues until the costs of running the internal market becomes large 
relative to the transaction costs in the open market. Thus, the development of 
managerial practices and improvement of transport and communication technology 
has boosted company size. 
Chandler (1977) contributed to the development of organisation theory by 
elaborating the mechanisms which create multi-divisional structures, business 
diversification and their integration. According to McDermott and Taylor (1982), the 
form of corporate organisation is strongly influenced by three key variables -
environment, technology and managerial (or organisational) structure. The initial 
4. The transaction cost model offers a partial framework. It is because of this that the first goal of 
corporate organisation is to produce commodities and to add value rather than save transaction cost 
(Sayer and Walker, 1992: 111). 
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force underlying the formation of a corporate organisation 1s technological 
development. Modem technology has specialised work tasks. The well-organised 
corporation is essential to undertaking the extensive planning necessary for 
combining specialised work tasks (Thomas and Le Heron, 1975: 248; Storper, 1981: 
22). Organisational structures are developed in order to coordinate decisions taken by 
different groups of people involved in diverse business activities. These functional 
areas include production, marketing, research, personnel and finance. Williamson 
(1975) identifies two different organisational structures - unitary and multidivisional 
forms. The former organises a firm into different functional departments and the 
latter is developed when the firm expands its business into different parts of product 
range (see Casson, 1983: 19). 
Thompson (1967) identified three types of internal interdependences between 
units - pooled, sequential and reciprocal. Later, Lorsch and Allen (1973) applied 
Thompson's typology to three major organisational structures - the conglomerate, the 
vertically-integrated, and the large single-product firm. According to Lorsch and 
Allen, enterprises pursuing a conglomerate strategy typically exhibit 'pooled' 
interdependence.5 Vertically-integrated firms, however, display a greater degree of 
'sequential' inter-unit connections where the output of one plant in the organisation is 
the input for another plant. The strongest interdependence relationships - 'reciprocal 
interdependence' - are to be found in a large single-product firm (see Dicken, 1976; 
Erickson, 1980). Thus, a particular interconnection between units creates a 
corresponding organisational structure. The organisational structure of corporation is 
understood as the formal allocation of work roles and the mechanisms to control and 
integrate work activities including those which cross organisational boundaries 
(Child, 1971 cited by Marshall, 1979: 534). 
5. As each units in conglomerate structure operates within different product market environments, there 
is little or no direct connection between them. 
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Organisation theory has further expanded its boundary from intra-
organisational connections to inter-organisational relations (Evan, 1976 cited by 
Watts, 1978: 217). The 'open system' view of organisations has emerged because the 
environmental uncertainties of a firm arise from other organisations (Wood, 1978: 
146). Oligopoly theory highlights inter-firm organisational behaviour, especially, in 
industrial sectors where a few firms account for a high proportion of sectoral output 
(Watts, 1978: 215). Each member in oligopoly relations takes into account its 
competitor's behaviour in its decision-making. The responsiveness of its competitor's 
decision-making and internal adaption requires the adoption of organisational 
strategies which accommodate change. 
Industrial geographers have transformed the aspatial organisational model by 
highlighting the spatially dispersed physical entities, such as factories, offices and 
research facilities (Wood, 1978: 147). The spatial expansion of corporate 
organisations is also explained by the same rationale used in explaining the formation 
of large business organisation. Theorists assume that every operational unit which 
executes a different function within a corporate organisation will be dispersed in 
space to meet their locational requirements. The implications of this spatial 
organisation are evident in the corporation's impact on uneven regional development 
(Hayter and Watts, 1983: 163). The distribution of operating units, their spatial 
adjustments, and the geographical concentration of control functions has a direct 
influence on spatial linkage patterns and regional employment. 
As branch plants have played a principal role in industrial growth in non-
metropolitan areas, much emphasis was focused on identifying regional economic 
impacts. There is, however, no concensus on the regional economic impacts of 
externally-controlled branch plants. Generally, few propositions are accepted (see 
Erickson, 1980: 492): First, It is hard to expect to establish self-sustaining and self-
generating economic growth in the host area because a branch plant does not have 
decision-making authority. Secondly, job creation by branch plants are limited to low 
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paying jobs, especially for females. Thirdly, the multiplier effects and agglomeration 
economies are not substantial because branch plants are unlikely to produce and sell 
locally. Finally, branch plants are likely to be closed in times of recession. 
Functional Relationships 
Active circulation of resources, goods and services are essential for successful 
business and regional economic development. Corporate organisations transmitting 
these economic elements bind regions together, and form a hierarchical system 
through their intra-organisational linkages. Intra-firm linkages are essential for a 
systems model because they imprint the corporation's hierarchical structures and 
growth processes on different levels of the space economy. Hence, linkage analysis is 
an essential instrument for defining industrial systems and analysing the spatial 
structure of modem economies (Tomqvist, 1977: 158). Thus, most studies of linkage 
analysis sought to compare the regional economic impact of different kinds of 
business organisations. 
Increasingly, concern has been given to non-equity arrangements (inter-firm 
alliances and networks), such as licensing and subcontracting. This is a reflection of 
greater contractual transactions between firms, which is well exemplified by the 
hierarchical subcontracting system in Japan. It combines giant business groups with 
multi-layered subcontracting networks of small firms. Thus, Dicken (1990) argues, 
quite correctly, that the industrial geography can only progress when the study on 
very large enterprises is integrated with that of smaller firms. According to Sayer and 
Walker (1992: 138-139), inter-firm networking has many advantages over 
internalisation or externalisation on free market: 
(a) dispersion of financial burden and risk; 
(b) quick reaction to changing market conditions; 
(c) easy entrance into new markets; 
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(d) reduction of management costs; 
(e) autonomy maintenance; and 
(f) easy access to diverse technologies and skills. 
Many research results derived from linkage analysis show that intra-regional 
and city-hinterland relationships assumed in many spatial economic theories have 
been dissolved and replaced by new connections (Storper, 1981: 24). Within a 
modem industrial society, the periphery is linked to the core by information and 
personnel of the corporate system and not by proximity. Indeed, the formation of 
large business organisations has greatly reduced the spatial restrictions on industrial 
location in a variety of activities - production and services (e.g., finance, insurance, 
real estate and transportation). These research results are contrary to the conceptions 
of growth pole, export-base, and leading-lagging sector theories (Walker and Storper, 
1981: 490). 
Firm's Environment and Geographical Scales 
The dictionary meaning of a firm's environment connotes 'all types of 
external influences' (Hamilton and Linge, 1979: 11). As any part of the external 
environment can be internal there are no fixed boundaries. Indeed, the corporation 
grows through the process of internalising part of the external environment. 
Ownership or contractual relationship, therefore, seems to be the best indices for 
distinguishing a firm from its environment. Yet they do not resolve the three 
fundamental questions raised by Hayter and Watts (1983: 158-159) which still have 
not been resolved: 'how is the firm distinguished from its environment; what part of 
the 'total' environment of firms under investigation should be incorporated; and how 
are firm-environment relations to be treated analytically?' 
A recurrent problem is different interpretation of what constitutes a firm's 
environment. Classical location theorists considered that it comprised locally-
endowed natural resources, cheap labour, markets, and the location of competitive 
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firms. Conversely, behavioural analysts identified the environment as the location 
decision-maker's perceptual space. Apart from classifying space in terms of 
geographical scales, systems analysts did not provide any environmental 
characteristics because the separation of environment and enterprise was impractical. 
Institutional analysts (or organisational theorists) comprehended the environment in 
terms of the power networks of business organisations and other major institutions, 
such as government. Lastly, the structuralists regarded the environment as being 
coterminous with labour market conditions. 
Considering the extreme conceptual broadness of the environment, it may be 
better to follow the systems model and identify it as 'all types of external influences'. 
The real problem, however, lies in having to filter the chaotic conditions and study the 
environment as a researchable object. There seems no alternative but to confine the 
environment to a few directly-linked external institutions, such as government, parent 
firm, subcontractor, financial institution and rival company. For instance, much of 
the environmental impact, especially in Newly Industrialising Economies (NIEs), is 
mediated by government through its policy-making processes. In the case of 
subcontractors, most external pressures are transmitted through their parent firms. 
The diverse external labour markets - a critical feature of a firm's environment - are 
conceptualised as institutional entities because labour is realised within a business 
structure. Thus, the labour market is seen as being coterminous with the firms 
associated with hierarchical production organisations. Taylor and Thrift (1983) have 
illuminated this problem by identifying interdependencies between large business 
organisations and various kinds of smaller firms (the dualistic economic structure 
model). Consequently, this study recognises the environment as the power relations 
between and within diverse business organisations and government. 
Another related problem is the identification of the mechanisms bridging the 
twin domains of industrial geography - business organisations and their 
environments. Industrial geographers have largely regarded the interaction processes 
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as a 'black box', and conceded that the research area belongs to other disciplines. 
This study recognises that the large business organisations and government are the 
main institutional power bases which characterise the geographical patterns 
underlying the Korean economy and labour markets. Government is considered as 
the key institution force which 'transmits' almost all external influences and creates 
the environment of business organisations. Conversely, large business organisations 
constitute the business environment of smaller firms. 
The final issue devolves on which part of the total environment or 
geographical scale should be incorporated in the investigation. The rapid 
internationalisation of economic activities makes the answer to this question more 
difficult. Wood (1981: 416) criticised the explosive expansion in the geographical 
scope of research: 
If ... we must study the whole world economic order as a prelude to 
the explanation of any specific location problem, it may not result in 
very much progress in the field! 
Although there is some truth in Wood's criticism, the geographical horizon must be 
wider! 
Further, this study recogmses that varying types of business organisations 
exploit, and are affected by, their corresponding labour market, financial sources and 
sales markets. Indeed, Taylor and Thrift (1982a) and Rimmer (1986) have recognised 
a number of spatial gaps in the sequences of corporate growth: neighbourhood, 
suburban, regional, metropolitan, national and global gaps. They have highlighted 
that access to different financial sources has been the determining factor behind them. 
Their research results suggest that a particular type of corporate organisation has a 
limited range and provides important insights into the geographical scale appropriate 
for analysis. Thus, the world economic system should receive greater emphasis than 
local subcontracting companies in discussing MNCs. 
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2.2 Internationalisation of Capital and Business Activities 
As a nation's economy is internationalised, a comprehensive analytical 
framework covering national, regional and local economic problems from a world 
economy perspective has become essential. The internationalisation process 
accompanies the intensification of interactions between countries with different 
sovereignty, socio-economic conditions, and cultural and political backgrounds. 
Given diverse national business environments, the fundamental question is how to 
accommodate the interplay between internal forces and overseas pressures. In 
tackling this question, a series of research issues are raised: how is capital 
internationalised; how are the circuits of capital transformed by the 
internationalisation process; how has the internationalisation of developing countries 
occurred; how have internationalisation policies sponsored by government affected 
corporate growth, industrial structure and location; and what is the logic of direct 
foreign investment by a developing country in advanced capitalist countries? 
Internationalisation of Capital 
The nature of the internationalisation process has been disputed by enterprise 
analysts and structuralists (or Marxists). Whereas the former concentrate on business 
management (micro-level), the latter focus on broad processes of capital accumulation 
and crisis (macro-level) (Harvey, 1975; Luxemburg, 1972). According to Bryan 
( 1987) these differences can be reconciled by assuming production can be relocated 
by changing sites. What moves is not the social activity associated with production 
but money (loans and investment) and commodities (the factory). Transnational 
corporations are the institutional manifestation of a capital movement process which 
has its own underlying logic. Indeed, according to Bryan (1987: 259) 'the 
internationalisation of capital should not be explained in terms of the decisions of 
corporate executives'. 
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Palloix (1977), a most influential theorist, identifies three separate circuits of 
capital corresponding to three historical stages in the development of the world 
economy: 
(a) Commodity capital: The first stage of the circuit of capital 
money takes only a commodity form. This phase is 
characterised by 'comparative capitalism' based on the 
mercantile form of simple commodity circulation. 
(b) Money capital: In the second phase of circuits of capital, 
represented as 'imperialism', money takes the form of 
international investment (restricted to the mining and 
agricultural sectors) and the export of capital (loans). 
(c) Productive capital: Transnational production corporations play 
a key role in the third stage of capital movement. This circuit 
accompanies the process of international labour differentiation 
(or the new international division of labour). 
Subsequently, attention has been extended to the massive growth of transnational 
finance capital. As exemplified by the Euro-currency markets, this type of capital has 
been influential in industrial restructuring occurring on a global scale (Fagan, 1990: 
650; Jenkins, 1984: 43). Palloix's intention was not merely to identify the functional 
direction of capital movement, but to connect the process of accumulation with the 
changing spatial structures of industrial production and class relations (structural 
analysis). The internationalisation of capital, therefore, is based upon the dynamics of 
the system itself, rather than the influence of multinational corporations. 
Criticising the New International Division of Labour concept6, Fagan (1989: 
671) asserts that an understanding of all circuits of capital is necessary to explain 
industrial restructuring at international and national scales. Four fundamental 
problems are identified: 
(a) Too much emphasis on capital searching for new sources of 
absolute surplus value in the less industrialised periphery. 
6. For detailed information on the NIDL concept see page 45 of this chapter. 
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(b) Overstating the role of technological change and hypermobility 
of productive capital in searching for lower-cost sites, and 
underplaying the role of the flexible production system. 7 
(c) Trade, finance and state regulations are of equal importance in 
the restructuring of production. 
Above all, (d) it neglects the new global finance system. 
Pagan's (1989) assertions are well supported by an empirical case study of 
BHP Ltd, an Australian conglomerate. The emergence of such a diversified company 
has made capital movements more complex and links between profit rates in any 
given sectors and geographical markets more indirect. Large loans from the United 
States, for example, have pressured the company to increase its business there to 
service its borrowings. Thus, 'the future livelihood of workers in Australia's steel 
manufacturing regions is determined only partly by absolute levels of profit in 
steelmaking' (Fagan, 1989: 673). 
Table 1.1 applies the circuits of capital model to Korea. Initially, Korea was 
the colonial commodity market of Japan (1910-1945). After liberation, Korea 
developed an import-substitution industry by introducing (money) capital from 
advanced capitalist countries (1946-1960). Then, Korea had to develop an export 
industry to repay the borrowed money. As the nation had only limited technology and 
accumulated capital, the attraction of direct foreign investment (productive capital) 
was imperative for the expansion of export industry. Finally, when the trade 
regulations were strengthened by advanced capitalist countries, Korean firms had to 
relocate their production sites to the 'core' despite having few comparative 
advantages. Finance capital supplied by advanced capitalist countries has played an 
important role in the relocation of these activities. A similar rationale can be used to 
explain developments in late-industrialising countries such as Thailand, Malaysia and 
Indonesia. Thus, as recognised by Palloix (1977), the capital can only move from 
'core' capitalist countries when 'peripheral' countries are ready to respond to their 
7. As the introduction of flexible production system adopts a fundamental, new production technology 
and labour process organisation, the NIDL model is not well suited in the new capital accumulation 
regime (flexible specialisation). 
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proposition. The identification of inter-relationships between core and periphery, 
therefore, are essential to an understanding of the internationalisation of capital. 
Table 1.1 Internationalisation of capital and Industrialisation 
Phases of capital movement and internationalisation 
Circuits of capital Commodity capital Money capital Productive capital Finance capital 
Advanced capitalist Trade Foreign loan Outward DFl Inward DFl 
countries 
Newly industrialising Colonial market Import-substitution Export-oriented Outward DFl 
countries (Korea) industrialisation industrialisation 
Late-industrialising Colonial market Semi-colonial Import-substitution Export-oriented 
countries market industrialisation industrialisation 
Internationalisation of Business Activities 
As corporations expand, their growth is stifled by the size of the domestic 
market. They are forced to spread their business activities into the international arena. 
Given that a typical developing country is characterised by over-population, a small 
domestic market, underdevelopment of related industries and limited capital, the 
critical issue devolves on what sort of strategies can be pursued? Thus, the nature of 
the internationalisation process is quite diverse between countries at different stages 
of economic development. As most studies have commenced by identifying the 
different characteristics of trade and direct foreign investment, the relationship 
between exports and investment in overseas operations has been neglected (Irie, 1983: 
96). 
Another important issue 1s how to comprehend both changing industrial 
structures and corporate growth patterns when a nation's economy 1s 
internationalised. If government subsidises a particular industry for export promotion 
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purposes its decision may adversely affect other sectors. As individual industrial 
sectors have different locational requirements government policy will create uneven 
regional growth (McConnell, 1986: 480). Once a nation's economy is integrated into 
the world economic system, it is largely influenced by global restructuring. If a 
government's labour-intensive industrialisation program is threatened by competition 
from other developing countries, the nation's economic structure must be transformed 
by the creation of capital-intensive or technology-intensive industries which require 
greater economies of scale. Given the relatively small domestic market, government 
has to develop foreign markets more energetically. Thus, the dynamic pattern of 
industrial structure, corporate growth and regional development are substantially 
influenced by the internationalisation of a nation's economy. 
Theorists have identified the multinational enterprise (MNE) as the key actor 
in internationalisation. It is recognised as 'an organisation which uses its internal 
market to produce and distribute products in an efficient manner in situations where a 
regular market fails to operate' (Kindleberger, 1969; Rugman, 1982: 11). As noted, 
Coase (1937) recognised that internal markets are generally more efficient than 
external markets (Rugman, 1982: 13). The first application of Coase's internalisation 
model in an international context was made by Hymer (1976). 
Contrary to the ideas of internalisation theorists, other researchers stress that 
inter-organisational relations (or contractual arrangements) are equally important in 
understanding the role of multinational corporation in the internationalisation process. 
As explained by Rugman ( 1982: 14-15): 
... contractual arrangements arise only when the risk of dissipation 
of the firm-specific advantage of the MNE is low. This occurs 
when the MNE is producing a standardized product or when resale 
is difficult To a large extent licensing occurs when the 
requirements for internalization are weakest. Once we have a 
theory of the MNE we also have a theory of licensing; that which 
need not be internalized can be licensed (or exported, if the 
conditions for free trade were to hold). 
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This comment provides important insights into the internationalisation process within 
the Newly Industrialising Countries, such as Korea. Their multinational enterprises 
have retained monopoly profits by internalising 'firm-specific advantages' and 
widening overseas markets by externalising second-hand technologies. In the 
process, their economies have been internationalised and very large corporations have 
emerged. As Korean firms have only limited firm-specific advantages to internalise 
in world markets compared with their advanced countries' counterparts, inter-
organisational cooperation is a feature of this study. Although the home bases of 
multinational enterprises have been changed markedly by the emergence of Third 
World representatives, the characteristics of the two groups are quite distinctive 
(Taylor and Thrift, 1986). 
Direct Foreign Investment 
With the rise of 'indigenous' multinationals headquartered m Newly 
Industrialising Countries, interest has focused on developing a model which will 
account for their particular brand of internationalisation. Researchers have recognised 
that indigenous Third World multinationals are basically different from their 
developed counterparts. The starting point, however, has always been the experience 
of multinationals domiciled in advanced capitalist countries, particularly the United 
States of America. A new point of departure is necessary because the 
internationalisation of the corporations in Newly Industrialising Countries is very 
different. 
Mainstream theory on direct foreign investment derives its concepts from 
monopolistic advantage, internalisation and eclectic models. Direct foreign 
investment has to overcome a variety of handicaps compared with a corporation with 
its headquarters in the host country - the cost of 'foreignness'. Thus, a corporation's 
direct foreign investment is only feasible when its firm-specific advantages can 
surmount this cost. They can only be realised by internalising them within the 
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corporate organisation as substantial parts of these ownership advantages are non-
saleable - joint production, centralised purchasing, organisational and financial 
economies (Clegg, 1987: 23). Another advantage is a corporation's geographically 
bounded heritage, such as access to natural resources and an abundant highly skilled 
workforce. According to Dunning (1980: 10), many contemporary ownership 
advantages of firms are a reflection of yesterday's national (or locational) advantages. 
Although Vernon's product life cycle concept made a great contribution to the 
development of direct foreign investment theory, it did not account for direct 
investment in advanced capitalist countries by corporations based in the Newly 
Industrialising Economies. 
In a bid to compensate for the weaknesses of extant models Dunning 
developed his eclectic model by incorporating the monopolistic advantage, 
internalisation and location concepts developed by other researchers. Its application 
predicts that a corporation's engagement in direct foreign investment stems from: its 
ownership advantages over other foreign firms; the relative efficiency of its internal 
transactions versus external exchanges; and the relative location costs of home versus 
host-country production (Clegg, 1987: 22). Yet it leaves many outstanding issues: 
(a) how is the direct foreign investment of corporations 
headquartered in Newly Industrialising Economies (NIEs) in 
advanced capitalist countries to be interpreted; 
(b) how do corporations with headquarters in NlEs manage their 
overseas business without the basic precondition of extant 
direct foreign investment theory - firm-specific advantages; 
and 
(c) how a synthetic model can be developed to account varying 
types of direct foreign investment activities of different-sized 
firms domiciled in advanced capitalist and peripheral capitalist 
countries? 
Dunning's eclectic model also starts by recognising firm-specific advantages which 
are not applicable in Newly Industrialising Economies. 
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Nevertheless, his eclectic model provides a most useful exploratory tool for 
identifying and comprehending different kinds of direct foreign investment activities 
(Dunning, 1981; Taylor and Thrift, 1986). It incorporates three noted advantages: 
ownership, internalisation and location. Hence, three major different types of direct 
foreign investment activities can be distinguished: 
(a) firm-specific advantages common to multinationals in 
advanced capitalist countries which surmount the cost of 
'foreignness'; 
(b) firm-specific advantages which do not exceed the cost of 
'foreignness' but can be compensated by exploiting the 
efficiency of a corporation's internal transactions (i.e., 
internalisation advantages) stemming from scale economies; 
and 
(c) locational advantages which are the only recourse for smaller 
firms without scale economies and unable to compensate for 
their 'foreignness' with firm-specific and internalisation 
advantages. 
Consequently, this model implies that a nation's foreign direct investment activities 
are the unique combination of ownership, location and internalisation advantages. 
Dunning's model, despite its usefulness, does not give any clear explanation 
of direct foreign investment in advanced capitalist countries by corporations from 
Newly Industrialising Economies. They have only limited advantages over their 
counterparts. Their sole strategy has been to transfer domestic comparative 
advantages to the advanced capitalist host countries through intra-organisational 
transactions (i.e., by supplying cheaper parts from home-based subsidiary plants). 
Indeed, the motives behind direct foreign investment by a business organisation with 
headquarters in a Newly Industrialising Economy are not inherent in their ownership 
advantages but in protecting a previously developed foreign export market. Given 
that multinationals from Newly Industrialising Countries have relatively small 
domestic markets, the contraction of foreign markets is directly related to their 
fortunes. These corporations, therefore, have to be conscious of probable future risks 
and build up skills to minimise the expenses of 'foreignness'. 
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2.3 Flexible Specialisation and Subcontracting 
Since the early 1980s, industrial geographers have been engaged in a fervent 
debate over 'flexible specialisation' and its implications for economic and spatial 
change (Rogerson, 1992). A burgeoning literature on flexible specialisation 
highlights major qualitative changes are occurring m advanced and peripheral 
capitalist countries brought about by the adoption of new technologies, labour 
processes and types of inter-firm connections. This new production system is seen as 
the key to the shift from a Fordist regime to a post-Fordist world (e.g., Sabel, 1982; 
Sabel and Piore, 1984). The assertion has been criticised by a minority of researchers 
studying North American and European economies (e.g., Murray, 1987) and Japan 
(e.g., Dore, 1987). As the Japanese multi-layer subcontracting systems have quite 
different characteristics to 'flexible specialisation' in North America and Europe (e.g., 
Sayer and Walker, 1992) it needs to be considered carefully. 
Flexible Specialisation 
The original concept of flexible specialisation was developed by Sabel' s 
(1982) pioneering research on small-sized engineering firms in the Emilia-Romagna 
area of Italy - the ideal production system for a future industrial society. It is 
distinguished by: multi-tasking skilled labour force and machinery; specialised and 
autonomous small firms; small batch production using the latest technologies; a 
variety of different quality products; diversification of the world markets and 
consumer tastes; faster rates of response to market changes; and spatial concentration 
to permit collaboration among specialised small firms. Compared with the dependent 
subcontracting firm, Sabel (1982) characterised this new type of small firm as an 
autonomous, innovative, flexible, and collaborative entity. Diversifying consumer 
tastes provide niche markets which independent, small firms can penetrate. The 
proportion of flexible, small firms will be increased substantially by supplanting the 
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production of large business enterprises associated with Fordist mass production. 
Changes in the organisation of labour and inter-firm relationships, and the 
modification of machinery are a necessary prerequisite for producing more diverse 
products, minimising downtime during changeovers, and speeding technical 
progress.8 According to Scott (1988: 14) the transformation of production system 
from mass production to flexible specialisation is substantial and has resulted in 
substantial locational changes in North America and Western Europe. In these areas, 
flexible firms prefer to locate in new industrial areas rather than in traditional working 
class communities. Peck's (1990) study on the Australian clothing industry, however, 
finds little evidence of significant technical change. 
Subsequently, researchers have applied the concept of 'flexibility' to large 
firms, subcontracting, employment strategies, delivery systems and labour process 
organisations according to their own specifications (Rogerson, 1992; Kaplinsky, 
1991; Sayer and Walker, 1992: 190). They include: 
(a) Flexibility in output volume (Fiore and Sable, 1984); 
(b) Product flexibility, allowing the firm to change its product 
configuration over the short run without marked losses of 
efficiency (Storper and Scott, 1988); 
(c) Flexible employment (Atkinson, 1984; Boyer, 1988); 
(d) Flexible working practices (Atkinson, 1984); 
(e) Flexible machinery (Kaplinsky, 1984); 
(f) Flexibility in restructuring (Fiore and Sabel, 1984); and 
(g) Flexible organizational forms, e.g., networks of specialist 
producers (Beccatini, 1978; Scott, 1988a; Sabel, 1989). 
This conceptual ambiguity (more correctly, confusion) needs to be resolved to 
prevent further confusion on this key issue. Not surprisingly, the concept of flexible 
specialisation has overlapped with subcontracting. Indeed, many authors, including 
Kaplinsky (1991) and Rogerson (1992), do not distinguish between the two types of 
8. Die changeover time in body presses in Japanese automobile manufacturing plants fell from more 
than 8 hours to 2 minutes (Kaplinsky, 1991: 14). 
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production systems. Rather, they include subcontracting within the boundary of 
flexible production system by characterising it as inter-firm (or organisational) 
flexibility. According to Rogerson (1992), for example, flexible specialisation has 
been widely diffused to developing countries as it is equated with the spread of 
subcontracting and Just-In-Time systems by Japanese subsidiaries. This integration 
of subcontracting into flexible specialisation systems, however, is inappropriate 
because the two concepts have different historical contexts. A distinction between the 
two production systems is essential in this study because they have implications in 
studying changes in economic geography within Newly Industrialising Economies. 
Fortunately, Sayer and Walker (1992) make a clear distinction between the two 
concepts. Multi-level subcontracting structure in Japan is quite distinct from flexible 
specialisation and cannot be usefully subsumed under Fordism (mass production) or 
post-Fordism (flexible production). 
Sabel's description of firms m the Emilian economy as post-Fordist is 
inappropriate 'because they were never Fordist, or because they are still characterised 
by variants of a Fordist labour process' (Murray, 1987: 91). According to Murray 
(1987), Sabel did not attempt to look at all small firms but concentrated on Emilia's 
most 'progressive' businesses. Further, 'the massive companies which dominate the 
national economy have neither withered away nor been converted into cottage 
workshops' (Murray, 1987: 86). Nevertheless, Fordism in the strictest sense is not as 
large as one might imagine. In 1982, for example, Littler (1985: 19) noted only 0.7 
million workers (3.4 per cent) of the 20.4 million labour force in Britain were 
allocated to the 'Fordist' mass production assembly line. Thus, the concept of 
Fordist-production has to be applied restrictively to the manufacturing of complex 
standardised products, such as cars and televisions, and not to the simple mass 
assembly products, such as ball-point pens. 
There are many border line cases between flexible specialisation and 
subcontracting but the production systems have unique characteristics. The former is 
37 
characterised by intra-firm flexibility (within both large and small firms) and 
collaboration among autonomous small firms. Conversely, the latter is characterised 
by inter-firm flexibility and unequal relationships between large enterprises and 
dependent small firms. Where flexible specialisation is well developed 
subcontracting is not required. The converse also holds. Indeed, in Japan and Korea, 
where hierarchical subcontracting structures are well developed, flexible 
specialisation is not widespread. This observation is supported by Kaplinsky' s (1991: 
68) research on Sunnyface Corporation, a garment firm in Cyprus, which emphasises 
that the 'transition to flexible specialisation is likely to be uneven at the global level'. 
Further, the Ford Corporation, for instance, could not succeed in implanting 
Japanese-style work practices in its British factories because of their multi-ethnic 
workforce and opposition from the trade unions (Littler, 1985: 26). Also, Japanese 
overseas production plants have been forced to mix its distinctive style of labour 
organisation with Western ingredients because of resistance to paternalism and close 
inter-firm ties. The adoption of a particular production system or labour organisation 
has been strongly influenced by a nation's level of economic development, labour 
market structure, union movement and cultural heritage. Thus, superior productivity 
in particular countries is 'not so much a question of their relative commitments to 
mass production or flexible specialisation' but to their adaptability to the broader 
environmental characteristics (Sayer and Walker, 1992: 223). 
These critiques suggest that any application of 'industrial district' concept, 
which is based on flexible specialisation, in a Korean context requires great caution. 9 
Flexible theorists find the rationale for the emergence of industrial districts in the 
transition from Fordism to post-Fordism. They argue that the intensification of 
flexible specialisation results in vertical disintegration (or specialisation of work 
tasks) and increases inter-firm exchanges. This transformation, in tum, leads to the 
9. The term 'industrial district' denotes a locally coordinated and well-articulated economic system 
which displays substantial collaboration between autonomous, innovative, specialised units, 
particularly small finns (Amin and Robins, 1990: 21). 
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locational convergence and spatial agglomeration of individual small firms (Storper 
and Scott, 1989). Indeed, the emergence of 'industrial districts' relates to the need of 
quick and effective response to the ever diversifying and volatile market (Sabel, 1989: 
53). 
The agglomeration of small firms in specific areas is common in Korea, but it 
is quite different from the industrial district based on flexible specialisation. The 
Korean phenomenon stems from close interactions with its major parent firm rather 
than interactions between specialised small firms. Most Korean subcontractors, as 
noted, are still low-skilled, labour-intensive, and heavily dependent, particularly in 
locational decision-making, on their major firms. Thus, the metropolitan 
reagglomeration of firms which dispersed during the expansion of branch-plants has 
been strongly influenced by the intensification of hierarchical subcontracting 
structures in Korea. 
Subcontracting 
Most North American and European-based researchers have concentrated on 
industrial restructuring within organisations associated with new technologies and 
flexible labour organisations. Less attention has been paid to major restructuring at 
the inter-firm level which is not necessarily tied to the new manufacturing technology 
and hierarchical subcontracting production associated with just-in-time systems. Yet, 
inter-firm flexibility is no less important than intra-firm flexibility. Superficially, the 
two systems seem to result in a similar outcome. Their effects on labour 
restructuring, industrial location and productivity, however, are quite different. In 
marked contrast to flexible specialisation, the subcontracting system uses a variety of 
labour and is characterised by unequal business relationships between large 
enterprises and small firms. 
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Many research results on Japan's subcontracting system attribute the nation's 
high productivity in manufacturing production to its exceptionally well-organised, 
inter-firm production system. Its subcontracting system is characterised by a 
vertically disintegrated, but highly organised, multi-layer production structure. 
According to Sayer and Walker (1992: 213) there is no other comparable capitalist 
country which has an identical production system. They highlight the unexpected 
combination of mass production and vertical disintegration (subcontracting or 
relational contracting) which are inflexible themselves. Although not identical, Korea 
has a similar subcontracting structure to Japan. Indeed, no other country is closer to 
Japan's industrial structure with its large business conglomerates and multi-layer 
subcontractors. Thus, Korea has a different production system, labour process, labour 
market structure and locational pattern to advanced capitalist countries in North 
America and Europe. 
Generally, subcontracting refers to a situation where an independent firm 
undertakes the processing of materials, parts, components and commodities to the 
specification of the order-placing firm (Holmes, 1984: 7). Typically, subcontracting 
is distinguished by 'organisational', 'persistent' and 'cooperative' relationships 
(SMIB, 1989: 16-22). Highlighting the close interrelationship between parent firm 
and subcontractor, Minato (1985: 4) characterised the arrangement as 'quasi-internal 
organisation' or 'semi-hierarchical integration'. 
Cooperative agreements between assembly firms and parts-supplying firms 
have become an essential ingredient of business success. Paradoxically, labour 
process theorists have considered subcontracting as a marginal and archaic feature of 
advanced capitalism which would be replaced by modernised factory production (or · 
Fordist production system) through continued rationalisation and centralization of 
production and capital. Consequently, subcontracting has been neglected by 
economic theorists (Friedman, 1977: 118; Rubery and Wilkinson, 1981: 124; Holmes, 
1984: 1-2). Contrary to their observation, however, subcontracting has not only 
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persisted but expanded, as witnessed in Japan, Korea and even Western advanced 
capitalist countries. 
Parent firms use subcontractors to: (a) economise on capital and labour; (b) 
exploit lower wages and use scattered capital and labour resources; 10 (c) take 
advantage of the subcontractors' special technology; (d) use subcontractors as a buffer 
against business fluctuations; and ( e) follow the government's economic dictates 
(Watanabe, 1971; Lawson, 1992). By using subcontractors, parent firms have been 
able to concentrate on higher value-added and more innovative sectors and to enlarge 
their production capacity. Moreover, parents benefit from the lower commodity price 
of subcontractors and an ability to meet peak demands without keeping redundant 
capacity during off-peak periods. On the other hand, entrepreneurs in small 
businesses can reduce barriers in establishing their businesses and securing stable 
sales markets. They can be supported by investment capital, production facilities and 
technologies from their parent firms. 
The development of subcontracting system (associated with the just-in-time 
system) has extended the division of labour beyond individual workplaces to inter-
firm levels and, even entire production systems. Its effect on the spatial division of 
labour and industrial location are quite different from flexible specialisation system. 
Whereas the inter-firm relationship in subcontracting is dependent, it is autonomous 
in flexible specialisation. Further, subcontracting exploits a different range of labour 
when associated with a hierarchical production organisation. As orders to 
subcontractors are small and frequent, suppliers have to deliver several times a day 
when the just-in-time system is adopted by parent firms. Ideally, parts are delivered 
to the particular assembly line where they are needed to reduce the costs of handling 
and storage. The system allows a marked reduction of the labour force and can 
10. Contrary to general images of Japan, lifetime employment is extremely limited in subcontracting 
company. They uses the greater proportion of female workers and lower paid labourers, up to 40 per 
cent lower than in the major firms. Due to these cost saving factors Nissan purchased components at 
30 per cent cheaper than those bought by British Leyland and Ford (adapted from Sayer and Walker, 
1992: 176). 
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eliminate the need for warehousing (Sayer and Walker, 1992: 173-174). Given the 
need for frequent and on-schedule delivery, geographical proximity between parent 
firms and their suppliers is a prerequisite for the just-in-time system. It results in 
localised, complex and multi-layered industrial agglomeration. 
2.4 Labour Market Segmentation and Spatial Division of Labour 
The division of labour equates with the specialisation of work tasks either 
between individual employees within factories or large groups of personnel within 
branches of an industry. This concept has both technical and social connotations. 
The technical division of labour is found within the workplaces, while the social 
division is created by inter-firm exchanges mediated by markets. Different degrees in 
the division of labour depends upon the desired volume of output, which, in tum, 
hinges on the size of the product market (Littler, 1985: 14). Thus, the concept has 
been blurred with the emergence of post-Fordist production regime which is 
characterised by small-lot, multi-product production. While labour has been divided 
into specialised work tasks, it must be integrated for the production process. Thus, 
work organisation (or production system) integrates these specialised work tasks 
(Sayer and Walker, 1992). 
In theory, the dual labour market is segmented into an internal market (or 
primary sector) and an external market (secondary sector). The segmentation concept 
is largely based on the assumption of homogeneity within the diversified labour 
market (Morrison, 1990). Within it the internal labour market is characterised by 
stable employment, high wages and good working conditions. Conversely, the 
external labour market is distinguished by unskilled or semi-skilled workers, low 
wages, poor working conditions and low job security (Morrison, 1990; Peck, 1989). 
Internal labour is used in producing for a stable market while external labour is used 
in producing for a variable and unstable product market. The former is most 
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developed in large firm sector, while the latter is dominant in the small firm sector 
(Morrison, 1990: 497). 
As the internal labour market provides stable employment and human capital 
promotion through on-the-job training, it is characterised not by wage competition, 
but by job competition (Throw, 1975 cited by Morrison, 1990: 497). This implies that 
job mobility is very low. In both Japan and Korea, this situation is affected by the 
oligopolistic market structures. Labour movement between competitive large 
corporations is almost negligible. In contrast, the external labour market is 
distinguished by short job duration associated with wage competition and market 
fluctuation. Thus, the division of labour is largely influenced by type of production 
system or labour organisation (i.e., the subcontracting system and flexible 
specialisation). In both Japan and Korea, the pattern of labour market segmentation is 
largely 'social' whereas in the West it is 'technical'. Contrary to the assumptions of 
many Western observers, individual job mobility in Japan is approximately the same 
as in other industrial capitalist countries. The much publicized phenomenon of 
lifetime employment covers only 20 per cent of the nation's workforce. Most are key 
workers - invariably male - in major companies (Sayer and Walker, 1992: 219-221). 
The rigidity of lifetime employment contracts for some men is complemented by the 
flexibility of female employment arising from the pressure on women to leave their 
employment on marriage. 
There are differing explanations of the causes underlying the creation of 
labour market segmentation. Orthodox economists attribute it to factors outside the 
labour market, such as education and training. Segmentation theorists, however, 
focus attention on the quality of jobs rather than the quality of workers (Peck, 1989: 
45). According to Peck (1989: 49) the key factors influencing the process of labour 
market segmentation are: 
(a) labour supply (e.g., gender division, ethnicity, trade union 
restriction); 
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(b) labour demand (e.g., technical requirements, product market 
conditions, employer's labour process control strategies, and 
industrial structure); and 
(c) state policies (e.g., welfare prov1s10n, taxation, support for 
training system, differentiation within the education system). 
Thus, the development of division of labour is influenced not by single variable but 
by multiple factors and their complex relations. 
Labour market segmentation does not result in any clear spatial division. 
Workers who occupy completely different segments of the labour market are found in 
the same workplace. The concept of segmentation itself 'poses something of a 
challenge to the notion of the spatial division of labour as it highlights the 
heterogeneity of local/regional labour pools' (Peck, 1989: 50). Thus, hierarchical 
subcontracting and associated just-in-time practices (particularly in Korea and Japan) 
create industrial agglomeration in a specific areas. 
According to Morrison ( 1990: 518), -three different types of (spatial) labour 
markets can be identified. The 'local' labour market is defined by the catchment of 
individual operating units while the 'spatial' market is defined by the set of local 
labour catchment from which a multilocational corporation draws its employees. On 
the other hand, the 'regional' labour market is characterised by the collective 
catchment or travel-to-work area of all firms operating within a functional urban area. 
Most geographers have concentrated on the 'spatial' labour market because it 
provides a clearer explanation of the 'spatial division of labour' mechanisms whereby 
large corporate organisations exploit the uneven distribution of surplus labour 
(Morrison, 1990: 518). Massey (1986), however, comprehends the 'spatial division 
of labour' as having a collective meaning. The significance of space in labour 
segmentation does not lie in the notion of the internally homogeneous travel-to-work 
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area, but in its influence upon the manner in which the diverse causal factors are 
revealed in different places (Peck, 1989: 55).11 
New International Division of Labour 
The increasing internationalisation of production after the Second World War 
has expanded the concept of 'spatial division of labour' to a global scale. The most 
influential authors of the concept of New International Division of Labour (NIDL), 
Frobel, Heinrichs and Kreye (1980), concentrated on the shift of industrial production 
from 'core' to 'periphery' of the global economy.12 The transnational corporation is 
considered as the major vehicle for internationalising production and developing an 
international division of labour. Frobel and others argue the rising cost of production 
in the core economies led to the TNCs relocating their production facilities and 
searching for new sources of cheap and unmilitarised labour. Together with the 
desire of capital to increase profits, three preconditions have played essential roles in 
the creation of the NIDL (Castles, 1979; Jacobson, Wickham and Wickham, 1979; 
Jenkins, 1984; Dicken, 1991): 
(a) The breakdown of traditional industry and social structures in 
Third World countries which provides cheap and abundant 
labour supply; 
(b) The international fragmentation and specialisation of 
production process technology which permit the use of 
unskilled workers; and 
(c) Innovations in transportation and communication technology. 
Basically the model assumes free trade which is best exemplified by free trade zones. 
11. These factors include: technical requirements, industrial structure, product market conditions, trade 
union activity, state policies and cultural systems. 
12. Stephen Hymer, a pioneer of the transnational corporation theory, is considered the first to use the 
term NIDL (Dicken, 1991:124). The concept of NIDL is in contrast to that of the 'classical' 
international division of labour which denotes that manufacturing is carried out at the core and 
agricultural and mineral raw material production at the periphery of the world economy. As the 
development of NIDL reproduces periphery's dependence on core in a 'new form', it does not mean 
any 'real' development of the Third World (Jacobson, Wickham and Wickham, 1979). 
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Further, the state in Third World countries is considered as a mere collaborator 
m the plans of international capital. Despite its usefulness in explaining 
industrialisation within Newly Industrialising Economies, the dependency theory-
based NIDL model has its own fundamental weaknesses (Castles, 1979: Jacobson, 
Wickham and Wickham, 1979; Jenkins, 1984; Lipietz, 1986). They include: 
(a) Its heavy reliance on the study of 'free trade zones' in Third 
World which represent only part of their economies; 
(b) The rationale of the off-shore production is not only for the 
exploitation of cheap labour in host countries but for the 
smooth industrial restructuring in home countries; 
(c) The thrust of direct foreign investment is to gain access to a 
protected market. (This model totally neglects political factors 
and national markets); 
(d) Direct foreign investment is still dominant in relations between 
advanced capitalist countries rather than between the core and 
periphery of the global economy. 
Finally, cheap labour does not necessarily mean that unit labour costs are lower. 
2.5 Integration of Government in the Analysis of Industrial Geography 
Discussion of the government's role has been relatively neglected by 
industrial geographers despite its enormous influence on the space economy 
(Johnston, 1984; Peet, 1982). This trend has been influenced by the heavy reliance on 
neo-classical economic concepts and the emergence of global corporations. 
Traditionally, government has been perceived as a neutral arbiter in capital-labour 
relations; a common good; and part of the superstructure of production relations (Hay, 
1988: 34-37). As outlined by Johnston (1984: 480-481), the role of government was 
considered as a gatekeeper of the capitalist mode of production: 
The state exists because such an institution is necessary for the 
continued existence of the [capitalist] mode of production. Without 
it, or some similar institution, the mode of production could not 
survive. Capitalism ... is based on competition between investors, 
seeking to reap as much profit as possible. Such competition must 
be governed by rules, otherwise it will be self-defeating. If 
contracts are not honoured, the system collapses .... An independent 
body must ensure that this happens. 
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As Johnston (1984: 476), however, admitted, there have been very few 'true' 
capitalist countries in the real world. Thus, the role of government in market 
economies has been underestimated. Indeed, the government (or state), as a sovereign 
body, has enormous power to affect the location of industry and production. All sorts 
of external influences are filtered by government and transformed through its policy-
making apparatus. In a narrow sense, therefore, government policies are coterminous 
with 'all sorts of external influences' at a national scale. 
Contrary to the anticipated weakness of the government's role with 
internationalisation, its influence on the space economy is still crucial - the nation 
state is still the basic unit of economic activity. Despite the increasing globalisation 
of economic activities, political processes are still confined within national boundaries 
(Bryan, 1987: 254-255). Thus, Third World states still exercise substantial control 
over the operations of MNCs (Jenkins, 1984). Further, labour markets are principally 
bounded and regulated at the national level, despite internal variations and 
international migration. Currencies are almost entirely national and are regulated by 
central banks, capital creation and movement always face national restrictions. These 
factors of production are not highly mobile across national boundaries (Ohlin, 1939). 
Although capitalism has expanded over large portions of the world, fundamental 
tension remains between national boundaries (Sayer and Walker, 1992: 143-144). 
Thus, many light industries in Korea have moved to late-industrialising countries, 
such as Indonesia and the Philippines, to by-pass quota restrictions imposed by 
advanced capitalist countries. Although government influence on the international 
movement of money, service and commodities has been gradually removed it falls 
short of a 'free' movement. The government imposes border controls and other 
indirect measures to regulate movements (Bryan, 1987: 253). 
Also, the government's role as an economic actor rather than a neutral arbiter 
has been enhanced. Between 1902 and 1970, total government expenditure in the 
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United States, according to Carson and others (1973), increased from 7 per cent of 
Gross National Product to over 32 per cent. Further, between 1964 and 1969, 
government-generated jobs accounted for 48 per cent of the net increase in the labour 
force. Shonfield (1965) and Miliband (1973) reported that government influence in 
Great Britain, France and Italy was even greater than in the USA (cited by King and 
Clark, 1978:3). Indeed, King and Clark (1978: 11) argued that government must be 
treated as an 'endogenous' economic agent and be integrated within regional 
development models. Massey (1978) stressed the importance of the British 
Government's Industrial Reorganisation Corporation (IRC) role as a regulator and 
capital supplier in the industrial restructuring of a nation's electronics industry. The 
IRC encouraged firms in declining industrial sectors to re-allocate their capital to 
more profitable lines of production through mergers and subsidies of particular 
sectors. Mergers, according to Massey (1978: 43), reduced the productive capacity of 
mature electronics industry by 50 per cent. 
The Korean Government has played a key role in all parts of national 
economy ranging from finance, industrial restructuring, locational decision-making 
and labour union movement control. According to Amsden (1989), Korea is a 
prototype 'developmental state' in which market rationality has been constrained by 
the priorities of strategic industrialisation. 13 Amsden contends that late-
industrialisation has been initiated by introducing technologies from advanced 
capitalist countries which require large initial investment capital, mass production 
technologies for the exploitation of economies of scale and long learning periods. As 
it is difficult for Third Word firms to 'catch-up' with their leading counterparts 
autonomously, state intervention is required until the former became competitive (see 
also Lui and Chiu, 1992). The rapid economic growth of East Asian economies stems 
13. According to Johnson (1982: 19), there are two differing orientations toward private economic 
activities: (a) regulatory (or market-rational) state and (b) developmental (or plan-rational) state. The 
Unites States is a good example of the regulatory state which has regulated antitrust practices but has 
not been concerned with industrial restructuring. Japan, by contrast, is best exemplified as the 
developmental state which has executed strong industrial policy to upgrade its industrial structure and 
to improve its international competitiveness. 
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from the concentration of investment in strategic industries which reqmre state 
subsidies. Thus, the authoritarian Korean Government has supported and directed a 
limited number of large business groups (chaebols) in strategic sectors. It has 
executed its industrial policies by 'tuning' incentives and regulations. More 
incentives are given to the company that conforms to government policy directions. 
In consequence, a company that adapts to shifts in government policy grows faster 
than a non-conforming rival. Thus the logic of developmental state rests on the close 
collaboration between an autonomous, strong bureaucracy and the private business 
organisation (Johnson, 1982; Onis, 1991: 115). 
Policy implementation in a developmental state is quite contrary to Western-
style welfare states where state subsidies are directed to declining firms or industries 
in financial difficulties. Major policy instruments used in state intervention are (Onis, 
1991): (a) price distortion, such as low interest, long-term credits; (b) the use of 
licensing to realise economies of scale; (c) regulation of the banking system to control 
of private business; and (d) restrictions on union activities. According to Koo and 
Kim (1992), Korea's strategic geopolitical position and its inherited centralised 
bureaucracy, particularly during the cold war period, enabled and legitimated the 
powerful implementation of the strategic industrialisation policies. The demolition of 
socialist countries and political liberalisation since early 1980s, however, have 
weakened the state's ability to manage the nation's economy, especially the chaebols. 
Geographical interest has concentrated on government impacts on regional 
economic dynamics and, more particularly, industrial location decision-making. 
Commonly, uneven regional development has been interpreted as a political problem, 
threatening a nation's economic and social fabric. Consequently, government has 
sought to manipulate its national economic geography (Johnston, 1986: 265). 
Economic globalisation, however, has reduced government influence on regional 
economic problems (Dicken, 1983). Indeed, governmental response to regional 
problems has shifted in response to economic changes. The major instrument, 
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however, in considering regional problems has been to intervene in industrial location 
decision-making. Thus, government has to be integrated in any analysis of Korea's 
industrial geography. 
3 UNCOVERING THE MECHANISMS OF SPATIAL CHANGE 
The spatial dynamics of industry and labour are influenced by numerous 
factors. Also, the relationships between these factors are difficult to disentangle. 
Given this complexity, it is essential for regional analysts to simplify them. Every 
researcher wears his or her own coloured glasses to filter the chaotic real world and 
reorganise it (Claus and Claus, 1971: 524). This study perceives the Korean economy 
as a system within which 'space-organising' large corporations (chaebols) interact 
with government, smaller firms and multinational corporations at different 
geographical scales (Figure 1.2). Further, this study supposes that any changes in the 
interrelationships between these organisations result in corresponding spatial 
variations. The purpose of this section is to uncover the mechanisms affecting 
changes in the location of Korean industry and labour. 
Mechanisms underlying spatial change are very diverse among countries with 
different levels of economic development, cultural backgrounds, political systems and 
resource bases. For instance, Korea has distinctive industrial organisations, 
government-business relations, and labour practices. Thus, the application of 
industrial geography models based on Western perceptions have to be applied with 
caution. Japan's ascent, for example, 
was achieved with an industrial system organized around 
combinations of giant firms, huge industrial groups, and layered 
subcontracting networks that do not readily fit Anglo-American or 
European experience (Dore, 1987). Indeed, the evident success of 
organizational models beyond the Anglo-American pale, especially 
in Germany and Korea, has opened a veritable Pandora's box 
(Katzenstein, 1989; Amsden, 1989) .... In short, all hell has broken 
loose and there is simply no overall theory of industrial organization 
that can contain the outburst. The whole problem needs to be 
rethought from the ground up, .... (adapted from Sayer and Walker, 
1992: 110). 
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CHANGING WORLD 
ECONOMIC CONDITIONS 
Underlying Relationships between Space-organising Institutions 
at Differing Geographical Scales 
Three different scales of explanation are distinguished m this study - political 
economy, business organisation and social contexts. Initially, the underlying 
relationships between and within major institutions (i.e., government, MNCs, large 
corporations and smaller firms) are clarified by concentrating on: linkages between 
government and business organisations; relationships between different types of 
business organisations; and connections between business organisations and labour 
markets. Then, an examination is made of the mechanisms generating spatial 
changes. 
3.1 Political Economic Context 
Government policies can be divided into two groups - spatial and aspatial. 
Spatial policy, in essence, is a policy of regional discrimination. For instance, a 
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government's massive investment on infrastructure within the 'problem' region is 
ostensibly to improve its locational environment. Indirectly, government can affect 
locational conditions within a region through incentives and regulations. On the other 
hand, an aspatial policy does not make spatial distinctions and is best understood as 
macroeconomic policy. Although indirect, a government's macroeconomic policy 
has a profound effect on national industrial location patterns. Not surprisingly, the 
locational dynamics of corporations and industrial restructuring policies of 
government are closely interrelated. Consequently, it is difficult to separate their 
relative impacts on the space economy. As the resource bases (infrastructure or 
labour) required by both old and new industries are different, the sectoral 
restructuring commonly results in locational changes (Johnston, 1986). Nevertheless, 
industrial geographers have always concentrated on analysing the impacts of spatial 
policies. Ironically, the nature of regional policies can be characterised as measures 
amending undesirable outcomes generated by aspatial dynamics. Consequently, 
attention must be concentrated on identifying the mechanisms through which aspatial 
forces produce their spatial outcomes. 
Assuming the typical economic development logic of developing countries, 
the establishment of an economic development plan by government has a fundamental 
impact on the growth of corporation, its industrial structure and organisation, and its 
locational patterns. There is, therefore, a need to discuss how government affects 
corporate business strategies. In the initial stage of economic development, almost all 
foreign capital is introduced by government due to the extremely low credit rating of 
typical Third World business activities. The government has the power to allocate 
foreign capital to private enterprises. Even in the rare instances where private 
companies introduce foreign capital on their own behalf, they are required to obtain 
government certification of payment. As the government is a major source of finance, 
business activities in the developing countries are directly and indirectly influenced 
by its policy objectives. Export-oriented industrialisation is seen as a logical outcome 
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of this style of decision-making because government has to repay the foreign loans. 
Consequently, government introduces various kinds of incentives to promote 
exports.14 Acknowledging these characteristics, any model of corporate growth 
within Newly Industrialising Economies must incorporate a variety of factors: 
(a) The government's pursuit of rapid economic growth that results 
in the introduction of modem technology which is larger in 
scale than is justified by its small domestic markets (Jones, 
1987: 132-133); 
(b) Diversification that is designed to overcome the limitation of a 
small market and the monopoly induced to satisfy the basic 
needs of large business organisations; 
(c) Entrepreneurs who endeavour to compensate for technological 
inferiority by exploiting economies of scale; 
(d) The concentration of limited capital resources on a small 
number of large business organisations with a successful 
investment track record; 
(e) The internalisation of external transactions as related business 
facilities are underdeveloped; and 
Finally, the continuous industrial restructuring policies of government that not only 
accelerates the diversification of business activities but results in rapid growth in the 
scale of corporations. 
Given the government's ubiquitous influence on private enterprise, the 
extraordinarily large and diversified business organisation (chaebol) is the product of 
the Korean Government's economic development policies. Again, the extremely 
large business organisations results in the spatial concentration of economic power 
within a few major cities. Indeed, the Korean Government's spatial policies have 
been focused on dispersing the business activities of chaebols to less-developed areas 
through regional policies based on industrial estate development. Further, 
Government policies designed to promote small and medium-sized firms have 
14. In 1975, the Korean Government established a general trading company system as a part of its 
export promotion drive. The rationale is that the general trading company system compensates for the 
country's inferior international trading position by exploiting economies of scale. Further, the 
Government regulated strongly the labour union movement to keep the wage level low. 
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focused on integrating them in large business organisations by encouragmg the 
division of labour between them. By integrating smaller firms into large corporations, 
the government has influenced the growth and locational patterns of smaller firms. 
Indeed, the Government is considered as a basic force shaping the environment to 
which business organisations have to respond and adjust. 
3.2 Business Organisational Context 
Business organisations can be divided into two different segments - larger and 
smaller business organisations - with varying bargaining powers. The bargaining 
power is determined by the superiority of large organisations in technology, 
management, capital-supply, sales and purchases. A few large organisations control 
most business activities while numerous smaller firms are under the dominance of the 
oligopolistic large corporations. This unequal power relationship between different 
types of business organisations changes only very slowly. Most of the smaller firms 
are supposed to be linked to the large business organisations through contractual 
arrangements, such as subcontracting, franchising and licensing. In particular, 
subcontracting is considered as a major means by which disorganised, local, smaller 
firms are integrated into large production systems. The fate of lower-layer firms is 
tied to the fortunes of the higher-layer organisations with which it deals. As the 
different kinds of corporate organisations exploit (or create) segmented labour 
markets, any changes in labour processes within large business organisations prompt 
corresponding restructuring and locational shifts of smaller firms. 
As a corporation grows its organisational structure must be adapted to cope 
with the diversification of its activities and the widening business arena. Given its 
operational units may have differing goals and functions, a large business 
organisation requires a range of locations to meet its needs. Through the 'space-
organising' function of large corporations local smaller firms are linked into regional, 
national and international economies. As noted, diversification is the most common 
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strategy adopted by the rapidly industrialising countries. According to Channon 
(1973) unrelated product units of the 100 largest corporations in England had grown 
from 2 per cent to 6 per cent between 1950 and 1970 (Bassett, 1984: 895). This is an 
extremely low figure, however, by developing country standards. Multi-locational 
and multi-product, large corporations are supposed to have more flexibility in spatial 
shifts and business restructuring (Chapman and Walker, 1987: 117). Thus, the 
extremely diversified corporate organisation (chaebol) and its rapid restructuring 
process have had an enormous impact on Korean industrial location patterns. 
Apart from government influence, the large business organisation is the key 
variable influencing national patterns of industrial location. Although governments 
have established industrial location dispersion policies for balanced regional 
development, the actual number of firms that can be relocated within the planned area 
is limited. Invariably, a smaller firm selects one place that fully satisfies its 
multifarious locational requirements. Within large corporations, however, the 
locational decision-making of each operating unit is considered within an 
organisational context. Owing to the functional specialisation of each operating unit, 
its locational requirements are limited to one or two main factors. Hence, the mix of 
corporate locations at a group level is more critical than searching out individual sites. 
Consequently, the locational opportunity cost of an individual small firm is greater 
than the establishment of a larger business organisation. Thus, the locational 
uprooting of a large corporation's operating unit is much easier than that of a smaller 
firm. 
Given the high business risk in the developing countries, the indigenous 
corporation tries to reduce risk by diversifying business activities and refraining from 
reliance on extreme measures. Actually, the archetypical conglomerate organisation 
of the Newly Industrialising Economies comprises a range of unrelated industries. 
Their development not only facilitates the interregional movement of goods, services, 
labour and capital, but encapsulates the role of particular regions within its spatial 
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organisation. Sometimes, the selective exploitation of space by large business 
organisations produces uneven regional development. Although it is the natural 
outcome of the application of economic laws, it is sometimes unacceptable to society 
on equity grounds. Indeed, the dissatisfaction of residents in these 'problem regions' 
is reflected in attempts to revise existing economic and regional development policies. 
Thus, the major target of the Korean government's industrial relocation policy has 
been chaebol 's operating units. 
3.3 Social Context 
Social implications of the emergence of large conglomerate corporations are 
considered by examining three aspects: 
(a) the economic power concentration on a few hands; 
(b) locational concentration in a few major areas (or unbalanced 
regional development); and 
(c) labour market restructuring. 
Economic power concentration on a few large enterprises implies the relative 
underdevelopment of small and medium-sized firms. Under this dualistic economic 
structure business relations between the two segments are largely unequal. As market 
structure is mostly oligopolistic (or monopolistic) the entrance barrier into major 
production activities is largely restricted to smaller firms. The most common way for 
smaller firms to participate into major productive activities is to become a 
subcontractor of the large business organisation. Large corporations become larger 
by paying lower prices to competitive subcontractors and allowing them to organise 
production activities that make use of lower-paid and dispersed workers (Susman and 
Schutz, 1983: 162). Nevertheless, as the two segments are also in an interdependent 
relationship, their desirable cooperation is essential for continued national economic 
growth. 
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As internal linkages are one of fundamental locational decision-making factors 
within a large business organisation its location is largely concentrated within a few 
core areas. The locational agglomeration initiated by large firms is reinforced by its 
production system being closely linked to numerous smaller parts-supplying firms. 
As the subcontracting firms are mostly dependent on large parent firms, their 
locations are strongly influenced by the latter's initial location. In extreme cases, a 
city is dominated by a single large business organisation. The concentration of 
corporate power in a few major cities makes regional economies dependent on 
decision-making undertaken at headquarters. Thus, the locational strategies, 
industrial restructuring policies and labour organisation within large business 
organisations has an enormous effect on the fortunes of regional economies. 
As noted, different types of business organisation create corresponding labour 
market segmentations: 
(a) the organised, full-time, better-paid labour employed in the 
giant firm; and 
(b) the unorganised, part-time, lower-paid labourer employed in the 
smaller firm. 
When younger, lower-wage labourers are available, large corporations exploit them in 
Fordist processing factories. When labour costs sky-rocket, however, they increase 
their orders to subcontractors who can exploit dispersed, lower-wage, female, part-
time workers. Further, major firms reduce the proportion of internal labour while 
increasing that of external workers. As subcontractors use numerous scattered, less-
skilled, lower-wage, part-time and female labourers, their social impacts, such as 
employment creation and income redistribution, are enormous. Thus, the change in 
labour processes within large business organisations affects the local labour market 
structure through the hierarchical subcontracting system. 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The purpose of this chapter has been: to review major theoretical trends; to 
discuss key issues in contemporary industrial geography; and to uncover the 
mechanisms underlying the generation of the Korean space economy. Initially, the 
main ideas and limitations of the various research approaches have been detailed to 
identify on-going research directions and pivotal issues (Section 1). The major 
research focus has shifted from classical location theory through the behavioural 
approach and the geography of enterprise to the structuralist approach. The disunity 
among these superseded approaches, however, has remained as a fundamental 
problem that has to be resolved. Cross-fertilisation between the geography of 
enterprise and structuralist approach has been recognised as the critical issue in 
contemporary industrial geography. Researchers, notably Dicken (1990), have tried 
to integrate the two strands together by placing 'firms' into their broader structural 
context. 
In Section 2, interest shifts to reinterpreting key concepts in contemporary 
industrial geography in a Korean context. The modern corporation is considered as a 
major space-organising institution which generates and transforms the spatial 
economy. It is recognised as a problem-solving institution which can adjust its 
organisational structure and management strategies to the changing environment. As 
the conceptualisation of a firm's environment in terms of 'all types of external 
influence' is too broad to disentangle, this study is restricted to an examination of a 
few key, interlinked institutions - government, parent firms and parts-supplying 
subcontractors. Together with economic internationalisation Korea's industrialisation 
has been influenced by both global capital movement and government intervention in 
economic activities. 
The definition of flexible specialisation has been misleading and needs to be 
distinguished from subcontracting. Contrary to the assertion of flexible specialisation 
theorists, the adoption of flexible technologies and labour organisations is not 
substantial in Korea. These changes towards flexible specialisation do not happen 
simultaneously in numerous countries which are at different stages of development 
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and have distinctive cultures. As Korea has a distinctive industrial organisation and 
labour practices, the application of the flexible specialisation concept to the Korean 
case requires great caution. 
Section 3 tries to uncover the mechanisms generating and transforming the 
Korean space economy. This study perceives it as a system within which chaebols 
interact with government, smaller firms and multinational corporations at different 
geographical scales. The growth of chaebols and their restructuring have been 
strongly influenced by government economic policies. More incentives have been 
given to the company that adheres to its policy objectives. The Korean Government 
has pursued balanced regional development by focusing on the relocation of the 
chaebol's affiliates to problem regions. Thus, Korea has been a prototype 
'developmental' state in which the Government has played a key role in corporate 
growth, industrial restructuring, internationalisation, locational adjustments and 
labour practices. 
As business activities are diversified a corporation expands its spatial 
organisation to satisfy the different locational requirements of its multi-functional 
units. Large business organisations are considered to be the main 'space-organising' 
entities through which the economy is integrated and transformed. Their selective 
exploitation of geographically bounded resources, such as lower-wage labour, 
encapsulates the role of particular regions and facilitates the spatial division of labour 
and unbalanced regional development. Further, smaller firms are considered to be 
integrated into the production systems of large firms as parts-supplying 
subcontractors. As the parent firms are in a dominant position in business relations, 
they strongly influence the decision-making undertaken by the manager of smaller 
firms. Subcontracting provides a major means of using scattered, part-time and 
home-based female workers who are not available as the full-time factory workers of 
large corporations. Any restructuring in large corporations has a fundamental impact 
both on smaller firms and the whole industrial system. 
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PART II 
CHAEBOLS 
CHAPTER2 
CHAEBOLS, GOVERNMENT POLICIES, AND THE SPATIAL CHANGES 
OF INDUSTRY AND POPULATION 
Since the early 1960s, Korea has experienced dramatic spatial changes of 
industry and population. The Seoul Metropolitan Area 1 and the Southeastern Coastal 
Area have enjoyed great economic booms while the remainder have experienced 
fundamental underdevelopment. The population increase of large cities and major 
industrial cities has been enormous while that of rural areas and local small and 
medium-sized cities have stagnated. Seoul has strengthened its management control 
functions while other areas have been specialised as production and consumption 
places. How have these spatial changes and restructurings occurred? Giving answers 
to a following series of issues is essential to explain the spatial shifts of Korea's 
industry and population: what are the most important 'space-organisers'; how have 
they been formed; through what mechanisms have they organised Korea's spatial 
economy; through what processes have the regional economy been readjusted; and 
how have the relationships among the major organisations been transformed? 
This study picks up chaebol as the key 'space-organiser', and tries to explain 
Korea's regional economic dynamics in the shifting relationship between chaebol and 
Government. The Korean Government has played a fundamental role in the growth 
of chaebols. Through the allocation of investment funds it has directly influenced 
their decision-making processes. By adapting to changes in Government objectives 
the chaebols have enjoyed continued growth. This symbiotic relationship between 
the Korean Government and chaebols has been reflected in the conception and 
implementation of regional economic development policies. 
1. This study defines the Seoul Metropolitan Area as the area which encompasses Seoul city and 
Kyonggi province. 
60 
Initially, Government's policy directions and corporate growth strategies are 
reviewed (Section 2). Then the mechanisms through which Korean chaebols 
accumulate their wealth are discussed (Section 3). With this background, attention is 
directed towards identifying the key components of their organisational structure 
(Section 4). Finally, the spatial aspects of organisational structures, linkage patterns, 
and people's migration paths are analysed to discover clues to the impact of chaebols 
on the spatial changes of industry and population (Section 5). 
1 THE GOVERNMENT'S ROLE IN THE GROWTH OF THE CHAEBOLS 
Four key phases are recognised in studying changes in the relationship between 
the Korean Government, the emergence of the chaebols and their effect on regional 
economies. They correspond to the major shifts in Korean economic and social 
development marked by the inception of Five Year Economic Development Plans. 
1.1 Pre-Korean War Roots 
The origins of the chaebols can be traced to the Japanese colonial period 
between 1910 and 1945. During that period their founders started business in such 
nondescript enterprises as general dealing, drapery, grain-retailing and small-scale 
trading. Their colonial masters, however, stifled their growth and prevented these 
small household businesses blossoming into modem enterprises. Instead, the Imperial 
Japanese Government gave preference to zaibatsu subsidiaries.2 By 1941, according 
to Ewing (1973), 70 per cent of total Japanese investment in Korea was conducted by 
six zaibatsu groups. Korean managers and technicians were almost completely 
excluded from their enterprises (Amsden, 1989: 34 ). 3 Although reviling these. 
2. The word chaebol was coined from the Japanese word zaibatsu prior to the Pacific War. Zaibatsu is 
used to refer to the large Japanese business groups. They were dispersed by the Supreme Commander 
of Allied Forces (SCAF). The zaibatsu, however, has re-emerged in the guise keiretsu. They involve 
independent companies clustering around core banks, with some policy coordination, intercompany 
stock-shareholding and regular meetings of presidents. 
3. As a result of this exclusion from their strategic basic industries, the sequestrated Japanese 
production facilities were mostly ill-managed by Koreans and in some cases could not be utilised at all 
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activities, local entrepreneurs perceived the zaibatsu as the ideal business 
arrangement.4 Consequently, it was not surprising that they sought to develop a 
Korean-style zaibatsu - the chaebol - after the withdrawal of the Japanese (Kim, 
E.M., 1987: 44). In 1948, the first chaebol - the Taechang Group with five affiliates 
- was established (Park, B.Y., 1982: 30). However, as their embryonic businesses 
were almost completely destroyed during the Korean War (1950-1953), it was not 
until the end of the War that the formation of chaebols gathered momentum. 
1.2 Post-War Restoration and Import Substitution, 1953-1961 
The initial expans10n of the chaebols stemmed from their co-option by the 
Korean Government to assist in supplying essential commodities and replacing 
devastated manufacturing facilities and social infrastructure. Most of their founders 
boosted their businesses by importing consumer goods, processing materials brought 
in under aid programs and constructing infrastructure projects. Samsung, for 
example, participated in trading and the so-called 'three white industries' (sugar 
refining, flour milling and cotton ginning). Conversely, Hyundai joined in the 
construction of national infrastructure projects and army camps for U.S. troops 
stationed in Korea. 
As domestic savings were insufficient for the reconstruction projects undertaken 
by the Korean Government, most of the requisite funds were reliant upon foreign aid, 
primarily from the United States. Together with the sequestrated Japanese properties, 
these funds were distributed to those whom the Government deemed to be the most 
productive users in terms of maximising growth and employment. This preferential 
redistribution of existing wealth provided the springboard for the accelerated growth 
of the chaebols after the Korean War. Already, eight of the nine leading 
after the Japanese withdrawal. 
4. For more detailed information on chaebols in the Japanese colonial time, see 'McNamara, D.L., 
1990. The Colonial Origins of Korean Enterprise 1910-1945, Cambridge, New York, Port Chester, 
Melbourne and Sydney, Cambridge University Press.' 
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organisations were m existence m 1955 (Chung, G.H., 1987: 42). Indeed, the 
government's first priority in aiming for efficiency rather than equity assured the 
chaebols' prosperity. In this way they maintained their position in the forefront of 
industry. 
Between 1953 and 1961, import substitution in non-durable consumer industries 
was the initial keynote of Government policy. Quickly, this was extended to 
encompass basic industries, such as oil refining and the manufacture of fertiliser and 
cement. The policy was facilitated by protecting the domestic market from foreign 
competition. Further, the Government allowed the introduction of production 
facilities and technologies to only limited entrepreneurs to prevent double calls on 
foreign currencies. These trading practices allowed the emerging chaebols to accrue 
monopoly profits and accelerated their accumulation of wealth. Their monopoly was 
reinforced by the small domestic market and the large economies of scale required for 
nominated industries. Not surprisingly, the chaebols preferred to rely on the 
Government's preferential treatment to generate profits rather than develop their own 
risky initiatives. 
1.3 Export Promotion Based on Light Industry, 1962-1971 
In 1961, a military government came to power through a coup and sought to 
legitimise itself through rapid economic development. After 1962, its plans were 
embodied in a series of Five Year Economic Development Plans. Contrary to its 
predecessor's emphasis on import substitution the new Government adopted an 
outward-looking development strategy. This fundamental change of policy direction 
stemmed from: (a) Korea's absence of natural resources; (b) the limits to 
industrialisation imposed by the small domestic market on import substitution 
activities; and (c) the diminishing supply of economic aid from the United States and 
increased reliance on public loans. These prompted the Korean Government to 
change its policy. Foreign borrowings were increased to pay for the new economic 
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development plans. In tum, the Government had to earn foreign currency to repay the 
loans. The key to its outward-looking development strategy, therefore, was to 
promote labour-intensive manufacturing exports in which Korea had a decided 
comparative advantage (Suh, S.M., 1986: 9). 
The Korean Government had to revise its trade policy to accommodate the new 
strategy. It readjusted the overvalued exchange rate and introduced a variety of 
financial and taxation incentives to promote exports. Government institutions were 
revamped to provide the necessary support for the export-oriented policy. The most 
significant institutional development was the foundation of the Economic Planning 
Board (EPB) in 1962. As a superministry, the Board not only created development 
plans but was directly involved in plan implementation. Its budgetary authority 
allowed it to distribute resources. It was also invested with a regulatory and 
coordination role. Another significant institutional change was the inauguration of 
the Export Promotion Council. Its subsequent monthly meetings were attended by the 
country's President, economic bureaucrats, and leading businessmen. Their task was 
to negotiate on an informal basis the participation of the chaebols in Government's 
industrial development projects and the level of administrative incentives. This high 
level meeting also established a set of corporate directives. 
After revamping trade policy and developing appropriate institutions, the 
Korean Government looked for partners who could make best use of the country's 
limited resources and ensure rapid economic growth. Requiring urgent collaboration, 
the military government selected the chaebols for the task and entered into joint-
ventures with them to undertake nominated economic development projects. 5 Most 
of the founders of the chaebols correctly evaluated the situation and grasped the 
5. At the time the so-called 'illicit accumulation of wealth' by chaebols was a major political and social 
issue. Despite public criticism, the military government did not take harsh actions against the chaebols 
other than to deprive them of the right to have their own banks. 
64 
-c 
Q) 
0 
.... 
Q) 
c. 
30 
20 
10 
0 
-10 
-20 
i-
.. 
.. 
. . 
. . 
.. 
. . 
.. 
. 
----><--- Nominal loan rate 
--o-- Real loan rate for key industry 
---·-+---- Real loan rate for export 
-30-t--~~~~---~~~~-.-~~~~--.-~~~~--.-~~~~.......-~~~~--. 
1960 1970 Year 1980 1990 
Note: Real loan rate: nominal loan rate - inflation rate. 
Source: Bank of Korea (pers. comm.); Chung, G.H., 1987: 72; Jones, 1987:146. 
Figure 2.1 
Trends of Interest Rates in Korea, 1961-1980 
opportunities. As almost all of the chosen business activities were new to local 
entrepreneurs, the Government selected the participants in specific projects and even 
supplied the necessary business funds, production facilities and overseas technologies. 
Enormous bank loans were given to the nominated entrepreneurs. As the real loan 
rate was negative under the prevailing hyper-inflation the bank loans given to the 
nominated businessmen were an enormous bonus (Figure 2.1; Appendix 2.1 ). 
Moreover, the Government, to avoid excessive competition, determined the number 
of participants especially in those activities where economies of scale were vital. 
Hence, an approved company was guaranteed high monopoly profits by the 
Government for pioneering new activities. Even the product's price and wage rises 
were regulated by the Government Indeed, trade unions were suppressed to keep the 
wage levels low, thereby raising the competitiveness of Korean products in the 
international market 
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Many chaebols grew rapidly by engaging m the export-related industries 
fostered by the Government. Daewoo, for instance, achieved rapid growth by 
exporting simple, labour-intensive, light industry goods, such as textiles, in which 
industries Korea had a comparative advantage. Conversely, Samsung was involved in 
electronics which followed textiles as the leading strategic export industry. The 
Lucky-Goldstar Group established a trading corporation to boost its export of 
electronics products. Other enterprises, however, disappeared from the list of the 
largest chaebols because they were unable to transform their business structures to 
accommodate changing Government objectives. 
1.4 Export Promotion Based on Heavy Industry, 1972-1981 
During the early 1970s, the export-promotion strategy based on labour-
intensive, light industries experienced problems due to: (a) rising wage levels; (b) 
competition from other developing countries; and (c) protectionism in advanced 
capitalist countries. In 1971, the situation was aggravated by a drastic reduction in 
the number of U.S. troops stationed in Korea. The Government had to speed up the 
development of heavy industry for defence purposes. These difficulties prompted the 
Korean Government to diversify its trading partners and upgrade its export products 
to higher value-added industrial items. Subsequently, the Government introduced the 
'General Trading Company System' to spur export growth and shift Korea's 
industrial structure towards the heavy and chemical industry sector as a means of 
generating new types of export products. 
In 1973, the Government announced the 'Heavy and Chemical Industry 
Development Plan'. This ambitious Plan resulted in Government assistance being 
focused on so-called 'strategic industries' such as shipbuilding, machinery, 
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automobiles, electronics, iron and steel, non-ferrous metals and petrochemicals. The 
Government bolstered this Plan by establishing the 'National Investment Fund' to 
provide funds at lower interest rates. It was also designed to protect 'infant 
industries' from foreign competition. Moreover, the Government granted monopolies 
to a number of industries in a bid to overcome the handicap of a small domestic 
market Further, the preferential treatment hitherto given to the labour-intensive, light 
industry sector was transferred to support its heavy and chemical industries initiatives. 
Thus, Government fiat overshadowed the market mechanism in allocating investment 
funds and resources. Encouraged by special incentives Korean businessmen rushed 
into the heavy and chemical industries6 without due regard for domestic and world 
demand for their products.7 By 1978, the heavy and chemical industries dominated 
the structure of the chaebols (Figure 2.2). 
The industrial restructuring policy had a number of key social and economic 
6. According to a Korean Government estimation, 74 and 82 per cent of fixed investments in the 
manufacturing sector were made in the heavy and chemical industries respectively in 1976 and 1979 
(Yoo, J.H., 1989: 13). 'Heavy and chemical industries' is defined according to Korean usage. It 
includes pulp and paper products (KSIC 34); chemicals, petroleum, coal, rubber and plastic products 
(KSIC 35); non-metallic mineral products (KSIC 36); basic metals (KSIC 37); fabricated metal 
products, machinery and equipment (KSIC 38). 
7. The Government provided so-called 'rescue loans' to the chaebols to prevent the inevitable serious 
economic, social and political repercussions arising from their liquidation. 
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effects. Firstly, the policy widened the existing income gap through its preoccupation 
with large and capital-intensive projects. Second, it fostered the rapid growth of large 
conglomerates and intensified the economic power concentration on a limited number 
of chaebols. Third, it widened regional disparities as small and medium-sized firms 
collapsed, particularly outside the capital region. 
These changes are reflected in the activities of the leading chaebols. For 
instance, Daewoo, whose major business was exporting textile products in the 1960s, 
transferred its attention to the heavy and chemical industries from the mid 1970s. In 
contrast, Hyundai has always concentrated on heavy engineering, such as 
shipbuilding, automobiles and heavy equipment. Ssangyong, however, sold off its 
textile operations during the early 1960s and turned to the manufacture of cement. 
Although Samsung's founder, Lee Byung-Chull, was initially reluctant to participate 
in the heavy and chemical industries, he changed his attitude in the early 1970s and 
the business group became one of the leading participants in this strategic sector. 
Undesirable repercussions from the Government's intervention in private sector 
activities, however, led to the recasting of policy in the early 1980s. 
1.5 Economic Liberalisation and Technology-intensive Industry since 1982 
When Korea's industrial base was established the Government redirected its 
attention to achieving a better regional balance of economic activities and an even 
income distribution between social classes. It eliminated preferential treatments 
given to targeted industries and let market forces supersede Government intervention. 
In promulgating this new policy, the Government enacted the Anti-Monopoly and 
Fair Trade Act in 1981 to improve the domestic market's competitive environment. 
Further, it had to liberalise imports to counteract developed countries' trade 
regulations. In the process the import liberalisation ratio was increased from almost 
53 per cent in 1977 to 75, 88, and 96 per cent in 1981, 1985, and 1990 respectively. 
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The withdrawal of Government support has prompted the chaebols to upgrade 
their internal organisations in a bid to improve their competitiveness. Their priority 
has changed from encouraging growth to promoting efficiency. This policy switch is 
reflected in heavy investment by chaebols in both the research and development 
sector and technology-intensive activities. In 1986, the twenty largest chaebols 
expended 49 per cent of the private sector's investment in research and development -
a figure that compared favourably with 33 per cent in Japan. Simultaneously, the 
chaebols expanded their share of subcontracting production and assisted small and 
medium-sized enterprises to improve their managerial efficiency. This promotion 
contributed to a more equitable distribution of regional income and strengthened the 
components sector. 
During the 1980s, the ranking of Korean chaebols was relatively stable. 
However, the rapid growth of the leading chaebols exceeded the national average. 
Also, they gained international recognition. In 1987, nine chaebols were included in 
Fortune's list of the 500 largest industrial corporations outside the United States 
(Fortune, August 1988).8 In particular, Samsung, Hyundai, Lucky-Goldstar and 
Daewoo groups were prominent because of their diversification and sheer size. 
Although the four groups had followed different strategies their business portfolios 
were almost identical. 
Clearly, the changing relationships between the Government and the growth of 
the chaebols has been of supreme importance. As described by Lee, K.U. (1986: 3): 
Economic activities in the private sector were led more by the national 
will than by individual choices. Consequently, the governmental 
intervention in the private sector became ubiquitous, and with the 
exception of private ownership of firms, Korean firms were not 
capitalistic in the true sense of the word. The concentration of 
economic power which occurred, therefore, was not necessarily the 
product of the market system. 
8. In 1990, eleven chaebols were selected as the world's 500 biggest industrial companies including 
USA's companies (Fortune, July 1991). 
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This position is underlined by an examination of the typical characteristics of the 
chaebols. 
2 DISTINCTIVE FEATURES OF THE CHAEBOL 
There is no generally accepted definition of the chaebol. No one, therefore, can 
answer the question, 'How many chaebols are there in Korea?', with any confidence. 
The number varies according to the criteria with many border line cases. In 1990, 
there were perhaps about fifty business groups worthy of the title chaebof.9 This 
conceptual confusion has led to most researchers classifying big business groups in 
terms of the top 5, top 10, top 30, top 100, and so on. The remainder arbitrarily 
classify them in terms of an employment threshold (i.e., more than 500 employees or 
more than 300 employees). Thus, it is fruitless to try and classify all Korean 
companies as either chaebols or non-chaebols. Nevertheless, it is very important to 
identify their primary characteristics because of the widespread impact of the 
chaebols on the nation's socio-economic conditions. 
A review and analysis of the central ideas of representative researchers is the 
best way of examining the primary characteristics of the chaebols. For instance, Yoo 
and Lee (1987: 97) defined the chaebol as a business group consisting of large 
companies which are owned and managed by family members or relatives in many 
diversified business areas (adapted from Steers, Shin and Ungson, 1989: 34). A 
simpler approach would be to suggest that it is identical with the zaibatsu. If that is 
the case, we can take up Yashoka's (1985) definition and describe the chaebol as a 
huge diversified business group which is owned and controlled by family members or 
9. In 1987, the Economic Planning Board's Fair Trade Commission identified certain business groups 
with a combined asset value of 400 billion won as 'special economic conglomerates' in a bid to prevent 
excessive economic concentration among major conglomerates. The Fair Trade Commission 
designated 32 in 1987, 40 in 1988, 43 in 1989, and 53 chaebols in 1990 as special economic 
conglomerates. They are banned from inter-company shareholding within the same group and 
prevented from investing more than 40 per cent of their net assets into other corporations which are not 
associated with the same conglomerates (Korea Business World, 1988: 24; Maeil Kyongje Sinmun [The 
Korea Economic Daily], 19 April 1990). 
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relatives and which can affect national and regional economy to a considerable extent. 
Similarly, Nakagawa (1969) emphasises it is a diversified business group necessarily 
created in cases when the underdeveloped traditional countries, which take the family 
as their instinctive social organisation, try to carry out their industrialisation projects 
strongly and rapidly by competing with their industrialised countries' counterparts in 
the world market. 
These vanous definitions suggest that the chaebol has been distilled from 
Korea's distinctive social, cultural, historical, political and economic conditions. 
Indeed, Yashoka' s definition implies that these large enterprise groups have had the 
greatest impact on the regional and local economies. Also, Nakagawa suggests that 
the chaebol is an artificial creation of the government's industrialisation policies. 
2.1 Ownership and Control Structure 
The most fundamental difference between chaebols and other nations' large 
conglomerate business groups is inherent in their unity of ownership and control. 
Although there are many varieties of ownership structure, the common trait is that 
initially principals and immediate families own the major company assets. Then the 
very major companies own the assets of the second-layer affiliates (Figure 2.3a). Yet, 
chaebols differ in their ownership structure from both the pre-war Japanese zaibatsu 
and the post-war Japanese keiretsu (Figure 2.3b). Unlike the zaibatsu there have been 
no holding companies in Korea, and intercompany shareholding has been very 
popular (Lee and Lee, 1990: 50). Again, the strong family ownership controls 
contrasts with the post-war keiretsu which are loosely combined business entities 
composed of independent member companies. 
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Figure 2.3b 
Ownership Structure of Pre- and Post-War Japanese Business Groups 
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According to Hattori (1984), family ownership (including group affiliates' 
share) accounted for almost one-third of the stocks of the top forty-one chaebols listed 
on the Korea Stock Exchange (KSE) in 1982. In 1989, a survey by the Fair Trade 
Commission showed that family ownership accounted for almost 50 per cent of the 
top 10 chaebols (13.7 per cent for family and 35.7 per cent for affiliates). The degree 
of family ownership, however, is much higher because only 139 affiliates of the 514 
affiliates of the top 10 chaebols were listed on the KSE in 1989 (Lee and Lee, 1990: 
54). Indeed, chaebols have been most reluctant to have their profit-making 
companies listed on the stock market. 
The intercompany shareholding system has been a popular means of controlling 
huge business groups. Until the shareholding system was prohibited in 1986 by the 
Anti-Monopoly and Fair Trade Act, only a small outlay was needed with loans 
provided by Government-controlled banks. IO While the intercompany shareholding 
system encouraged expansion, it weakened the financial structure of the chaebols. 
With an unsound financial structure it is possible for losses within one affiliate to 
trigger a chain-bankruptcy throughout the entire business group (Table 2.1 ). During a 
recession, this ownership structure can cause enormous negative effects on regional 
economies, especially in the industrial cities, such as Ulsan, Changwon, Kumi, 
Yochon and Suwon dominated by the chaebols. 
As noted, most chaebols are completely controlled by family owners. Although 
ownership is widely dispersed among family members for tax purposes, the 
chairperson has supreme control. This closed ownership structure has been attributed 
to Korea's Confucian tradition, the short history of chaebols, and the need for 
confidentiality. According to Yoo and Lee (1987), 31 per cent of the executive 
managers of the top twenty chaebols were family members. Conversely, two-fifths of 
the managers were recruited from outside the company. Only 29 per cent were 
promoted from within. Not surprisingly, the top managerial positions are the 
10. A group of companies is generally able to borrow more money from the bank than a single 
enterprise by double-counting of inter-company investments within the same business group. That is, 
capital invested is considered by banks as equity in both the parent and affiliated companies. Therefore, 
original equity capital is multiplied for the purpose of securing bank loans (KIS, 1988: 57). 
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Table 2.1 
Share of the Equity Capital of the Top 10 Chaebols, 1988 
Groups Affiliates Equity capital 
no. per cent 
Samsung 41 16.6 
Hyundai 36 18.9 
Daewoo 28 17.0 
Lucky-Goldstar 58 19.7 
Hanjin 16 16.9 
Ssangyong 21 30.7 
Sunkyung 21 16.9 
Donga Construction 16 3.3 
Korea Explosives 25 34.6 
Lotte 31 45.3 
Source: KIS, 1989: 32; Office of Bank Supervision and Examination, 1989. 
exclusive birthright of family members - a marked difference from Japanese 
corporations in which almost all executives are promoted from within. Thus, the 
Korean managerial environment is much more volatile. Indeed, it raises a 
fundamental question: how does this particular ownership and control structure affect 
regional economies? More specifically, how does it affect the locational decision-
making and the linkage patterns of chaebols' spatially-separated operating units? In 
Korea, locational and managerial decision-making is influenced more by an 
individual owner's psychological make-up than by professional managers and 
locational analysts.11 Originally, most of the founders of chaebols located their 
operating units around their birthplaces. A large proportion of their business is still in 
their 'heart' area. These practices contributed strongly to the concentration of 
11. There is a well-known story that a prominent chaebol' s president referred all locational decisions to 
geomancers and followed their advice implicitly. 
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industry in North and South Kyongsang provinces. Most of the founders of chaebols 
were born in Kyongsang provinces which offered a haven from devastation during the 
Korean War. 
Management of spatially-separated chaebols' operating units is controlled 
directly from their Seoul headquarters. Consequently, it is very difficult for dispersed 
local chaebol organisations to have an autonomous stance. As a result, they could 
neither develop good relationships with indigenous small and medium-sized firms nor 
foster the local economy. The effect of the dispersed local plants is limited to 
creating unskilled employment because companies have developed interchange 
policies for personnel which encourage migration between units. While the 
proportion of linkages involving material shipments among group affiliates is high, 
those with local firms is relatively low. Indeed, the rate of intra-group transactions 
among affiliates of the top five chaebols was almost 28 per cent in 1988 (Lee, K.U., 
1990: 43). The contribution of chaebols to balanced regional development, however, 
was smaller than the governmental policymakers expected. 
2.2 Diversification of Business Activity 
Japanese general trading companies sell everything from noodles to missiles. 
However, chaebols not only sell everything from noodles to missiles but also produce 
them as well. This extreme diversification has brought adverse public comment that 
they are 'octopus-like' in expanding their business lines. Their indiscriminate 
encroachment into almost all industrial sectors has generated disputes with small and 
medium-sized firms intent on defending their business preserves from encroachment. 
Generally, the growth of chaebols has been independent of small and medium-sized 
firms. While chaebols continued to expand, local small and medium-sized firms have 
contracted. The proportion of small and medium-sized firms in manufacturing 
production decreased from almost 67 per cent in 1960 to less than 24 per cent in 
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1980.12 Although the proportion was increased to almost 31 per cent up to 1987, its 
positive effects were limited to major industrial centres, particularly the Seoul 
Metropolitan Area. The economy of peripheral areas, therefore, has been devastated. 
This raises the issue as to why the chaebols have so energetically diversified 
their business activities. The answers are rooted in the special economic conditions 
prevailing in underdeveloped countries which have carried out a policy of rapid 
industrialisation. First, chaebols have had to supply products or resources within their 
respective group because there were too few related industries. Second, the rapid 
changes in Government policy pressured chaebols to move into new 'strategic 
industrial sectors'. Third, the rapid and strong industrialisation implemented by the 
Government provided new markets.13 Fourth, chaebols diversified their business 
activities through unrelated industrial sectors as insurance against economic 
fluctuations. Consequently, they did not have time to develop their own industrial 
technology as a competitive weapon against foreign rivals. Indeed, the expansion of 
their product base was more profitable than confining their activity to a particular 
business sphere. In the process they did not develop complementary relationships 
with small and medium-sized firms. Thus, their roots in local areas were shallow. 
2.3 Economic Power Concentration 
Chaebol influence can be gauged by estimating contribution to the national 
economy. Although there is no absolute yardstick for comparing economic 
concentration at a national level, Korea has been deemed unusual by developing 
country standards because of the rapidity of its transformation. Indeed, the aggregate 
economic concentration rate of Korea measured in shipments for the top 100 
manufacturing companies was approximately two times and 1.7 times higher than that 
12. Although 'small and medium-sized firms' are usually defined as the firms which have less than 300 
employees, they are specially defined here as the firms which employ less than 200 persons for 
comparability over time. 
13. Given the small domestic market of Korea, they had a head start in the new spheres of activity on 
their competitors and enjoyed high monopolistic profits. 
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of Taiwan and Japan respectively (Amsden, 1989: 122-123). Jones' research (1987: 
101-102) shows that value-added by the forty-six largest groups increased from 
almost 10 per cent of Korea's GDP in 1973 to over 17 per cent in 1978. Their real 
compound annual growth rate between 1973 and 1978 was 24 per cent compared with 
10 per cent for the Korean economy as a whole. Kee, W.S. (1988: 15) shows that in 
1986 the value-added of the fifty largest chaebols was equivalent to one-fifth of 
Korea's total value-added. Further, Lee and Lee (1990: 28) highlight that the 
manufacturing shipment of the thirty largest chaebols peaked in 1982 and has 
declined since. Yet the top five chaebols have not experienced similar trends. 
Indeed, their employment has increased. Clearly, the development of the larger 
chaebols has been different from their smaller counterparts. 
Lee and Lee's (1990) research also demonstrates that the average number of 
manufacturing affiliates of the top 30 chaebols increased from 4.2 in 1970 to 14.3 in 
1979. During the period, the growth rate of the total manufacturing firms in Korea 
was 1.3. However, the increase in number of chaebols' manufacturing affiliates was 
more than threefold. Therefore, the top 30 chaebols grew rapidly while their small 
and medium-sized manufacturing counterparts stagnated. As a result, the gap between 
the former and the latter widened - a phenomenon that made the nation's economic 
structure more vulnerable. Further, the share of the top 5 chaebols in Korea's two 
major strategic industries - KSIC 35 sector (chemicals, petroleum, rubber and 
plastics) and KSIC 38 sector (fabricated metal products, machinery and equipment) -
was almost 28 per cent and almost 41 per cent respectively. This implies that the 
chaebols' growth has been strongly influenced by the Government's industrialisation 
policies. 
Even Lee and Lee's (1990) figures, however, underestimate the economic 
concentration of the chaebols. If all industrial sectors had been included in the 
calculation, their stranglehold over the economy would have been much higher. For 
instance, the Korea Investors Service (1988: 120) showed that in 1987 the top 30 
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chaebols contributed 54 per cent of the sales in the construction sector, almost 83 per 
cent in the retail and wholesale sector, almost 89 per cent in the transport and 
warehouse sector, and 85 per cent in the entertainment and cultural sector. These 
industrial sectors are more attracted to large metropolitan areas than the 
manufacturing sector. Indeed, they underline the influence of the chaebols on the 
spatial economy and their preoccupation with the Seoul Metropolitan Area. This 
outcome arising from their investment in the heavy and chemical industry sector, 
especially in high-tech industry is a natural and, even desirable, phenomenon. Thus, 
attention has to be focused on minimising their negative effects on balanced regional 
development and promoting their positive behaviour by providing appropriate 
location sites. 
3 CHAEBOLS' IMPACT ON REGIONAL ECONOMY 
The advent of large business organisations with many spatially-separated 
operating units has undermined self-sustaining or isolated regional and local 
economies. Instead, space economies have become susceptible to decisions made 
through the business networks of multi-regional enterprises headquartered in other 
areas. Further, the diversification of production requires cooperation with other firms 
as an indispensable precondition for successful operation. Through the process of 
organising production, large business organisations become highlighted as 'area 
organisers' - a trend prompting industrial geographers to incorporate regional studies 
in their analyses of corporate organisations and locational behaviours. Studying the 
spatial organisation of chaebols and their linkages with local firms, therefore, holds 
the key to understanding the characteristics of Korea's regional economies. 
3.1 Chaebols' Spatial Organisation 
The chaebols, despite their brief history, have emerged as the most important 
'area-organising' institution in Korea. Indeed, the organising mechanisms of multi-
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regional enterprises have dictated regional economic development, locational change 
and the spatial division of labour. Thus, the dynamics of regional economies (or the 
patterns of locational change and the dynamics of city systems) are largely 
determined by the activities of chaebols. 
In 1986, the Directory of Korean Business shows that the forty-five largest 
groups had 505 affiliates (though it examined only 458 of them). All 'group 
headquarters' were located in Seoul. In comparison, about 70 per cent of the 
headquarters of the affiliates were situated in Seoul, while over 80 per cent had 
addresses in the Seoul Metropolitan Area. Nevertheless, there were marked 
differences between industrial sectors. The headquarters of manufacturing affiliates 
were dispersed whereas those in other sectors were concentrated in Seoul (Table 2.2). 
Further, the branch plants, branch offices, and sales units in all sectors were widely 
dispersed. This distribution underlines that decisions made in the headquarters of 
both groups and their affiliates had a direct influence on regional economies. 
Together, Table 2.3 and Table 2.4 highlight the distinctive characteristics of the 
spatial corporate organisation patterns of chaebols. 
Clearly, Table 2.3 shows that Seoul is the dominant corporate control area. 
Corporations with Seoul headquarters have most of their plants in other provinces 
whereas almost all of the companies with headquarters in other areas have plants in 
the same cities and provinces. Further, Seoul has 282 plants in other cities and 
provinces but there is only one plant belonging to a company with headquarters in 
other provinces. Most of their branch plants are located in Kyonggi and South 
Kyongsang provinces - the two major national industrial centres. All decisions about 
business activities in particular regions, therefore, are made and controlled by 
headquarters in Seoul. Indeed, the corporate structure of chaebols reveals an inter-
provincial control structure and linkage pattern within Korea's private sector. 
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00 
0 
Province 
Seoul 
Pusan 
Taegu 
Kyonggi 
Kang won 
North ChungchOng 
South ChungchOng 
North CMlla 
South ChOlla 
North Kyongsang 
South Kyongsang 
Whole country 
Table 2.2 
Spatial Distribution of the Affiliates of the 45 Largest Business Groups, 1986 
Manufacturing A.F.M.a 
no. no. 
168 5 
9 
5 
50 1 
2 
6 
1 
13 1 
24 
278 8 
Construction & 
engineering 
no. 
36 
1 
2 
1 
1 
41 
Trading & Transportation & 
sales warehousing 
no. no. 
28 19 
2 
1 
29 24 
Finance & 
insurance 
no. 
34 
1 
1 
37 
Tourism & 
others 
no. 
34 
2 
1 
1 
2 
1 
41 
Whole 
sectors 
no. 
324 
14 
5 
57 
5 
2 
6 
1 
2 
16 
26 
458 
Note: The figures show the location of headquarters of the 45 largest business groups' affiliates as of 1986. The figures involve only the firms 
listed and identified as the member companies of the business groups in the Directory of Korean Business by the author. The affiliates in 
education, hospital, mass-media, sports, arts, etc are not included in the calculation. 
aA.M.F. denotes agricultural, fishery, and mining sectors. 
Source: Compiled and calculated from the Korea Productivity Centre, 1986. 
00 
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Branch plants 
Seoul 
Pusan 
Taegu 
Kyonggi 
Kang won 
North Chungch6ng 
South Chungch6ng 
North Ch6lla 
South Ch6lla 
North Kyongsang 
South Kyongsang 
Che ju 
Total 
Table 2.3 
Spatial Organisation of the 45 Largest Business Groups: Manufacturing Sector, 1986 
Seoul Pusan Taegu 
no. no. no. 
(48) 
18 (6) 
5 (5) 
100 
7 
11 
12 1 
10 
17 
28 
72 4 
2 
330 10 6 
Headquarters 
Kyonggi Kang won South 
Chungch6ng 
no. no. no. 
3 
(50) 
(2) 
1 
(5) 
1 
1 
2 
56 2 7 
North 
CM Ila 
no. 
(1) 
1 
North 
Kyongsang 
no. 
(13) 
13 
South 
Kyongsang 
no. 
1 
1 
3 
1 
(22) 
28 
Note: The plants belonging to trading companies, construction companies, primary sectors and overseas subsidiaries were not included in 
calculation. 
Source: Compiled and calculated from the Korea Productivity Centre, 1986. 
Total 
no. 
49 
27 
11 
153 
10 
12 
18 
12 
17 
42 
100 
2 
453 
Another key dimension in identifying the national linkage patterns of large 
corporations is the spatial pattern of branch offices. Indeed, Park's (1985) 
investigation of the location of branch offices revealed that most manufacturing 
corporations based in provincial areas are situating their branch offices in Seoul. 
Conversely, corporations with Seoul headquarters are basing most of their branch 
offices in local central cities (Table 2.4). This pattern suggests that the two different 
types of branch offices have distinctive functions. Local area branch offices are 
geared to supporting the product sales whereas those in Seoul have been established 
to make contact with foreign buyers, government institutions, financial agencies and 
to gather other information available in the capital. Thus, branch offices in Seoul 
function as headquarters (Park, S.O., 1985). Indeed, most presidents operate from 
their branch offices in Seoul. This phenomenon stems from the forced relocation of 
firms based in Seoul to provincial areas. Also, this is due to strong opposition from 
local people against relocating the headquarters of large corporations. The presidents 
are cautious about moving headquarters to other areas, because it may trigger 
antipathy which will result in the loss of their traditional market. 
3.2 Relationships with Small and Medium-sized Firms 
Regional economic impacts of large business organisations are best investigated 
by examining their transactions with subcontractors supplying parts and components. 
These small and medium-sized subcontracting firms are closely linked with regional 
economies. Most of these small subcontractors are owned by local entrepreneurs and 
use geographically bounded workers, particularly home-based female labourers. 
As modem manufacturing production shifts from mass-production to multi-
product, small-lot production, and competition in international markets intensifies, 
large Korean corporations have increased their reliance on subcontractors. Figure 2.4 
shows that the share of subcontractors in the total small and medium-sized firms 
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00 
w 
Headquarters 
Seoul 
no. 
Seoul 28 
Kyonggi 2 
Pusan 60 
South Kyongsang 
Taegu 20 
North Kyongsang 
South Chungch6ng 3 
South CMlla 3 
Others 1 
Total 117 
(per cent) 30.2 
Table 2.4 
Spatial Organisation of Large Business Corporations: Branch Offices, 1985 
Kyonggi 
no. 
90 
3 
93 
24.0 
Pusan 
no. 
46 
3 
1 
50 
12.9 
South 
Kyongsang 
no. 
56 
1 
1 
58 
15.0 
Branch offices 
Taegu North South South 
Kyongsang Chungch6ng Ch6lla 
no. no. no. no. 
14 12 18 9 
2 
14 12 20 9 
3.6 3.1 5.2 2.3 
Note: The figures include only the manufacturing corporations which employed more than 500 persons. 
Source: Park, S.O., 1985: 214. 
Others Total 
no. no. per cent 
14 287 74.2 
2 0.5 
69 17.8 
0.3 
21 5.4 
0.0 
3 0.8 
3 0.8 
0.3 
14 697 100.0 
3.6 100.0 
60 
50 
40 
-c 
Q) 
0 
30 
,_ 
Q) 
c.. 
20 
10 
0 
1971 1981 1985 1988 
year 
Source: MTI and KFSB, 1972, 1982, 1986 and 1989. 
Figure 2.4 
The Proportion of Subcontractors in Korea's Total 
Small and Medium-sized Firms, 1971-1988 
increased significantly from almost 24 per cent in 1971 to over 55 per cent in 1988. 
Also, the contribution of subcontracting production to the total shipments of 
subcontractors increased sharply over the same period. In 1988, more than 80 per 
cent of subcontractors derived almost 81 per cent of their business from 
subcontracting. 
The popularity of subcontracting stems from a variety of reasons (Lee, K.U., 
1988: 20-22). A parent firm can: react effectively to the changing production modes, 
multi-product and small-lot production; concentrate its managerial skills on more 
important areas, such as high value-added production and research and development 
sectors; minimise labour disputes; and make use of cheaper labour by increasing the 
use of subcontracting. Conversely, the small and medium-sized firms can secure a 
steady market despite an increasing dependence on the parent firms. Indeed, it is very 
difficult for small and medium-sized firms to survive as independent entities given 
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nsmg international competitive pressures. Both order-placing firms and 
subcontracting firms are mutually dependent. The external competitiveness of large 
corporations is based ultimately on the strength of their subcontractors. 
The increasing share of subcontracting production and the growing role of small 
and medium-sized subcontractors in balancing income distribution and further 
regional development prompted changes in Government's large organisation-centred 
economic policy. In 1984, 'The Act for Promoting Interconnection of Small and 
Medium-sized Firms', enacted in 1975, was revised by the Government: it allocated 
small and medium-sized enterprises to parent firms engaged in assembly production. 
This revision was prompted by the widening income gap between large and small 
companies which was undermining the industrial parts and components sector - the 
twin bases for stable economic development. The revised law strengthened 
Government's control over the linkages between large and small manufacturing firms. 
It required parent firms to use subcontractors to produce designated items. In 1988, 
however, small and medium-sized firms interconnected by the Government accounted 
for less than 4 per cent of the total. Most of the subcontracting transactions, however, 
were independent from Government regulation. 
Subcontracting transactions differed markedly between reg10ns (Table 2.5). 
While subcontractors accounted for up to three-fifths of the small and medium-sized 
firms in major cities, such as Seoul, and industrialised provinces, such as North 
Kyongsang and South Kyongsang, their share in other areas was about one-fifth. 
Table 2.5 shows that subcontractors in major cities and industrialised areas have 
greater contact with a range of parent firms than their counterparts in other areas. In 
particular, small and medium-sized firms in Seoul exhibited a number of distinctive 
features in subcontracting transactions. The 'subcontracting ratio' in Seoul is quite 
low compared with that of the other areas. Also, a large proportion of subcontracting 
firms have diversified their businesses into both subcontracting and market sales 
whereas their counterparts in other areas have specialised on the former. Further, the 
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Table 2.5 
Regional Share of Subcontracting Transactions, 1988 
Parent firmsb Subcontractingratioc 
Province Total small and Share of 
medium-sized firms subcontractinga 
2-5 6 - 20 21- -40 41 - 80 81 -
no. per cent per cent per cent per cent per cent per cent per cent per cent 
Seoul 15,652 60.0 12.7 46.7 23.7 16.9 54.0 6.7 39.3 
Pusan 6,033 61.0 0.8 39.2 41.5 18.5 11.8 18.4 69.8 
Taegu 4,264 52.5 0.6 52.8 26.7 19.9 20.2 7.8 72.0 
lnch6n 2,825 50.0 23.0 45.4 21.6 2.1 6.0 91.9 
00 
0\ Kwangju 592 51.1 13.9 52.9 22.0 11.2 3.3 13.8 82.9 
Kyonggi 11,958 69.2 35.5 45.4 19.1 7.8 16.7 75.5 
Kang won 887 10.3 21.1 46.6 13.4 18.9 10.0 6.4 83.6 
North Chungch6ng 751 22.2 0.6 71.2 21.9 6.3 11.0 14.8 74.2 
South Chungch6ng 2,024 21.3 0.5 58.8 31.6 9.1 12.l 6.9 81.0 
North Challa 1,473 36.0 0.2 71.6 25.5 2.7 9.3 4.3 86.4 
South Challa 1,636 21.7 73.6 24.4 2.0 11.3 13.5 75.2 
North Kyongsang 2,088 54.0 0.5 48.6 28.1 22.8 7.9 5.3 86.8 
South Kyongsang 2,712 52.5 3.8 48.5 23.3 16.3 6.9 11.6 81.5 
Che ju 194 2.6 80.0 20.0 33.3 33.4 33.3 
Total 53,089 55.5 4.6 43.2 34.5 17.7 7.9 11.4 80.7 
Note: a'Share of subcontracting' represents the proportion of subcontractors in the total number of small and medium-sized firms; b'Parent 
firms' refers to the order-placing firms with whom a subcontracting firm has transaction relationship; c·subcontracting ratio' denotes the 
percentage of subcontracting production in the total shipments of subcontracting firms. The total number of small and medium-sized firms 
included in this survey conducted in 1988 was 31,329 firms. 
Source: MTI and KFSB, 1989. 
business relationship of over half of the subcontracting firms in Seoul are restricted to 
small and medium-sized firms whereas the proportions in Pusan, Taegu, and Inchon 
were less than 3 per cent, less than 1 per cent, and less than 3 per cent, respectively. 
These results highlight that subcontractors in Seoul are much more diversified than 
their counterparts in other areas. Subcontractors in Seoul are distinguished by multi-
level hierarchies whereas those in provincial areas are non-hierarchical. Most 
industries in provincial areas are engaged in highly standardised and capital-intensive 
activities involving simple technology and few subcontractors. 
3.3 Inter-provincial Migration: Some Implications of Chaebols' Impact 
Given the regional impacts of both the chaebols and Government policies they 
should have had a marked effect on inter-provincial migration. This influence, 
however, is difficult to identify because migration is not only motivated by 
employment but by other activities, such as education. Nevertheless, the chaebols 
and Government industrial policies have had a decisive influence. Ultimately, the 
search for better education is job-related. 
Between 1960 and 1990, Korea recorded marked population movements (Table 
2.6). Seoul, Kyonggi and South Kyongsang provinces have experienced sharp 
increases at the expense of other provinces. South Kyongsang's reversal in fortunes 
during the 1970s stems from the Government's policy of locating large scale heavy 
and chemical industrial complexes there. Kyonggi's accelerated population growth, 
however, was delayed until the 1980s when the economy switched from heavy and 
chemical industries to technology-intensive activity. Concurrently, South 
Kyongsang's rate of growth declined. Nevertheless, Seoul's population rose from 
less than 10 per cent of the country in 1960 to over 25 per cent in 1990 - a reflection 
of the growth of office employment in both the public and private sectors. 
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Table 2.6 
Regional Share of Population, 1960-1990 
Province 1960 1966 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 
per cent per cent per cent per cent per cent per cent per cent 
Seoul 9.8 13.0 17.6 19.9 22.3 23.8 25.1 
Kyonggi 11.0 10.6 10.7 11.6 13.2 15.2 17.0 
Kangwon 6.6 6.3 5.9 5.4 4.8 4.3 3.8 
00 North ChungchOng 5.5 5.3 4.7 4.4 3.8 3.4 3.1 
00 
South ChungchOng 10.1 10.0 9.1 8.5 7.9 7.4 7.0 
North ChOlla 9.6 8.6 7.7 7.1 6.1 5.4 4.9 
South ChOlla 14.2 13.9 12.7 11.5 10.1 9.3 8.6 
North Kyongsang 15.4 15.3 14.5 14.0 13.2 12.4 11.8 
<Taegu> <2.7> <2.9> <3.4> <3.8> <4.3> <5.0> <5.3> 
South Kyongsang 16.7 15.8 15.9 16.6 17.3 17.4 17.4 
<Pusan> <4.7> <4.9> <6.0> <7.1> <8.4> <8.7> <8.9> 
Che ju 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 
Note: The data of 1990 is based on projection of the Economic Planning Board; The figures of Kyonggi, North Kyongsang, and South 
Kyongsang include the populations of their major cities InchOn, Taegu, and Pusan whose administrative boundaries are separated from 
them. 
Source: Economic Planning Board, 1960-1990. 
Table 2.7 showing the regional proportion of jobs occupied by migrants bolsters 
the argument that economic factors such as employment were the main force behind 
migration. In 1975, migrants provided more than four-fifths of Pusan's workforce. In 
1985, less than one-third of North Kyongsang's workforce were migrants. This 
disparity suggests that the shortage of labour in major cities and industrialised 
provinces has attracted migrants from those where employment was restricted. Also, 
job creation in the manufacturing sector was paramount over other sectors in dictating 
migration pattern. Over time, migration has been selective in attracting the 
economically-active young people from provincial areas and leaving behind the old 
and handicapped. 
Table 2.8 provides more detailed information on the proportion of migrants 
employed in the highly industrialised areas of Seoul, Pusan, Kyonggi, and South 
Kyongsang for the periods between 1976 and 1980 and between 1981 and 1985. 
Clearly, the contributions of intra-regional migrants and those from major cities and 
industrialised provinces is much lower compared with those from the less 
industrialised local areas, notably Kangwon, North Chungchong, South Chungchong, 
North Cholla, and South Cholla. Thus, these figures support the chaebol argument 
that migration is closely related to the impacts of the locational behaviour of chaebols 
and the Government's industrial policies. This is because only chaebols were able to 
locate their spatially-separated operating units in local targeted areas following the 
Government's industrial location policies. 
4 LOCATIONAL CHANGE AND INDUSTRIAL LOCATION POLICY 
Locational change in business activities has long been an attractive research 
theme for industrial geographers. This interest stems from the fact that it 
encompasses the effects of government policies, shifting industrial structures, 
organisational arrangements and, more widely, variations in regional economic 
conditions. Essentially, locational change or dynamics involves the relocation of 
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\0 
0 
Province 
Seoul 
Pusan 
Kyonggi 
Kang won 
North ChungchOng 
South ChungchOng 
North ChOlla 
South ChOlla 
North Kyongsang 
South Kyongsang 
Che ju 
Whole Country 
1971-75 
per cent 
67.8 
80.7 
77.8 
47.9 
57.6 
53.9 
37.6 
32.3 
38.0 
51.0 
66.0 
65.2 
Table 2.7 
Migration to Employment, 1971-1985 
Manufacturing sector 
1976-80 
per cent 
58.0 
74.1 
79.3 
50.8 
58.0 
52.2 
36.2 
30.9 
32.0 
63.9 
68.5 
60.8 
1981-85 
per cent 
60.9 
68.9 
78.9 
57.1 
56.5 
55.3 
37.4 
34.6 
28.9 
63.8 
63.2 
62.5 
1971-75 
per cent 
53.5 
65.1 
73.8 
49.9 
57.3 
56.8 
43.1 
30.1 
37.9 
52.0 
68.1 
54.3 
Other industrial sectors 
1976-80 
per cent 
44.6 
55.3 
73.2 
52.6 
57.4 
57.5 
41.6 
29.8 
30.7 
58.9 
66.6 
49.6 
1981-85 
per cent 
45.6 
48.6 
74.7 
54.8 
38.7 
58.4 
45.5 
36.2 
30.1 
58.8 
57.2 
51.3 
Note: Census data include only the migrants aged more than fourteen; The figures were calculated by following formula: (number of employees 
whose usual residences were in another provinces five years ago I total employees in particular areas) X 100. 
·Source: Calculated from EPB, 1973-1987. 
Table 2.8 
Proportion of the Migrants in the Labour Force for the Periods 1976-1980 and 1981-1985 
Destination Source area 
Seoul Pusan Kyonggi Kang won North South North South North South 
ChungchOng ChungchOng ChOlla ChOlla Ky6ngsang Kyongsang 
per cent per cent per cent per cent per cent per cent per cent per cent per cent per cent 
1976-1980a 
\0 Seoul 45.1 43.7 49.7 55.7 55.4 54.8 57.3 58.6 51.0 49.4 
-
Pusan 49.6 46.4 53.3 57.1 60.8 54.1 60.2 62.5 56.5 53.3 
Kyonggi 48.8 49.6 50.7 58.6 59.1 56.2 59.6 61.4 55.3 52.9 
South Kyongsang 54.4 56.0 58.7 56.4 57.9 58.5 65.3 65.3 58.5 51.1 
Whole country 46.8 48.2 50.9 53.3 52.7 52.4 54.1 53.2 51.0 52.4 
1981-1985b 
Seoul 36.8 35.3 33.3 45.4 46.3 46.1 46.4 49.5 41.7 38.2 
Pusan 38.8 36.5 38.8 47.0 45.6 41.9 48.7 54.7 42.8 43.8 
Kyonggi 39.4 38.7 39.6 48.4 48.8 47.8 50.1 52.2 44.2 40.8 
South Kyongsang 44.9 43.9 43.0 46.8 49.9 49.0 56.7 55.7 47.6 41.5 
Whole country 38.0 38.2 38.9 41.7 42.4 42.3 42.5 41.7 40.2 41.5 
Note: aThe figures of 1976-1980 refer to the employment rate of the migrants aged over 14; bThe figures of 1981-1985 denote the employment 
rate of the migrants aged more than five. 
Source: Calculated from EPB, 1978-1987. 
business activities. Usually, however, locational change comprises changes in the 
spatial pattern of business activities stemming from the birth, death, relocation, 
differential growth and the organisational rearrangement of firms (Park, S.O., 1981: 
8). 
4.1 Locational Change of Manufacturing Firms 
Since the early 1960s, Korean manufacturing has experienced marked locational 
shifts (Table 2.9). Although locational change in the manufacturing sector exhibits 
different patterns according to the indices used, a number of common features 
characterise the general pattern of locational dynamics between 1963 and 1988. 
Seoul's proportion of employment and production has declined markedly but its 
share of the number of manufacturing plants has increased. This pattern reflects the 
establishment of many small firms in Seoul between 1963 and 1988. Others, 
including large corporations, relocated to other areas, mainly Kyonggi province. The 
relocation from Seoul to the rest of Kyonggi province was much easier, particularly 
for small and medium-sized firms, because they could sustain contacts and linkages 
with Seoul (Choe, S.C., 1986: 23). Indeed, Kyonggi increased its share in all indices 
between 1963 and 1988. Kyonggi was the only region which maintained a high 
growth rate between 1980 and 1988 - a period when the nation's industrial structure 
shifted from heavy industry to technology-intensive sectors. 
The close relationship between changes in industrial structure and variations in 
locational pattern exhibited by Kyonggi is also reflected in South Kyongsang. While 
the former has experienced a marked increase, South Kyongsang has stagnated. Plant 
numbers in Kyonggi have increased but they have declined in South Kyongsang. 
This divergent behaviour stems from the incursion of manufacturing into South 
Kyongsang being led by large corporations without an accompanying growth 
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Table 2.9 
Locational Dynamics of Manufacturing Sector, 1963-1988 
Province Plants Employees Production 
1963 1970 1980 1988 1963 1970 1980 1988 1963 1970 1980 1988 
per cent per cent per cent per cent per cent per cent per cent per cent per cent per cent per cent per cent 
Seoul 24.0 23.7 24.8 28.6 29.6 33.9 22.1 17.7 33.7 33.2 16.2 12.1 
\0 Pusan 10.8 8.6 11.8 10.9 17.2 16.0 15.8 13.2 18.1 16.7 11.3 8.3 
w 
Kyonggi 8.8 9.2 19.0 29.5 10.2 12.1 23.8 30.8 11.0 13.l 22.4 32.1 
Kang won 3.5 4.3 3.0 1.6 2.0 2.2 1.1 0.9 1.8 1.5 1.3 1.2 
North Chungchang 3.4 3.3 2.3 1.4 2.5 2.3 2.0 2.4 4.1 2.9 2.1 2.5 
South Chungchang 8.7 8.0 5.8 3.7 5.9 5.3 4.4 3.8 4.5 5.9 3.9 3.6 
North Challa 7.4 6.7 3.9 2.8 6.0 4.2 2.7 2.5 4.8 3.7 2.3 2.1 
South Challa 9.2 11.4 7.0 3.9 6.2 4.9 3.3 3.3 5.0 2.9 9.2 6.3 
North Kyongsang 15.2 16.5 14.6 11.6 14.5 11.5 13.1 12.3 12.7 8.1 12.2 12.5 
South Kyongsang 8.1 7.1 7.0 5.7 5.3 7.0 11.5 12.8 3.7 11.8 19.0 19.4 
Che ju 0.9 1.3 0.8 0.3 0.8 0.6 0.2 0.1 0.5 0.3 0.1 0.1 
Source: Economic Planning Board, 1965-1990. 
in the number of small and medium-sized firms. Apart from Kyanggi and South 
Kyangsang all the other areas experienced a decline in their share of national 
production. Indeed, Kangwan, North Chungchang, South Chungchang, North Challa, 
and South Challa experienced an absolute decrease in plant numbers during the 
period of heavy and chemical industrialisation ( 1972-1981 ). 
By 1986, almost one-quarter of all manufacturing firms had relocated. Most of 
them had been short-distance moves within the same municipality (70 per cent) or to 
adjacent provinces (26 per cent)_ 14 Only 4 per cent of firms had moved towards the 
centre of cities or engaged in 'long-distance relocation' to more remote provinces 
(MTI, KLDC and KEIC, 1988: 360). This implies that the locational patterns of less-
industrialised local areas were largely influenced by the newly established companies, 
particularly chaebols' affiliates, rather than by the relocations of existing companies. 
The locational behaviour of large corporations differed from those patterns 
between 1967 and 1987. Table 2.10 shows the regional share of large manufacturing 
firms which have more than 500 employees. Most of them would be the affiliates or 
branch plants of chaebols. Although their overall share increased during the 1970s 
and then declined during the 1980s there were marked regional differences. While 
the proportion of large firms in Seoul, Pusan, and Kyanggi declined between 1970 
and 1988, other areas, such as North Chungchang, South Chungchong, North Challa, 
South Challa, North Kyangsang and South Kyangsang increased their share of 
employment and Kangwan, North Chungchang, North Challa, South Challa and 
South Kyongsang their share of production. Generally, the contribution of large firms 
to employment creation in declining areas is quite low compared with their share of 
production. Indeed, Table 2.10 can be interpreted in two ways. Firstly, the location 
of large firms in depressed areas contributed very little to the birth and growth of 
small and medium-sized firms. Secondly, only large firms engaged in standardised, 
14. The survey of MTI, KLDC and KEIC included 25,234 manufacturing firms which employed more 
than ten persons. This is equivalent to 84.3 per cent of all enumerated in the 1985 census. 
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\0 
VI 
Province 
Seoul 
Pusan 
Kyonggi 
Kangwon 
North ChungchOng 
South ChungchOng 
North ChOlla 
South ChOlla 
North Kyongsang 
South Kyongsang 
Whole Nation 
1967 
per cent 
27.9 
42.0 
37.0 
15.0 
24.9 
19.9 
26.8 
17.3 
16.0 
20.6 
27.5 
Table 2.10 
The Regional Share of Large Manufacturing Firms, 1967-1987 
Employment 
1970 
per cent 
38.3 
43.8 
42.8 
30.2 
30.2 
27.5 
25.0 
20.1 
15.3 
45.6 
35.0 
1980 
per cent 
37.6 
49.4 
39.0 
20.9 
53.0 
38.3 
41.0 
31.3 
30.7 
64.0 
41.9 
1987 
per cent 
22.5 
41.1 
31.1 
17.8 
55.3 
35.7 
30.4 
36.6 
29.7 
63.2 
35.5 
1967 
per cent 
31.2 
42.2 
51.5 
46.1 
41.6 
51.4 
33.9 
25.4 
28.1 
70.5 
40.3 
Note: The figures indicate the percentage share of the firms which employed more than 500 persons. 
Source: Economic Planning Board, 1969-1989. 
Production 
1970 
per cent 
53.0 
51.3 
51.9 
32.9 
52.0 
59.3 
51.1 
38.3 
36.7 
80.3 
53.9 
1980 
per cent 
48.2 
53.1 
49.2 
43.6 
67.0 
55.5 
60.8 
79.7 
56.2 
76.6 
59.1 
1987 
per cent 
34.1 
43.2 
44.8 
50.7 
63.6 
51.3 
54.5 
79.3 
54.8 
75.8 
53.6 
capital-intensive production could survive m depressed areas while small and 
medium-sized firms were best catered for in major cities. Whether the divergent 
interpretations are sound or not, the high proportion of large firms in local areas 
highlights that they have dominated Korea's locational dynamics. Moreover, their 
influence would be much greater if the investigation had extended to all the 
corporations employing more than 300 persons - the large firm threshold in Korea. 
4.2 Government's Industrial Location Policy 
The concentration of economic power on a few monopolistic corporations has 
been the main preoccupation of economists. Conversely, its regional concentration, 
reflected in the distribution of population and industrial firms, has been the major 
concern of planners. Coping with these twin dimensions has been a fundamental 
research topic in capitalist countries. In Korea, the concentration of population in a 
few large cities, particularly Seoul, has been the ultimate issue faced by regional 
planners. The Korean Government, like its counterparts in other areas of the world, 
has recognised that creating a rational distribution of industrial activities is one of the 
most effective means for redistributing population and, ultimately, for achieving 
balanced regional development. Therefore, the Korean Government has intervened 
energetically in the locational decision-making of private companies by controlling 
the development of industrial estates. The proportion of planned location have 
increased from less than 11 per cent in 1966 to more than 26 per cent in 1971 and to 
almost 45 per cent in 1986 (Korea Research Institute for Human Settlements, pers. 
comm.). Given the Government's overriding concern with achieving rapid economic 
growth it was difficult to redistribute industries equitably while simultaneously 
deriving the benefits of efficiency arising from the agglomeration of industries. 
Hence, the Korean Government has pursued the development of large industrial 
complexes to achieve both equity and efficiency. 
Chronologically, the first industrial estate was established in Ulsan in 1962 to 
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accommodate the nation's key industrial plants_ 15 As an import duty free zone the 
Export Industrial Estate was developed in Kuro-dong, Seoul, between 1963 and 1973 
with the so-called export processing zones being designated in 1970 at Masan, South 
Kyongsang province, and in 1973 at Iri, North Challa province. In 1968, the 'Local 
Industrial Development Law' was enacted to promote industrial estates in specified 
local areas expecting to reduce regional disparities between Seoul and local cities. By 
1988, twenty-two local industrial estates had been developed in local cities. Further, 
the Korean Government enacted the 'Heavy Industrial Complex Development Act' in 
1973 to provide sites for heavy industries - the national priority during the 1970s. 
Most of the large-scale heavy and chemical industrial estates were developed along 
the Southeastern Coastal Area at Pohang, Ulsan, Onsan, Changwon and Y6ch6n. 
In 1977, the Korean Government enacted the 'National Plan for Population 
Redistribution for the Capital Region' to manage the problem of capital region's 
population in a more comprehensive way by widening the areas subject to industrial 
relocation program to encompass the whole nation. The law introduced the concept 
of dividing the nation into three different categories: the 'dispersal zone' which 
encompassed Seoul and its northern vicinity encouraged relocation; the 'status-quo 
zone' which included Pusan and its vicinity and Seoul's satellite cities discouraged 
expansions of existing industries; and the 'inducement zone' which covered the rest 
of the country attracted industries (Kwon, W.Y., 1985: 25). Both the 1977 legislation 
and the 'Industrial Distribution Law' of 1978 tried to integrate both negative controls 
over dispersal zones and positive incentives for inducement zones. According to the 
law, the Government can issue relocation orders to undesirable plants, such as those 
permitted in non-conforming zones by municipal zoning ordinances and pollution-
prone plants. Moreover, the Korean Government has continually sought to introduce 
industries into rural area. The 'New Community Factory Program', the 'Farm 
Household Side-business Program', the 'Development of Folkcraft Industry', and 
15. The information in this paragraph is reliant on Choe, S.C. (1986). 
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more recently, the 'Farm Household Income Source Development Law' of 1983 were 
enacted to encourage the development of rural industrial estates. 
The Government, however, could not catch the two 'rabbits' equity and 
efficiency - simultaneously. Most of the developed industrial estates were 
concentrated in the Southeastern Coastal Area, North Kyongsang, South Kyongsang, 
and more recently, South Challa. Nevertheless, unencumbered locations were 
increased in Kyonggi province which was essentially Seoul's hinterland (Appendix 
2.2). Due to the peculiar locational requirements of newly-introduced technology-
intensive industries, there have been clear limits in regulating the locational decision-
making of private enterprises. Further, the industrial estate development policy was 
not effective for small and medium-sized firms. The occurrence of small firms in 
planned locations was two to three times lower than that of their large counterparts. 
While the percentage share of planned location of companies which employed less 
than 30 persons was less than 12 per cent, that of the companies whose employees 
were between 300 and 999, and above 1,000 were almost 38 per cent and more than 
41 per cent, respectively (MTI, 1988: 357). On reflection, the Government's 
industrial location policy has reinforced the 'bipolar' concentration of industry - the 
creation of new industrial concentration in the Southeastern Coastal Area and the 
dispersion of Seoul's population and industries over a wider area. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In examining the development of chaebols this chapter has highlighted: the 
Korean Government's influence on their growth; distinctive features of their 
operations and their spatial organisation; and their impact on changes in the 
distribution of industry and population. Korea's large business organisations have 
emerged by cooperating with the Government in its economic development program. 
More investment funds and other advantages have been given to entrepreneurs who 
have followed the Government's policy directions. Reflecting this symbiotic 
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relationship, the industrial structure of chaebols has matched policy shifts. In 
particular, this symbiosis has resulted in such distinctive features as business 
diversification and extreme economic concentration among chaebols. Given the 
Government's ubiquitous influence on corporate growth, industrial structure, location, 
and labour markets, it is an essential ingredient in any analysis of the Korean space 
economy. Needless to say, the Korean Government's policy-making, in turn, has 
been strongly influenced by changes within the world economy. Thus, the nation's 
industrialisation process is well explained by the circuits of capital model in 
international scale. 
As chaebols have grown up, they have extended their business networks 
throughout the nation. The creation of their spatial organisations has made regional 
economies more dependent on decision-making undertaken in their headquarters, 
notably Seoul. The organising mechanisms of multi-locational enterprises have 
dictated the country's regional economic shifts, locational changes within industries 
and the spatial division of labour. Given the nature of their spatial organisations the 
value-added created by the local operating units of chaebols has been transferred to 
their Seoul headquarters. Further, business connections between spatially-separated 
operating units of chaebols and their subcontractors have substantial implications for 
regional economic development. 
As consumer demand has diversified, Korean firms have adapted by pursuing 
flexible production methods (i.e., from mass production through multi-products to 
small-lot manufacturing). The pursuit 'flexibility', however, has differed from their 
Western counterparts. Essentially, Korean firms have adopted Japanese-style inter-
firm flexibility (hierarchical subcontracting organisations) rather than intra-firm 
flexibility (flexible specialisation). Although many small and medium-sized firms 
have been interconnected with large corporations, particularly since the mid 1970s, 
their incorporation rates differed markedly between regions. While large 
metropolitan cities and major industrial provinces showed high interconnection rates, 
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other areas which were alienated from chaebols' spatial production networks reflected 
negligible rates. Thus, the development of subcontracting in particular areas has been 
heavily influenced by the spatial organisation of chaebols rather than the location of 
cheap labour. 
The locational changes and the industrial restructuring of chaebols has resulted 
in enormous inter-provincial population movements. Many economically-active 
young people migrated from provincial areas to major cities and industrialised 
provinces looking for jobs. The Government has sought to cope with the unbalanced 
regional development problems by seeking to guide locational decision-making by 
private companies. This study supports the argument that locational changes in 
industries within depressed provincial areas were largely influenced by large business 
organisation. Korea's spatial dynamics of industry and population have been strongly 
influenced by changes in the location of chaebol activities and government policy 
shifts. 
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CHAPTER3 
INTERNATIONALISATION OF CHAEBOLS 
National, regional and local economic problems have to be considered from a 
world economic perspective. Present-day business managers have to optimise their 
management activities from a global viewpoint. They draw capital from sources with 
the cheapest capital cost. They locate plants where production costs are lowest. They 
sell their commodities in markets offering the greatest economies of scale. This does 
not mean, however, that globalisation is paramount. It implies that the influence of 
globalisation has increased substantially. Multinational corporations (MNCs) and 
newly-emerging global corporations have played a leading role in forming global 
economic systems.I In 1972, almost one-third of world trade comprised intra-firm 
exchanges within multinational corporations (Palloix, 1977: 7). Further, Ballance and 
Sinclair (1983) have stressed that MNCs accounted for 50 per cent of trade between 
high-income industrialised countries (Douglass, 1988: 344). In 1987, about 23 per 
cent of Korea's exports and 17 per cent of its imports were intra-organisational 
transactions between home and overseas subsidiaries (Bank of Korea, pers. comm.). 
The internationalisation of corporations has been described by Lee and Mun 
(1988: 18) as the degree of foreign influence in trade, production, finance and 
technology acquisition. This study, however, does not equate 'internationalisation' or 
'foreign influence' with 'foreign dependence' .2 Foreign influence is seen to be 
secondary to the logic of domestic capital movement (Park, S.K., 1990: 14-19). Apart 
from the foreign aid-oriented period of economic development during the 1950s and 
1. The corporations which manage their business in a number of countries are referred to as 
multinational, transnational, global, borderless and, sometimes, stateless corporations. Although 
definitions vary, all of them manage businesses in a number of overseas countries. 
2. Dependency theory insists that the characteristics of developing countries' economy are defined 
unilaterally by the capital movement logic of developed countries. 
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early 1960s, the Korean economy has been managed solely by the Korean 
Government to meet national goals. During the 1980s, the contribution of direct 
foreign investment in net inflow of long-term private capital has always been less than 
5 per cent compared with 60-70 per cent in Singapore and Taiwan (Lee, W.Y., 1987: 
3). 
This chapter examines: the foreign influence on the growth of Korean large 
business organisations; chaebols' internationalisation; and the regional economic 
effects of the former two factors. Initially, this chapter considers the impact of 
foreign capital inducement on the growth of chaebols. Then it outlines regional 
economic implications of the internationalisation of Korean economy (Section 1). 3 It 
discusses the effect of general trading companies (GTCs) on the growth of chaebols 
and the expansion of Korean exports in detail (Section 2). Finally, it shifts interest to 
the last stage of internationalisation process, direct foreign investment by Korean 
firms and its regional economic impact (Section 3).4 
1 INTRODUCTION OF FOREIGN CAPITAL AND CHAEBOL GROWTH 
The internationalisation of a national economy or a corporation can be 
considered as part of the process of evolution. Four major internationalisation stages 
of the Korean economy can be identified: foreign aid; introduction of foreign loans; 
export promotion; and overseas production. In the process of responding to the 
shifting foreign influences and domestic needs Korea's economic internationalisation 
has been refashioned. This chapter examines the shifting characteristics of Korea's 
economic internationalisation and its impacts on the growth of chaebols, industrial 
location, industrial restructuring, and regional economy. 
3. Three fundamental problems exist in dealing with the regional economic impacts of the 
internationalisation of chaebols: the division of domestic and overseas impacts are not clear; the 
internationalisation of corporations can occur both at home and overseas; and regional economic 
impacts stemming from the outward direct investment by Korean firms is difficult to analyse because . 
their domicile is overseas. Indirect evidence has to be cited. 
4. This study does not cover inward direct investments and relationships between Korean finns and 
foreign MNCs in Korea. 
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1.1 Foreign Aid 
Korea's war-torn economy was rescued by foreign aid. During the 1950s, it 
was the main source of capital for financing public institutions, reconstructing social 
infrastructure and rehabilitating industrial facilities (Figure 3.1 ). The main items of 
foreign aid were the United States' surplus agricultural products and other raw 
materials. Between 1953 and 1961, they accounted for three-quarters of the total aid 
under the International Cooperation Administration (ICA) program. Aid comprised 
28 per cent 'facility materials' (manufacturing facility was only 4 per cent) and 72 per 
cent raw materials such as agricultural products, crude rubber, fertiliser and artificial 
fibre. Another important program, PL 480, accounting for 9 per cent of total aid 
during the same period, was composed solely of surplus agricultural products from 
the United States (Chung, I.Y., 1987: 144-145). 
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Figure 3.1 
Contribution of Foreign Aid in Post-war Korean Economy, 
1957-1960 
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1961 
Most pre-chaebol corporations commenced business by processing aid 
materials. Aid, comprising goods and foreign currencies5, was allocated on a 
preferential basis to a few large corporations and justified in terms of efficiency. 
Materials were processed in requisitioned Japanese factories with overseas machinery 
bought by the aid dollar. As illustrated by the Samsung Group's Cheil Sugar & 
Corporation, the required capital (both domestic and foreign currency) was generated 
from Government sources. Samsung President Lee Byung-Chull (1986: 66), writing 
in his autobiography, stated that he had borrowed US$ 180,000 in 1953 from the 
Government to obtain manufacturing equipment from overseas sources. Later, he 
borrowed 20 million hwan6 from the government-run Commerce and Industry Bank 
to overcome the capital shortfall required to build a factory with the support of the 
Ministry of Trade and Industry. 
Foreign aid played a decisive role in changing the characteristics of the 
Korean economy by shifting its industrial structure from a position of self-reliance to 
one of overseas dependence. Almost all of the raw materials of the consumer goods 
industry - a major sector of the Korean economy - were derived from foreign 
sources. In 1961, when foreign aid was curtailed, the shortfall of overseas raw 
materials and foreign currencies was reflected in a decline in operating rates of 
factory of 23 per cent in flour milling, 26 per cent in sugar, 35 per cent in alcohol, 58 
per cent in rubber shoes, 35 per cent in soap, and 50 per cent in cotton textiles (Lee, 
D.K., 1987: 164). Established without reference to locally-produced materials, the 
consumer goods industry, therefore, was central to Korea's economic structure being 
dependent on overseas sources. 
Further, the imports devastated Korea's agricultural production - the then 
leading sector of the economy (Table 3.1). In 1968, for example, the area devoted to 
5. As the Korean currency was highly overvalued against the US dollar - two to three times - its 
allocation was a great preference to chaebol (Kang, Choe and Chung, 1991: 129). 
6. Hwan was changed to won by the currency reform in 1962. 
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Table 3.1 
Rice Introduction through Foreign Aid, 1956-1959 
Domestic deficiency Foreign aid Excessive introduction 
1,000 sog 1,000 sog 1,000 sog 
1956 3,092 3,092 
1957 5,899 6,318 419 
1958 4,388 6,465 2,077 
1959 1,018 1,890 872 
Note: One sog is 5.12 US bushels or 47.6 US gallons. 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries cited by Chung, I.Y., 1987: 155. 
cotton was less than 10 per cent of its 1940s peak. Foreign aid, especially in 
agricultural commodities, changed the pattern of Korean consumption. Inevitably, 
there were huge imports of raw materials. The ostracized farmers flocked into major 
cities and created a huge reservoir of unemployed labour. This abundant supply of 
cheap labour was the dominant factor in Korea's accelerated industrialisation. As the 
finance derived from selling aid goods required the donor's approval, the Korean 
economy was controlled by external forces, not by the Korean Government. The 
latter had to contribute half the cost of a survey commitment by the U.S.A. to 
investigate the investment potential for its firms in Korea. Aid materials were 
orchestrated at the whim of the United States of America - increases and curtailment 
being dictated by its felt needs. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, when foreign aid 
was reduced, the Korean Government had to speedily enact the Foreign Capital 
Introduction Law (1966), Free Trade Area Establishment Law, and the Special 
Labour Law for Foreign Companies to attract foreign capital. Until then, the Korean 
Government's economic development plan was determined by the donor. 
The increased level of overseas 'involvement' in the Korean economy did not 
equate to 'internationalisation'. Korea was still a typical agricultural country geared 
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to domestic rather than overseas markets. Also, local and import-substitution 
industries were centred on the domestic market. Yet foreign aid was critical because: 
it played the role of midwife in inducing the birth of chaebols; it shifted Korea's 
industrial structure from self-reliance to overseas-dependency; and it created a huge 
labour army by devastating rural society. The reservoir of labour played a pivotal role 
in Korea's subsequent industrialisation. 
1.2 Foreign Loan 
In 1962, the military government, as discussed in Chapter 2, prepared an 
ambitious, even visionary, economic development plan under the slogan of 'liberation 
from the four millennium hunger'. Its thrust was to develop a more autonomous 
economy. Under this new regime, materials were produced by local firms to replace 
those derived primarily from foreign aid. The reduction of foreign aid, however, 
created problems for the Korean Government. Funds were required to provide the 
continuous inflow of raw materials necessary for the overseas-dependent industries 
established during the 1950s. As the country's fledgling banking sector was unable to 
provide this investment the Government had no option but to seek funds overseas. 
Hence, the success of the Government's plan hinged on the smooth introduction of 
foreign loans. 
A military government handicapped Korea's search for foreign capital. This 
prompted the Korean Government to encourage private enterprises to take the lead in 
negotiating the introduction of foreign capital. As their credit rating was low the 
Government had to guarantee these commercial loans. By the early 1960s, this 
cooperation established a stable relationship between the Government and the 
chaebols. The need to repay borrowed money led to the Government shifting from an 
inward to an outward-looking development policy. Foreign loans were required to 
construct the nation's basic industries, notably oil refining, fertilizer, and iron and 
steel. 
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After the mid 1960s, there was an influx of foreign capital. In 1965, relations 
with Japan were normalised. This led to commercial loans and joint venture 
activities. Although the construction of basic industry plants relied on foreign capital, 
the nature of 'international involvement' had changed. For the first time, the Korean 
Government was able to establish an autonomous development plan albeit within the 
constraints of a heavy repayment burden. Unlike foreign aid, which was dictated by 
external forces, foreign loans were controlled by internal forces. 
This raises questions about the effects of foreign loans on the growth of 
chaebols. Between 1963 and 1970, foreign loans were a very important capital source 
for corporations (Figure 3.2). As only large corporations could obtain foreign loans 
their effect on the growth of chaebols was paramount. They permitted the chaebols to 
increase their productivity markedly by introducing advanced machinery and 
technology from overseas.7 With outdated facilities and technologies, indigenous, 
small and medium-sized firms could not compete with chaebols and were rapidly 
eliminated from the business arena. 
The advantages of access to foreign capital were reinforced by a high 
proportion of domestic bank credits being allocated to chaebols at preferential interest 
rates. Domestic funds were apportioned to the corporations that had obtained the 
necessary foreign capital to introduce machinery and technology from overseas. 
Consequently, Figure 3.2 shows that domestic bank loans were increased in tandem 
with foreign loans. During the 1960s, over 70 per cent of bank credits were directed 
to large corporations (Park, S.K., 1990: 39). After the foreign loans, funds from 
domestic banks provided the greatest impetus to chaebols because of the marked 
difference in interest rate between the nominal loan and the special loan for export 
and strategic industries. In 1967, the difference was 20 per cent (see Appendix 2.1). 
7. Redundant or overlapped overseas technology introduction was strictly regulated by the Government 
to save foreign currencies. This policy resulted in the same effect of approving monopoly. 
107 
-c 
G> 
u 
.... 
G> 
c.. 
100 
80 
60 
40 
20 
0 
D Others 
El Private loan 
[3 Foreign loan 
El Bank loan 
• Stock 
1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 
Year 
Source: Bank of Korea, 1978 cited by Lee, J.H., 1987: 210. 
Figure 3.2 
External Capital Reliance of Corporations, 
/ "' / / 
... ' ......... 
/ / / / 
... ... ... ... ... 
/ / / ... 
... ... ... ... ... 
/ "' / / 
... ... ... ... ... 
/ / / / 
... ... ... ... ... 
/ / ... / 
... ... ... ... ... 
... / / / 
... ... ... ... ... 
/ / / / 
.... ... ... ' ... 
1969 
1963-1970 
/ / / .I / 
............ 
... / / / / 
............ 
/ / ... / ... 
............ 
,/' ... / / ... 
............. 
/ / ...... / 
............ 
/ ... .... / / 
............ 
/ / / / / 
............ 
/ / / / / 
... ' ...... / ...... / / 
............ 
1970 
Given that foreign loans had to be repaid, the Government used its powers to support 
the corporations that had used this facility. 
In its desire to boost the international competitiveness of Korean products, the 
Government encouraged the rapid growth of chaebols. It had no option because 
Korea had no comparative advantage over developed countries in supplying capital, 
technology and management techniques. Hence, the Government concentrated the 
country's scarce capital resources on large corporations to secure economies of scale. 
Already, in the 1960s, the large corporations and export-oriented industries came to 
dominate the Korean economy. 
Also, a range of tax reduction or exemption measures were introduced to 
encourage the growth of export industries. These export bounties made overseas 
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trade more profitable than production for the domestic market. Not surprisingly, the 
Government's outward-looking development policies resulted in the rapid increase of 
exports (Figure 3.3). Reliance on foreign capital and markets integrated the Korean 
economy into the world economy and made it sensitive to global fluctuations. In tum, 
these fluctuations prompted the Korean Government to accelerate the restructuring of 
Korean industry. 
In the 1970s, foreign loans played a decisive role in Korea's heavy and 
chemical industrialisation. Initially, governmental policymakers planned to draw 
more than 40 per cent of the required investment capital from overseas (KDI, 1974: 
74). Although the Korean Government sought capital from overseas sources it was 
cautious about direct foreign investment. Initially, joint-ventures with foreign MNCs 
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and inward direct investment involving 100 per cent of funds from overseas were 
regulated by the Government. These reservations were prompted by Korea's past 
colonial experience. Exceptions were made when there was no other way of securing 
capital, technology and sales networks. By 1982, more than 81 per cent of the top 4 
chaebols' joint-ventures (total 32 cases) were concentrated in the machinery sector 
because of the need to acquire the requisite technology (Lee, J.H., 1986: 147). 
However, as most types of business were new to Korean entrepreneurs joint-venture 
was common. 
The integration of large corporations into the world economic system has led 
to a restructuring of the organisation of small and medium-sized firms. Smaller firms 
were incorporated into the business networks of chaebols which, in turn, had links 
with foreign MNCs. In 1989, almost 42 per cent of the exports from these small and 
medium-sized firms relied on local letters of credit (UC) mostly come from chaebols 
(KFSB, 1989). Indeed, the internationalisation of chaebols and their cooperation with 
foreign MNCs resulted in smaller firms' internationalisation. Further, the high 
proportion of exports from original equipment manufacturers (OEM) in the total 
exports of chaebols is indicative of their close relationship with foreign MN Cs. 8 For 
example, more than 80 per cent of refrigerators were produced with foreign MNC' s 
trade mark (Figure 3.4). Such business cooperation is inevitable in the increasingly 
complex business environment. 
1.3 REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF INTERNATIONALISATION 
The prime result of the internationalisation of the Korean economy has been 
the emergence of Seoul as a global trade centre. More than 86 per cent of trade 
agents are concentrated in Seoul - the equivalent figure for the Seoul Metropolitan 
8. 'Original equipment manufacturer' (OEM) implies that the manufacturers produce items with the 
buyer's trademark. This phenomenon reflects the new international division of labour. 
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Area is more than 92 per cent (Table 3.2). Most agents outside of the Seoul 
Metropolitan Area are affiliates of large corporations. Predominantly, their business 
is operated through the Seoul branch offices. The concentration of international trade 
activities on Seoul is almost total. This stranglehold over trade activities has attracted 
manufacturing activities. The rapid growth of Seoul has been intensified by 
internationalisation. 
Indeed, Korea's regional development and industrial location can be explained 
by reference to internationalisation. The manufacturing growth of Southeastern 
Coastal Area, for example, has been influenced by the Port of Pusan which handled 
about 98 per cent of Korea's total container movement in 1987 (Ministry of 
Transportation, 1988). Considering Korea's typical trade structure - import of raw 
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Table 3.2 
Location Pattern of Korea's Trade Agents, 1990 
General End user Foreign Total 
trader trader trader 
no. no. no. no., per cent 
Seoul 4,074 225 183 4,482 86.1 
Kyonggi 123 105 12 240 4.6 
<Inchon> 31 57 2 90 1.7 
Kangwon 1 1 2 0.0 
North Chungchong 3 2 2 7 0.1 
South Chungchong 6 4 10 0.2 
<Taejon> 5 1 6 0.1 
North Cholla 4 2 6 0.1 
South Cholla 3 3 6 0.1 
North Kyongsang 10 71 2 83 1.6 
<Taegu> 18 4 22 0.4 
Kyongsang 17 28 6 51 1.0 
<Pusan> 168 29 5 202 3.9 
Che ju 1 1 0.0 
Total 4,463 532 213 5,208 100.0 
Source: Compiled and calculated from AFTAK, 1990. 
materials, processing and commodity export - port location was of paramount 
importance in siting industries, particularly heavy and chemical industry. 
Furthermore, the development of the Western Coastal Area can be attributed 
to anticipated trade expansion with China. Following its open door policy, since 
1979, the Chinese Government has opened coastal cities to foreign entrepreneurs (5 
special economic zones, 14 coastal open cities and 9 delta area cities). This had 
prompted the Korean Government and chaebols to accelerate development in the 
Western Coastal Area. The Government is constructing expressways, large-scale 
industrial estates, ports and their supporting urban structures. In turn, the chaebols 
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are constructing large-scale factories. In 1987, the Government announced 
development projects in the Western Coastal Areas in preparation for trade with 
China. The main industrial estate development were Sihwa District Development 
Project, Asan Industrial Basement Construction Project, Kunsan-Changhang 
Industrial Basement Construction Project, Second Kunsan Industrial Estate, and 
Daebul Industrial Estate Construction Projects (Figure 3.5). These large-scale 
projects will also assist balanced regional development though this is secondary to the 
attractions of trade with China. 
Most factory sites have been secured by major chaebols and they have been 
hastening to construct large-scale plants. For example, Kia Automobile secured a 
400,000 pyong factory site in Asan Industrial Estate among the total developed 
1,000,000 pyong.9 Kia is constructing an automobile assembly line with an annual 
capacity of 600,000 cars. Also, it is planning to attract 60 subcontracting companies 
to the district. Daewoo Automobile is planning to locate a new assembly factory in 
the Second Kunsan Industrial Estate and to attract 100 parts and components 
subcontracting companies to the site. Also, Dongyang Chemical of Dongyang Group, 
Daehan Heavy Machinery of Kia Group, Cheil Sugar of Samsung Group are 
constructing factories in the Kunsan-Changhang Industrial Complex. Further, 
Samsung and Hyundai are building rival large-scale petrochemical complexes in 
Sosan District of South Chungchong province. This will be Korea's third 
petrochemical complex constructed by these two private companies - the others being 
at the Ulsan and Yochon (Lee, S.J., 1988: 278-282). 
2 KOREAN GENERAL TRADING COMPANIES 
During the early 1970s Korea's trade policies governing its exports had to be 
restructured. The main reasons were: the strengthening of import regulations in 
developed countries following the world-wide recession after the oil crisis in 1973; 
9. One pyong is 3.3058 square meter. 
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the further intensification of competition, particularly in light industries, from other 
late-developing countries; the aggravation of foreign debt stemming from imports of 
raw materials and production facilities for light industries; the Government's inability 
to further subsidise export activities to the same extent as during the 1960s boom; 
and Korea's limited domestic market for heavy and chemical industries. Rapid export 
growth was the key to overcoming these problems. 
Rapid export growth could not be achieved through small, combined trade-
manufacturing organisations. They relied on foreign buyers visiting Korea and 
foreign MNCs' sales networks rather than securing markets overseas. The Korean 
Government sought to overcome these difficulties through institutional innovations -
the introduction of the general trading company (GTC) system. Efficient trade 
organisations were sought which were 'large enough to attain economies of scale in 
the world market, specialised enough in exports to gain international competitiveness, 
self-sufficient and independent from Government support, and capable of systematic 
overseas marketing' (Cho, D.S., 1987: 51). The key issues of this section are: Korean 
GTC' s contribution to the growth of national exports; their impacts on the growth of 
chaebols; and the GTC system's implications on the export industrialisation of small 
and medium-sized firms. 
2.1 Establishment of General Trading Companies 
For the institutional innovations, the Korean Government investigated 
overseas trading companies and foreign governments' assistance system for them. 
Salvation was sought in trying to replicate the sogo-shosha - the Japanese General 
Trading Company. At the time it was perceived by Korean policymakers as the 
engine of the Japan's export growth. Originally, it had been established 'as part of the 
modernisation programme (Meiji Renovation) that Japan embarked upon in the mid-
19th century to connect the resource-poor, industrially backward country with the rest 
of the world' (Kojima and Ozawa, 1984: 11). Given its heavy reliance on foreign 
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trade organisations the Japanese Government sought to develop innovative trade 
organisations to compete with rivals from advanced capitalist countries. IO Initially 
the sogo-shosha system pursued large-scale organisations to exploit economies of 
scale. The deficiency of trade-related businesses in Japan, such as shipping, insurance 
and finance, forced the sogo-shosha to provide all services within a single 
organisation. Hence, there was a marked diversification into a range of business 
areas, commodity items, and market areas. The sogo-shosha supplied raw material, 
technology, capital and a wide variety of overseas market intelligence to both of their 
group (zaibatsu or keiretsu) companies and subcontracting manufacturing companies. 
Again, they exported what they manufactured. 
In 1975, after its investigation of the sogo-shosha system, the Korean 
Government decided to introduce the GTC system. Its prospectus outlined the 
institutions which it wished to establish as the Korean GTCs (Table 3.3). 
Policymakers wanted to establish the most efficient 'export-specialised organisation' 
that was: large enough to compete with foreign rivals; capable of developing new 
export products; and possessed public enterprise characteristics (e.g., stock market 
listing), enthusiasm about exploring new export-markets, and desirous of diversifying 
Korea's export markets. 
Policymakers had two different interpretations of 'efficiency': a purely 
economic definition; and the Government's own prescription. It was not easy for 
Government to persuade numerous small-scale trading companies to follow its 
directions. By concentrating trade activities on a few large general trading companies 
Government was able to mould them to meet its declared objectives. Only a limited 
number of multifunctional chaebols could satisfy the Government's minimum 
requirements for the designation of Korean GTCs. 
10. Since Japan opened its ports to foreigners in 1868, most imports were dominated by overseas 
traders from England, Portugal and the Netherlands. After the establishment of government-oriented 
sogo-shosha, their share of the country's imports increased from 5 per cent in 1876 through 13 per cent 
in 1887, 39 per cent in 1890 to 80 per cent in 1918 (Cho, D.S., 1988: 446-447). 
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Table 3.3 
Changes in Minimum Requisites for Designation as a General Trading Company in Korea, 1975-1985 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1981 1985 
Minimum annual export 50 100 150 2% of total 2% of total 2% of total 
(US$ 1 million) export export export 
Minimum capital 1 1.5 2 
(billion won) 
ESJSort items over 7a 10 10 5 
U $ 1 million 
ESJSort countries over 10 15 20 
-
U $ 1 million 
-..J 
Public offering of 
stocks 
mandatory mandatory mandatory mandatory 
Number of overseas 10 15 20 20 
branch offices 
M. E.b: 15% 
Officesc 
Export to special M. E. : two 
areas M.C.A.: 3% M.C.A.: two 
Africa: 3% Africa: two 
Number of GTCs 5 11 11 13 10 9 
Note: aMore than US$ 500,000; bAbbreviations: M.E. (Middle East) and M.C.A. (Middle and South America). 
c1n 1977, the export amount included office establishment requirements. 
Source: Cho, D.S., 1987a: 53. 
In return for establishing GTCs the chaebol presidents received special 
privileges (Cho, D.S., 1987: 54; 1988: 30-49). They included: priority in tendering 
for international contracts offered by Government agencies; relaxation of the 
regulations requiring mandating membership of various commodity export 
associations; the right to import raw materials irrespective of their ultimate use; 
reserving financing for finished products; and an increase in foreign currency 
limitations on overseas branches. As most of these subsidies were extended over time 
to non-OTC exporters Government subsidies were not of paramount importance. The 
chaebol presidents were attracted to OTC status by 'invisible' advantages to their 
group's growth potential. Those chaebol groups with OTC affiliates were fulsomely 
praised as 'export spearheads'. They were able to enjoy more credit and participate in 
important Government projects (e.g., heavy and chemical industrialisation projects).11 
These played a decisive role in the accelerated growth of chaebols. Also, the 
octopus-like integration of small and medium-sized firms, infiltration of smaller 
firms' markets, and extensive diversification of their business areas were approved 
tacitly in the name of 'founding the nation on the basis of export'. Another important 
reason was that chaebols could attain their OTC title without much extra expenditure. 
They could satisfy the designation requirements of OTC by simply restructuring their 
existing export-related organisations. 
2.2 Characteristics of Korean General Trading Companies 
The archetypical Korean OTC is distinguished by its orientation towards 
government, chaebol connections and specialist export organisations. As they were 
established through a symbiotic relationship with Government, particularly through 
its export goals and subsidies, their behaviour has to be considered within this 
11. The establishment of GTCs provided good excuses for chaebols to participate in heavy and 
chemical industrialisation projects. The export of the heavy industry products was the most important 
precondition due to the small domestic market. 
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Table 3.4 
The Establishment and Withdrawal of General Trading Companies' Overseas 
Branch Offices, 1975-1987 
Before 1976 1976-1979 1980-1983 1984-1987 
Asia 11 37 27 (1) 18 (0) 
Middle East 4 19 17 (4) 3 (4) 
Europe 10 14 8 (3) 14 (2) 
North America 8 26 6 (3) 18 (6) 
Latin America 3 6 7 (5) 9 (8) 
Africa 1 10 5 (2) 2 (8) 
Oceania 3 1 3 (1) 2 (0) 
Total 40 113 73 (19) 66 (28) 
Note: Based on the existing seven GTCs. The figures in parentheses represent 
branch office withdrawals after 1982. 
Source: Chung, 1989: 287. 
context. The size, spatial organisation, business lines, and even export areas of GTCs 
were substantially influenced by the Government's minimum requirements. At the 
behest of the Government, they specialised in export activities. Also, the GTCs had 
to establish a large number of overseas offices in the so-called 'special areas' -
Middle East, Latin America, and Africa. This close relationship between the GTCs 
and Government is reflected in their enthusiasm for established overseas offices and 
the speed at which they closed them once the Government's requirement was 
withdrawn (Table 3.4). 
Korean General Trading Companies have a strong characteristic as the 
outdoor channels of chaebols. All the external transactions of chaebol affiliates were 
conducted through their groups' GTCs to satisfy the Government's requirements. 
Most of the high export growth of GTCs was achieved by grabbing the export 
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Table 3.5 
Group Dependency among Korean General Trading Companies, 1987 
Samsung 
Ssangyong 
Daewoo 
Hyosung 
Lucky-Goldstar 
Sunkyung 
Hyundai 
Export 
per cent 
55 
30 
75 
35 
65 
40 
90 
Source: Daewoo Security Corporation, 1988: 73. 
Import 
per cent 
65 
30 
45 
50 
85 
65 
80 
performances of their affiliates rather than by creating new export markets by 
themselves. This structure wa~ contrary to the Government's expectation. In the case 
of Hyundai's GTC, about 90 per cent of their exports were derived from the group 
affiliates' commodities (Table 3.5). Korean GTCs can be understood more properly 
when they are considered as one composition member of chaebols rather than as 
independent entities. 
GTCs made a decisive contribution to the extraordinary expans10n of 
chaebols. The diversification of export commodities provided a good excuse to 
participate in many new business areas. The average number of chaebol affiliates 
with GTCs were increased from 14 in 1976 to 23 in 1979 (Cho, D.S., 1986: 72). 
Chaebols' participation in heavy and chemical industries is well represented by the 
GTC's heavy reliance on heavy industry products.12 Its contribution to the growth of 
the chaebol is well expressed by chaebols with GTCs being referred to as 
12. The proportion of heavy industry products in GTCs' total exports was: Hyundai 95.7, Samsung 
72.1, Daewoo 70.9, Lucky-Goldstar 82.8, Sunkyung 59.3, Ssangyong 60.0, Hyosung 60.1, while that of 
Korean total was 52.9 per cent (DERI, 1989 cited by Lee, J.Y., 1989: 93). 
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Japanese GTCs Korean GTCs 
Figure 3.6 
A Comparison of Japanese and Korean Business Groups 
'representative' Korean chaebols. The GTC's position within the business group, 
however, is less important than that of the sogo-shosha. While a Korean GTC acts as 
a member company of the Group, the sogo-shosha plays a core role in Japanese 
business groups (Figure 3.6). The difference stems from: chaebol owners having a 
greater role in group management; chaebol organisation not having a relationship 
with major banks; and the export-specialisation forced on the chaebol by the Korean 
Government. 
Export specialisation differentiates Korean GTCs from the sogo-shosha (Table 
3.6). Actually, the title of 'general trading company' is not suitable to the Korean 
version of sogo-shosha. The specialisation on export business substantially limited 
Korean GTCs' role as coordinators or intermediaries for both their group companies 
and independent manufacturing companies. The discontinuity of business line -
import, domestic sale, and export - weakened their cooperative relationships with 
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Table 3.6 
Business Structure of Korean and Japanese General Trading Companies 
Export Import Domestic sales Third-country trade 
per cent per cent per cent per cent 
Korea: 
1981 81.5 16.8 1.7 0.0 
1984 77.9 20.0 2.1 0.0 
1987 74.7 21.4 3.4 0.5 
Japan: 
1980 20.4 24.8 42.5 12.3 
1984 19.6 23.9 38.6 17.9 
1987 16.4 18.9 44.9 19.9 
Source: Chung, G.H., 1989: 194-195; Daewoo Security Corporation, 1988: 64. 
independent manufacturing companies, and even led to competition between them. It 
was a prime reason behind their participation in manufacturing activities.13 
2.3 General Trading Companies: Are They Korea's Export Spearhead? 
A number of aspects have to be considered before Korean General Trading 
Companies can be evaluated. Firstly, their promotion was introduced by Government 
to satisfy national economic goals rather than the needs of private corporations - a 
feature making evaluation in terms of costs and benefits obsolete. Secondly, the 
Korean GTCs have to be evaluated as individual member companies of chaebol 
groups rather than as independent entities. Thirdly, their business behaviour has to be 
interpreted from a political economy perspective because they are dependent upon 
13. As of 1980, Korean GTCs have following number of manufacturing plants: Samsung (4), 
Ssangyong (3), Daewoo (6), Kookje (6), Hyosung (6), Lucky-Goldstar (3), and Sunkyung (6) (Cho, 
D.S., 1988: 321-323). 
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Figure 3.7 
Export Proportion of the Korean General Trading Companies, 
1977-1989 
1990 
Government subsidies.14 Since 1975, the GTCs' share of Korea's total exports has 
increased annually. In the latter half of the 1980s, however, its relative proportion 
declined sharply when the Korean economy was liberalised (Figure 3. 7). Also, this 
was influenced by the withdrawal of all Government specifications other than 
minimum export volume and stock market listing. Nevertheless, the contribution of 
GTCs remained substantial and their extraordinary export growth requires more 
careful investigation. 
A large proportion of the export performance of GTCs was based on the 
export achievements of other companies rather than on new overseas demand created 
by its own activities. By offering a premium and document manipulation they 
obtained the quotas of other companies. According to Cho' s (1988: 55) investigation, 
these quotas accounted for about 50 per cent of their total exports between 1976 and 
14. Government's subsidies, mostly low interest rate financing for GTCs' export, often surpassed the 
losses incurred by attempting even below-cost exports. 
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Figure 3.8 
The Export Structure of General Trading Companies by 
Type of Product, 1981 and 1987 
1978 - an argument bolstered by the lack of any discernible difference in the rate of 
export growth after the introduction of GTCs. Even allowing for the world's export 
growth rate, it is difficult to substantiate that the GTCs have had a marked effect on 
Korea's performance. Between 1981 and 1987, their reliance on group companies 
has increased at the expense of independent companies following the Government's 
noted reduction in minimum requirements (Figure 3.8). 
Also, the declining role of GTCs as Korea's export spearhead has been 
affected by the world's changing economic structure: from standardised and mass-
produced commodities to multi-product, small-lot, and high technology commodities. 
This has diminished their cost advantage derived from dealing in standardised 
commodities. Also, the heightened before- and after-sale service requirements of 
high technology products have forced manufacturers to establish their own trading 
units. 
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Table 3.7 
Overseas Manufacturing Investment Undertaken by General Trading 
Companies in Cooperation with Small and Medium-sized Firms, 
1989 
General trading Small and Country Date Commodity 
companies medium-sized firms 
Daewoo Shinpoong Sudan 1988 Pharmacy 
Daegwang Nigeria plan Bags 
Bookyang Indonesia plan Canning 
Hanil Indonesia plan Tennis balls 
Samsung Daejung Guatemala 1989 Garments 
Campari Indonesia 1989 Jackets 
Doogo Guatemala 1989 Garments 
Sungsil Guatemala 1989 Garments 
Sam boo Indonesia plan Tape 
Woncheon Indonesia plan Garments 
Iljin Indonesia 1989 Blazers 
Dae ho Indonesia 1989 Sweaters 
Hyosung Sam boo Indonesia 1989 Tape 
Lucky-Goldstar Chilsung Sri Lanka 1989 Polyester 
thread 
Ssangyong Jotex Indonesia 1988 Jackets 
Sambo England 1988 Computers 
Source: Korea Export Import Bank, 1989: 44; Samsung Corporation (pers. comm.). 
In response to this changing business environment, Korean GTCs have 
diversified business areas, consolidated organisations, and explored new export 
markets, particularly those in the Socialist bloc. Further, they have expanded 
domestic sales, import businesses, third-country trades, and involvement in overseas 
resource developments. Also, they are seeking joint-ventures with small and 
medium-sized firms in establishing overseas manufacturing plants to overcome the 
quota regulations of developed countries and the ever-rising domestic labour costs 
(Table 3.7). 
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Figure 3.9 
Proportion of Exports to Developing Countries, 1980-1986 
2.4 Exploration of New Export Markets 
The contribution of GTCs to Korea's exports is reflected in new markets. 
Trade barriers and conflicts prompted the Korean Government to diversify its export 
markets as a means of securing stable economic growth. Their penetration of markets 
in developing countries is much higher than the national average (Figure 3.9). 
Although the reduction in government requirements diminished their thrust into 
'special areas', they made important breakthroughs. 
Since the mid 1980s, the GTCs have pioneered emerging markets in the 
Socialist bloc. Until 1970, trade with the Socialist bloc had been prohibited by the 
Government. Since then it has been conducted indirectly through Hong Kong, 
Singapore, Austria and Japan. In 1987, a more direct arrangement was introduced. 
Although trade is still small (3 per cent of the total in 1988), it is increasing. It 
represents an important breakthrough in overcoming intensifying trade barriers and 
export diversification. In 1990, the companies have established twenty branch offices 
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in the Socialist bloc with a parallel number in the planning stage for 1991 (Joongang 
Daily Newspaper, 19 November 1990). In 1989, they accounted for 70 per cent of 
exports with the Socialist bloc. 
2.5 Relationship with Small and Medium-sized Firms 
A prime reason for the Korean Government's introduction of the GTC system 
was to promote the export activities of small and medium-sized firms. This explains 
its willingness to accept the exports derived from small and medium-sized firms as 
part of the General Trading Company's contribution. The Government sought to 
consummate the relationship by offering them low interest credits. This cooperative 
relationship between Government and the GTCs was necessary for them to achieve 
their minimum export targets. In return, the small and medium-sized firms were able 
to minimise their costs in developing export markets and internationalising their 
business activities. This symbiotic relationship led to many small and medium-sized 
firms being linked to GTCs as subcontractors or suppliers of export commodities 
(Table 3.8). 
The initiation of small and medium-sized firms in export activities was a key 
contribution of the Korean GTCs. Between 1976 and 1979, the proportion of small 
and medium-sized firms in overall exports increased from 21 per cent to 32 per cent 
(Lee, J.Y., 1987: 93). In return, the GTCs assisted the manufacturing activities of 
small and medium-sized firms. Their proportion of 'indirect exports' increased from 
32 per cent in 1982 to more than 50 per cent in 1984 (KFSB, 1984)_ 15 As the first 
priority of GTCs was the growth of their own affiliates, related firms and groups' 
other member companies, their support of the exports from independent small and 
medium-sized firms, however, was always secondary. At best, they helped achieve 
their minimum export objectives. 
15. 'Indirect exports' implies that manufacturers place their exports to other independent trade agents, 
such as general trading companies. 
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Table 3.8 
Subcontracting Linkages of General Trading Companies, 1976 and 1977 
1976 
SMFsa Amount 
no. 100 million won 
Samsung 163 266 
Daewoo 80 100 
Ssangyong 97 35 
Kookje 35 9 
Hanil 70 5 
Lucky-Golds tar 53 55 
Hyosung 76 32 
Samhwa 120 30 
Sunkyung 100 37 
Kumho 45 120 
Koryo 50 8 
Total 839 697 
Note: aAbbreviation: small and medium-sized firms. 
Source: Lee, J.Y., 1987b: 226. 
SMFs 
no. 
193 
150 
160 
60 
150 
100 
50 
180 
150 
80 
60 
1,333 
1977 
Amount 
100 million won 
346 
150 
119 
25 
48 
110 
100 
72 
100 
200 
12 
1,282 
The role of the Korean GTCs in the internationalisation of both chaebols and 
small and medium-sized firms was minuscule compared to that of the sogo-shosha. 
Nevertheless, they did make an important contribution to Korea's export growth and 
internationalisation. Indeed, they pioneered markets in the Socialist bloc. Also, they 
made an enormous contribution in linking national, regional, and local economies to 
the overseas market. Their international trade experience and global information 
networks have played a decisive role in penetrating new export markets and assisting 
direct investments of group companies. Also, they supplied their information and 
sales networks to overseas subsidiaries. There are more than 3,000 people secured in 
the 310 overseas offices actively expanding these networks (Table 3.9). 
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Table 3.9 
The Overseas Offices of Korean General Trading Companies, 1988 
Asia 
(Japan) 
Middle East 
Europe 
America 
(U.S.A.) 
Latin America 
Africa 
Oceania 
Total 
Source: Chung, 1989: 291. 
Offices 
no. 
99 
(26) 
43 
53 
59 
(50) 
25 
22 
9 
310 
3 DIRECT FOREIGN INVESTMENT OF CHAEBOLS 
Employees 
no. 
1,174 
(546) 
209 
654 
852 
(825) 
135 
100 
41 
3,165 
In the early 1980s, direct foreign investment (DFI) by corporations with 
headquarters in developing countries captured the popular imagination. Their direct 
investment in developed countries challenged direct foreign investment theories 
derived from Western sources. The latter were based on the assumption that outward 
direct investment is conducted in underdeveloped countries by companies with 
headquarters in developed countries to exploit their ownership (or firm-specific) 
advantages and the host countries' locational advantages.16 Yet, this extraordinary 
phenomenon is now being undertaken by firms with headquarters in Korea. Although 
direct foreign investment by Korean companies is still small, its rapid growth is 
16. As they are the property of the finn the income generating advantages of firms are termed 
'ownership-specific' or 'ownership' advantages (Clegg, 1987: 22). They are also termed 'firm-
specific' because most of the advantages cannot be sold in an external market. 
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sufficient to capture the interest of researchers. It has become a particular concern to 
industrial geographers because it not only accompanies commodity flows but also the 
overseas movement of capital, management, personnel, technology and production 
facilities. Its regional economic impact is more striking than that of any simple trade 
activity. 
A number of issues are raised about the uniqueness of Korean DFI. The key 
question is whether extant theories are applicable to Korean (or Newly Industrialising 
Countries) activities. How do the firm-specific advantages of corporations in 
developed countries compare with those having headquarters in Korea; and how do 
their locational advantages differ? If answers to these questions are in favour of 
developed countries it behoves us to question: what other advantages drove Korean 
chaebols overseas? Assuming that there are factors particular to Korea we need to 
question: how have these differences affected the regional economy? 
3.1 General Background of Korean Direct Foreign Investment 
In 1968, the first Korean direct foreign investment was made in Indonesia by 
the Nambang Development Corporation which developed timber for use in the 
plywood industry (Koo and Lee, 1985: 18). Until 1980, however, outward direct 
investment was regulated by the Government because of ever-mounting trade deficits 
and the threat of currency flight. After 1980, the regulations were relaxed because the 
Korean Government needed DFI to offset unabated trade protectionism, resource 
nationalism, rapid appreciation of the won and the rising cost of domestic labour. 
Since 1986, there has been further liberalisation prompted by Korea's trade surplus. 
Initially, Korean DFI was focused on the mining sector to secure raw 
materials. Later, it shifted to the trade sector in a bid to develop new export markets. 
Now, the emphasis is on an overseas investment in the manufacturing sector. It has 
been led by major home electronics manufacturing companies, such as Samsung, 
130 
100 
80 
- 60 c 
Cl> 
u 
..... 
Cl> 
c...40 
a·······················O·······················O·······················'[J···· .. ·················O·······················O·······················'[] 
>C·-·-·-·-·-·-)l·-·-·-·-·-·-M·-·-·-·-·-·-)l·-·-·-·-·-·-)1 .• 
........ 
[ill Smaller firms (amount) 
[J Smaller firms (projects) 
····a··· Large firms (amount) 
-·tc-- Large firms (projects) 
1981 1983 1984 
Note: Based on remaining investment. 
1985 
Year 
Source KT A, 1989: 334; SMIPC, 1983-1986. 
Figure 3.10 
1986 
·-·-·-,.·-·-· 
-·-·-·-x 
1987 1988 
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Goldstar and Daewoo. When trade restrictions were applied to Korean commodities 
they moved their assembly lines off-shore. Otherwise they would have lost their 
export markets. Not surprisingly, these large firms accounted for 96 per cent of 
Korea's total DFI (Figure 3.10). 
Since the late 1980s, labour-intensive and low-wage industries, such as 
garment-making, footwear and stuffed toys have moved their production facilities off-
shore because of increasing value of the won, labour disputation, and the increasing 
cost of labour per unit of production. A marked feature has been the increased 
participation of small and medium-sized firms in the process. Even so, in 1988, the 
proportion of Korean DFI in GNP was less than one per cent (Bank of Korea, pers. 
comm.). 
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3.2 Motivation for Korean Direct Foreign Investment 
Korea's direct foreign investment has been distributed throughout the world. 
The lack of concentration suggests a multi-variate explanation. Essentially, the 
pattern stems from the result of exploiting differing location factors (e.g., cheap 
labour cost and large potential market) and adapting to changing world economic 
environments (e.g., alterations in trade regulations). The main factors, however, can 
be classified as resource development, export promotion, new market development, 
productive efficiency, acquisition of advanced technology and avoidance of trade 
regulations. 
An MTI and SMIPC survey (1988: 30) underlines that the major motivations 
behind Korean direct investment have been: 
(a) Avoidance of trade barriers posted by developed countries 
(25.0 per cent); 
(b) Maintenance of existing export markets (18.8 per cent); 
(c) New market development (12.5 per cent); 
(d) Raw material supply to home country (12.5 per cent); 
(e) Technology and machinery exports (6.3 per cent); 
(f) Exploitation of low production costs within host country 
(18.8 per cent); and 
(g) Acquisition of advanced technology and management skills 
(6.3 per cent). 
These reasons are different from those motivating firms with headquarters in 
developed countries. The former exploited ownership advantages whereas Korean 
firms sought to circumvent trade regulations. Although locational advantages was the 
second most important reason in the Korean case it was confined to investment in 
less-developed countries. This does not explain DFI in developed countries which 
account for 60 per cent of the investment in manufacturing (Table 3.10). 
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Table 3.10 
Regional Composition of Direct Foreign Investment, 1989 
Total direct foreign investment 
Southeast Asia 
Middle East 
North America 
Latin America 
Europe 
Africa 
Oceania 
Total 
Projects 
no., per cent 
325 36.2 
35 3.9 
313 34.8 
78 8.7 
79 8.8 
23 2.6 
46 5.1 
899 100.0 
Source: Ministry of Finance, 1990. 
Amount 
US$ million, per cent 
409 28.3 
122 8.5 
639 44.3 
85 5.9 
60 4.2 
21 1.5 
109 7.6 
1,444 100.0 
Manufacturing direct foreign investment 
Projects 
no., per cent 
147 49.9 
7 2.4 
56 19.0 
44 14.9 
18 6.1 
7 2.4 
16 5.4 
295 100.0 
Amount 
US$ million, per cent 
134 25.2 
17 3.2 
289 54.4 
33 6.2 
31 5.8 
9 1.7 
8 1.5 
531 100.0 
Further, MTI and SMIPC investigation (1988: 33) suggests that the subsidy to 
Group companies was the most important advantage (36 per cent), followed by 
technology (27 per cent), management skills (15 per cent), marketing skills (12 per 
cent), financial ability (8 per cent), and other advantages (2 per cent). Thus, the 
survey underlines why Korean DFI is dominated by large firms, mostly subsidiaries 
of chaebols. According to Koo and Lee (1985: 18) the twenty largest companies 
accounted for 80 per cent of Korean DFI in 1983. Although DFI by small and 
medium-sized firms has increased since the mid 1980s, it is small in amount. Further, 
most of them are involved in joint-ventures with general trading companies (see Table 
3.7). 
Korea's DFI in manufacturing has been concentrated on Southeast Asia (50 
per cent of projects and 25 per cent of value) and North America (19 per cent and 54 
per cent respectively). The difference between the former and the latter reflects 
different characteristics and motives. Projects in Southeast Asia are labour-intensive 
and involve small-scale investment to secure better rates of labour. Conversely, those 
in North America are capital-intensive and concern large-scale investment by major 
business groups to capture specific markets (Table 3.10). 
3.3 Evaluation of Korea's Direct Foreign Investment 
Why have Korean firms invested overseas, particularly in developed countries 
when they have limited 'ownership' advantages? Given their poor overseas 
performance explanation is difficult. Their emphasis on developing countries, 
however, can be attributed to lower profit rates in advanced capitalist countries 
(Figure 3.11; Table 3.11). Although this performance stems from the huge initial 
capital investment it is not the main cause because there is no significant relationship 
between profitability and date of investment. The main reason is the absence of any 
ownership advantages. 
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Figure 3.11 
Trends in Profit Rates Stemming from Korean 
Direct Foreign Investment, 1984-1988 
Table 3.11 
1989 
Regional Profit Rates Stemming from Korean Direct Foreign Investment, 
1986-1988 
Southeast Asia 
Middle East 
Europe 
North America 
(U.S.A.) 
Latin America 
Africa 
Oceania 
Total 
Companies 
no. 
25 
7 
3 
25 
23 
13 
2 
9 
84 
Source: Bank of Korea (pers. comm.). 
1986 
per cent 
0.3 
6.9 
-0.9 
-5.1 
-3.1 
0.5 
-0.5 
2.1 
-3.7 
135 
1987 
per cent 
0.3 
23.1 
-2.0 
-2.0 
-3.2 
-0.3 
1.6 
4.9 
0.1 
1988 
per cent 
5.1 
28.4 
0.2 
-2.2 
-1.9 
0.8 
0.7 
3.6 
4.2 
Unless Korean firms develop ownership advantages direct foreign investment 
is not a recipe for long-term success. At present, it is a defensive strategy to secure 
existing export markets. Without its adoption Korean firms would have been 
deprived of export markets. It is definitely the second best choice of Korean 
entrepreneurs. Indeed, direct foreign investment must be understood as an extension 
of exports rather than an attempt at the internationalisation of production based on the 
exploitation of ownership advantages. This conclusion is supported by the MTI and 
SMIPC investigation (1988: 33) which highlight that more than 56 per cent of the 
firms surveyed sought to expand markets. 
This rationale raises another issue: how have Korean firms minimised their 
obvious disadvantages in overseas markets? Some clues are provided in Figure 3.12. 
It shows trends of three key indices (shipments, parts supply from home country and 
current net profits) are virtually identical. Clearly, their disadvantages are offset by 
the supply of parts and components from their subsidiaries in Korea which still have a 
competitive advantage in production costs. Firms have just moved their assembly 
activities off-shore and left their other production segments in Korea. 
Indeed, their initial direct foreign investment by Korean firms was only 
possible by internalising their transactions within corporate organisations. As noted, 
their key advantage was a subsidy from the mother firm. Further, Figure 3.12 
underlines that their profit rate was buoyed by sourcing parts and components from 
Korea. According to Hwang Jin-Sung, director of Korea Overseas Investment 
Institute, some overseas (electronics) plants drew 80 per cent of their parts from home 
(Korea Business World, October 1988: 11). Thus, they were able to offset losses 
involved in direct foreign investment by profits from parts and components. 
Changes in the location of direct foreign investments in manufacturing have 
been influenced by shifts in both domestic and overseas economic environments. 
Initially, Korean electronics companies located their assembly factories in U.S.A. and 
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European countries to avoid quota restrictions. Also, they established research 
institutions in developed countries to acquire sophisticated technologies and 
management skills. 
When the host country governments started to regulate the supply of parts and 
components from Korea by imposing quotas and anti-dumping taxes, they established 
their component factories in adjacent countries, such as Mexico, which were free of 
duties and quotas. These firms supplied produced parts to assembly factories in 
developed countries. In 1988, European Economic Community (EEC) countries 
increased localisation requirements of parts-supply from 40 per cent to 50 per cent -
the USA remained at 40 per cent. 
Also, many labour-intensive industries, such as garment, textile, shoes, stuffed 
toys moved out their production sites to Caribbean nations and Southeast Asian 
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countries to counter rising labour costs in Korea and to avoid import restrictions 
imposed in advanced capitalist countries. Since the late 1980s, a number of Korean 
firms established their factories in socialist countries to develop new markets. 
According to Korea Export and Import Bank (1989: 45), a total of 22 projects were 
established in socialist countries as of June 1989 (19 in China, 2 in former USSR and 
1 in Hungary). Thus, direct foreign investment by Korean firms has been aimed at 
developing ownership advantages tailored to changing world economic environments. 
3.4 Regional Economic Effects of Korea's Outward Direct Investment 
It is too early to analyse the impact of Korean direct foreign investment on 
regional and national economy because of its short history and relative insignificance 
to the economy as a whole. According to the Bank of Korea, overseas manufacturing 
in 1987 accounted for only 1.4 per cent of domestic production. l 7 It was less than 1 
per cent of Gross National Product (Figure 3.13). Yet, it could still have a substantial 
impact on both regional and national economies. In 1988, Goldstar' s off-shore 
production accounted for 7 per cent. Three years later it was expected to reach 15 per 
cent (Far Eastern Economic Review, 1989: 89). 
If these trends are sustained direct foreign investment will reduce exports of 
manufactured goods and increase those of parts and components. This reliance on 
home-made parts and components will minimise its effect on small and medium-sized 
subcontractors. The strong linkage of Korea's direct foreign investment with the 
domestic economy is in marked contrast to United States experience where the entire 
production process has been moved overseas. Thus, the negative effect of direct 
foreign investment on regional and national economies has been minimal. 
Further, direct foreign investment will lead to the long-term upgrading of 
Korea's industrial structure by shifting matured and less-competitive industries to 
17. In 1983, comparable figures for the Japan and the U.S.A. were 4 and 17 per cent respectively. 
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overseas locations. The relocation of the labour-intensive industries, however, is 
likely to undermine employment growth. Already much of the plywood industry - a 
major export commodity in 1980 - has shifted overseas. Similarly, shoe 
manufacturing has moved overseas which has had a marked deleterious effect on 
Pusan - the industry's core. Indeed, the Shoe Manufacturing Industry Association 
forecasts that by 1990 about 30 per cent of production capacity will have moved off-
shore (Korea Economic Newspaper, 22 February 1990). The same process is 
affecting the textile, garment and stuffed-toy industries. 
The regional impact of direct foreign investment is uneven. Indeed, the 
relocation of labour-intensive, matured industries will have a marked impact on local 
and provincial locations. Conversely, local sourcing of parts and components in 
technology-intensive industries, such as electronics, will boost the Seoul Metropolitan 
Area. This pattern will be reinforced by the need for subcontractors to be located near 
their Seoul-based mother finns. A less competitive local economy, however, will 
have a negative long-tenn effect on Korea's direct foreign investment. 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This chapter has examined the processes that have 'internationalised' the 
Korean economy. They can be divided into four major stages: foreign aid; the 
introduction of foreign loans; export promotion; and direct foreign investment. 
Initially, the international involvement of Korean economy was prompted by the 
foreign aid provided for the rehabilitation of the war-tom economy. Aid given the 
form of agricultural commodities devastated Korea's rural industries and made the 
nation's economy as dependent overseas influences. The disenfranchised farmers 
flocked to the major cities and created a huge reservoir of unemployed labour which 
provided the spur to accelerate Korea's industrialisation. The Chaebols accumulated 
their initial investment capital by processing the resources imported as aid. 
In 1962, the military government established a series of Five Year Economic 
Development Plans to legitimise its activities. The required capital for these 
development projects was imported by the Government from overseas and distributed 
to a few nominated chaebols. As the borrowed money had to be repaid, the 
Government encouraged export industries. In 1975, it introduced the general trading 
company (GTC) concept to exploit overseas markets more efficiently. The 
concentration of the Government's export subsidies on a few major chaebols with 
GTC affiliates resulted in their further growth and expansion. In return, the GTCs 
had to pioneer new overseas markets and encourage the export activities of small and 
medium-sized firms by incorporating them into their international networks. 
Since the early 1980s, the chaebols have moved their production sites to off-
shore locations to circumvent the strengthening trade regulations imposed by 
advanced capitalist countries. Their rationale for direct foreign investments was to 
defend existing export markets rather than attempt to exploit their ownership 
advantages. This assertion is clarified by the extremely poor performance of their 
direct foreign investment in developed countries. Korean firms, however, minimised 
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their disadvantages by supplying parts and components from their Korean subsidiaries 
which still had lower production costs. These arrangements lessened the impact of 
the direct foreign investment on the domestic economy. When host countries raised 
the required local content ratios, however, Korean firms established their component 
factories in developing countries which were free of duties and quotas. Thus, the 
Korean economy has been closely related to the wider economic system. 
In theoretical terms, the internationalisation process of Korea has been 
influenced by the two distinct, but converging, forces: (a) the power of international 
capital flows to circumvent the state; and (b) regulations on international capital 
movements (see Bryan, 1987: 271). The general features of Korea's 
internationalisation have been closely moulded by shifts in the nature of international 
capital accumulation. The inflow of different fractions of capital - commodity, 
money, productive and finance capital - has transformed and facilitated the nation's 
industrial restructuring during the colonial, import-substitution, export-oriented and 
outward direct investment phases. Apart from these flows the internationalisation of 
the Korean economy has been strongly mediated by state control exerted over 
international movements of money and commodities. On the one hand, the trade 
regulations of the Korean Government has facilitated foreign capital inflow for local 
production. On the other hand, foreign countries' trade barriers on Korean 
commodities have accelerated Korean firms' outward direct investment. Although it 
was not paramount, the state regulation has substantially transformed the 
internationalisation of the Korean economy. 
This assertion is strongly supported by the empirical findings of this study. 
Direct foreign investment by Korean business organisation was initially concentrated 
in advanced capitalist countries. As Korean firms had only limited ownership 
advantages, its main purpose was not to exploit them but to circumvent the host 
countries' trade regulations. Thus, the subsequent shift of Korean firms to developing 
countries was not only to exploit their cheap labour resources but also to by-pass trade 
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barriers - high tariff rates and quotas - imposed on them by advanced capitalist 
countries. These findings suggest that the New International Division of Labour 
model is only partially applicable to the Korean experience. Another key finding of 
this chapter is that Third World multinationals, such as chaebols, overcome their 
disadvantages in overseas markets by circumventing host countries' trade regulations. 
Korean firms have transferred their 'home countries' comparative advantages' - not 
their firm-specific advantages - to overseas locations through the intra-organisational 
transactions. This outcome is contrary to extant direct foreign investment theories 
which assume firm-specific advantages are a necessary precondition. 
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PART III 
SAMSUNG: A CASE STUDY 
CHAPTER4 
SAMSUNG GROUP 
In his autobiography, Samsung's late Founder (Lee Byung-Chull) highlighted 
the fact that the business group's history since the 1950s coincided with Korea's 
industrial restructuring (Lee, B.C., 1986: 247). In other words, Samsung's growth 
pattern reflected changes in Korea's business environment fashioned by inherited 
conditions and Government's economic policies. As the inherited factors were 
beyond corporate control Samsung's performance stemmed from its successful 
adaptation to shifts in economic policies. Samsung's story is not unique in Korean 
corporate history. In many ways, it illustrates the typical corporate growth pattern of 
chaebols (Steers, Shin and Ungson, 1989: 21). Indeed, Samsung has been recognised 
as Korea's representative chaebol. 
As the general characteristics of chaebols have been detailed (Chapter 2 and 
3) this chapter is devoted to a case study of the Samsung Group. The main issue of 
this chapter is to examine chaebol's general characteristics in individual group level 
and in that manner to test the utility of the conceptual framework developed in 
Chapter 1. Initially, interest is centred on Samsung's growth processes and the 
Group's reaction to changed economic circumstances (Section 1). Then attention is 
focused on how Samsung's particular organisational structure has affected its 
business linkages, locational patterns and regional economy (Section 2). Finally, 
interest is widened to international issues: how Samsung has responded to changes in 
the global business environment (Section 3). 
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1 CORPORA TE GROWTH AND STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT 
In 1990, Samsung was ranked as the 14th largest business organisation in the 
World in sales volume (Fortune, 29 July 1991). By 1988, the Samsung Group 
comprised 41 affiliates; employed 175,710 persons; sold US$ 29 billion of 
commodities; and possessed assets of US$ 22 billion (KIS, 1989: 32; OESSG, 1989: 
2-6). As it only commenced full-scale operation after the Korean War (1950-1953), 
its growth is remarkable by any standard (Table 4.1). 
Table 4.1 
The Growth of Samsung, 1962-1988 
Year GNP (A) Net sales of Samsung (B) B/AX 100 
billion won billion won per cent 
1962 356 5 1.4 
1967 1,281 15 1.2 
1972 4,178 67 1.6 
1975 10,065 341 3.4 
1978 23,937 966 4.0 
1981 45,528 3,479 7.6 
1984 70,084 8,338 11.9 
1988 126,231 21,248 16.8 
Source: OESSG, 1988a: 804; EPB, 1990: 5. 
1.1 The Growth of Samsung 
Samsung's initial business was rice-processing. In 1936, the late Founder 
opened the Hyobdong Rice-processing Factory in Masan in South Kyongsang 
province. I Vertical integration occurred when it acquired Ilchul Transportation 
Company which was engaged in trucking rice. Soon, the Founder moved to Taegu, 
1. Masan was a small rice-exporting port where his brother lived. 
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the provincial capital of North Kyongsang provmce, and opened Samsung Store 
(1938), which eventually became Samsung Corporation. In 1939, he took over the 
Choson Brewery Company. 
After liberation, Lee moved his business arena to Seoul to expand trade 
activities. In 1948, Lee established the Samsung Moolsan Company in Seoul. As the 
demand for daily necessities was great he saw the opportunity to make his fortune by 
importing them, as domestic production had not recovered from the Japanese 
withdrawal. Unfortunately, these ventures were devastated by the Korean War. After 
its end, the company had to be reborn. 
Samsung in the 1950s 
In 1950, Chairman Lee moved to Taegu as the Choson Brewery was his only 
property left standing. During 1951, Lee used this base to establish Samsung 
Moolsan Corporation in Pusan - the wartime temporary national capital. Once again, 
he made a great fortune by importing daily consumer goods during the War. Within a 
year the company's initial investment capital had increased twenty-fold (Lee, B.C., 
1986: 61).2 
In 1953, Lee established the Cheil Sugar & Co. in Pusan to participate in the 
Korean Government's import-substitution programme. Lee established his enterprise 
with money (US$ 180,000 and 20 million hwan) borrowed from the Government 
(Lee, B.C., 1986: 66). In 1954, Lee (1986: 76) established another import-
substitution industry - the Cheil Wool Textile Co. - in Taegu with US$ one million 
borrowed from the Government. As the two initial businesses were Korea's 
pioneering ventures, he enjoyed monopolistic profits. Further, he benefited from the 
Government's prohibition on wool textile imports to protect its infant industry 
(OESSG, 1988a: 138). In 1957, when sugar-refining became more competitive, Cheil 
2. This enormous performance was partly influenced by the wartime inflation. 
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Sugar & Co. diversified by adding a flour-milling business.3 Further diversification 
followed as Lee acquired: Pungkug Alcohol Co. (1953); Taehan Sugar Sales Co. 
(1955); Kuryongpo Canning (1956);4 Dongyang Sugar Co. (1957); Kiinyong Moolsan 
Co. (1958); Dongil Textile Co. (1958); and Changmi-rasa5 (1958). 
Following the successful establishment of trade and manufacturing, the 
Founder's interest shifted to finance. When the Government privatised its city banks 
in 1957, Samsung secured almost 50 per cent of the stocks of four companies. 6 
Further, he acquired the stock-dealing company - Chonil Securities Co. (1957) - and 
the insurance company - Ankuk Fire & Marine Insurance Co. (1958). These 
strengthened Lee's capital supply ability and contributed to the Group's business 
volume expansion (OESSG, 1988a: 147). During the 1950s, other companies became 
Samsung's affiliates including: Hankook Tire Co. (1958); Samchog Cement Co. 
(1958); and Honam Fertilizer Industries Co. (see Appendix 4.1). 
Samsung in the 1960s 
In the 1960s, Samsung experienced a number of problems, such as the so-
called 'illicit wealth accumulation', 'saccharine smuggling incident', and the military 
coup. Lee was fined eight billion hwan for the illicit wealth accumulation incident. 
In 1961, the military junta nationalised his three city banks. Later, the junta 
normalised relationship because it needed the chaebol's cooperation in carrying out 
its economic development plan. Rather than let chaebols pay their fines with cash the 
Government ordered them to construct factories with the money and offer their stocks 
3. The flour-milling factory maintained an operation rate of almost 92 per cent in 1960 while its 
counterparts achieved less than 31 per cent (OESSG, 1988a: 198). Thus, Samsung was able to use its 
dominant marketing power in sugar to sell flour. By 1961, its domestic market share of flour-milling 
was 33 per cent. 
4. The factory was acquired by Cheil Sugar & Co. to secure requisite dollars for international trade by 
supplying canned fish to US army stationed in Korea. 
5. Changmi-rasa was established as a sales organisation of Cheil Wool Textile Co. 
6. In 1957, Lee secured 83 per cent stocks of Hiingob Bank (present-day Hanil Bank) and 33 per cent 
stocks of Commercial Bank (Hiingob Bank owned 33 per cent of Commercial Bank's stocks). Further, 
he took over 55 per cent stocks of Choheung Bank in 1959. 
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- equivalent to their fines - to the Government. 7 It designated Samsung to construct a 
fertiliser factory. Irrespective of the Government's factory construction order, Lee 
constructed the World's largest fertiliser manufacturing factory. In 1964, he 
introduced a US$ 48 million loan from Japan under the Government's repayment 
certification. 8 Following the so-called 'saccharine smuggling accident', the World's 
largest fertiliser factory had to be transferred to the Government. In 1967, Lee 
donated 51 per cent stocks of the Korea Fertiliser Co. to the Government. 
Except for the huge investment in Korea Fertiliser Co., Samsung's 
investments during the 1960s were focused on the service sector. It was because of 
this that the import-substitution industries were no longer lucrative businesses by the 
late 1950s. As the Founder had great difficulty in supplying investment capital 
through the nationalisation of city banks, a number of financial (or capital-generating) 
institutions were acquired to ensure the smooth supply of investment capital. He took 
over Anbo Fire & Marine Insurance Co. (1962), Dongbang Life Insurance Co. (1963), 
Donghwa Department Store (1963), Tongyang Fire Insurance Co. (1963), and 
Dongnam Securities Co. (1963). These institutions provided a strong base for 
Samsung's future investment. 9 
Later, Lee branched into mass-media to offset the criticisms of journalists and. 
politicians every time he was involved in scandals. Although he countered scepticism 
over his motivation the rationale was admitted in his autobiography. IO In 1963, Lee 
7. As no entrepreneur finished factory construction within the allotted time, the fines were paid by cash 
rather than stocks. 
8. More than 90 per cent of investment capital for Korea Fertiliser Co. was supplied from external 
funds (Uhm, l.Y., 1966: 124). 
9. Almost all non-bank financial intermediaries (NBFI) had been controlled by the big business groups. 
According to the Ministry of Finance, the share of total deposit liabilities held by NBFis increased 
from 27 per cent in 1980 to 42 per cent in 1984 (adapted from Amsden, 1989: 135). 
10. Admitting the weakness of the businessmen, Lee confessed that be wanted to be a politician. 
Rather than follow his inclination he decided to establish mass-media companies to curb the bad 
administration and recommend good practices (Lee, B.C., 1986: 182-183). Further, be dispatched bis 
reporters to catch the illegal election scene of the candidates who condemned Samsung in the National 
Assembly. All anti-Samsung candidates failed in the election (Lee, B.C., 1986: 190). 
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established Tongyang TV Broadcasting Co.11 and Radio Seoul Broadcasting Co. and 
two years later, Joongang Daily News Co. Almost all chaebols participated in mass-
media business to offset the Government's dominance and to counter anti-chaebol 
criticism (Kang, Choe and Chang, 1991: 83-86). In 1964, Chairman Lee acquired 
Taegu University12 and Songkyunkwan University in the following year. Further, he 
established Samsung Foundation of Art and Culture (1965), Koryo General Hospital 
(1966) and Anyang Country Club (1968). During the 1960s, only small amounts of 
money were invested in consumer goods and import-substitution industries, such as 
Taehan Edible Oil Manufacturing Co. (1963), Wonhyong Industrial Co. (1965), 
Saehan Paper Co.13 (1965), and Samyong Industry (1968). In 1969, Samsung made 
its initial large-scale investment in the electronics industry but its full-scale 
development did not occur until the 1970s. 
Samsung in the 1970s 
In the 1970s, Samsung's investment was focused on electronics and the heavy 
and chemical industries. Repeatedly in his autobiography, Lee emphasises the 
importance of matching the twists and turns in the nation's industrialisation process. 
As noted, he started business by importing daily consumer necessities, shifted to 
import-substitution industries (1950s) and then to finance and other service sectors 
(1960s). He perceived the electronics industry as the key for the 1970s. After 
Samsung Electronics Co. (1969), the Group's founding electronics industry, Lee 
established Samsung Sanyo Electric Co. (1969), Samsung NEC Co. (1970), Samsung 
Electric Co. (1971), Samsung Sanyo Parts Co. (1973), Samsung Coming Co. (1973), 
Samsung GTE Telecommunications Co. (1977) and acquired Korea Semiconductor 
11. In November 1980, Tongyang TV Broadcasting Co. was incorporated into the government-run 
Korea Broadcasting System (KBS) following another military coup. It appeared that chaebols' control 
over the mass-media was an important means of checking Governments' dominance. Under the 
Chun's regime (1981-1987) a number of chaebol-backed mass-media institutions were liquidated. 
12. Lee paid the equivalent of establishing a new university in Seoul to acquire Taegu University 
because he wanted to contribute to the regional development of Samsung's initial business arena (Lee's 
speech in the 18th opening ceremony of the University). 
13. Saehan Paper Co. was acquired to supply paper for Samsung's newspaper, book and magazine 
publishing businesses. 
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Co. (1977) and Korea Telecommunications Co. (1980). As the company names 
suggest, most electronics affiliates were established as joint-ventures with foreign 
multinational corporations for the acquisition of requisite technologies and overseas 
sales networks. 
Further, Samsung participated in heavy and chemical industries prompted by 
the Government's substantial support. Lee established Cheil Synthetic Textiles Co. 
(1972), Samsung Petrochemical Industries Co. (1974), Samsung Heavy Industries Co. 
(1974) and acquired Woojin Shipbuilding Co. (1977), Daesung Heavy Industries Co. 
(1977) and Korea Engineering Co. (1978). In 1977, Samsung Precision Industries Co. 
(renamed as Samsung Aerospace Industries) was established mainly for the 
development of defence industries. During the 1970s, Samsung's manufacturing 
sector expanded enormously. In 1975, Samsung Co. was designated as the first 
Korean general trading company to promote exports of strategic industrial products. 
Further, Samsung diversified its business lines into the construction industry by 
acquiring Dongil Construction Co. (1977) and Shinwon Development Co. (1978), 
later renamed as Samsung Construction Co. 
Samsung in the 1980s 
Major changes in Samsung during the 1980s can be characterised as: the 
transformation into a high technology enterprise; globalisation of business activity; 
and reinforcement of the service sector. Samsung's endeavours to transform itself as 
a high-tech enterprise is reflected in the investment pattern of research and 
development. In 1986, Samsung invested US$ 300 million - equivalent to 4 per cent 
of the total manufacturing sales - for its research and development activities (OESSG, 
1988b: 46).14 Thirteen of its eighteen research institutions were established during 
the 1980s. In 1988, Samsung employed over 8,100 employees in these centres (Table 
4.2). Further, Samsung operated three overseas research centres to secure advanced 
14. The national average was less than 2 per cent in the same year. 
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Table 4.2 
Samsung's Research Activity, 1978-1988 
R&D centres Year Location Employees 
1984 1988 
Samsung Aerospace 1978 Changwon (SK)b 86 210 
Samsung Semi. & Telecom. 1981 Kihung (KG) 421 1,935 
Samsung Electro-Mechanics 1982 Su won (KG) 115 427 
Samsung Electronics 1980 Su won (KG) 1,490 2;500 
Samsung Corning 1984 Su won (KG) 42 145 
Samsung Electron Devices 1983 Su won (KG) 185 262 
Cheil Wool Textile 1979 Taegu (NK) 47 38 
Cheil Synthetic Textile 1979 Ku mi (NK) 84 95 
Cheil Sugar 1978 Ichon (KG) 150 256 
Chonju Paper 1979 Chonju (NC) 41 34 
Samsung Data Systems 1985 Seoul 24 
Samsung Petrochemical 1988 Ulsan (SK) 43 
Samsung Watch 1987 Changwon (SK) 36 
Samsung Medical Systems 1986 Su won (KG) 32 
Samsung Construction 1985 An yang (KG) 30 
Samsung Heavy Industry 1986a Changwon (SK) 245 
Samsung Hewlett Packard 1984 Seoul 23 
S. Advanced Ins. of Techno. 1987 Kihung (KG) 1,843 
Note: aLicensed year; bAbbreviations: KG (Kyonggi); NK (North Kyongsang); SK 
(South Kyongsang); and NC (North Challa). 
Source: KIRI, 1985, 1989. 
technologies. Also, the Group poured enormous capital into semiconductors. In 
1987, Samsung developed the 4 mega DRAM chip using its own technology and its 
16 and 64 mega DRAM successively. Further, Samsung has expanded its investment 
in software. 
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Samsung's new affiliates in the 1980s reflects its transformation processes: 
Korea Telecommunications Co. (1980), Korea Security System Co. (1981), Samsung 
Watch Co. (1983), Samsung Medical Systems Co. (1984), Samsung Hewlett Packard 
Co. (1984), Samsung United Aerospace Co. (1985), Samsung Data Systems Co. 
(1985), Samsung Advanced Institute of Technology (1987), and Samsung General 
Chemicals Co. (1988). The restructuring processes for high-tech industry was not 
confined to acquiring new businesses but extended to reorganising existing 
operations. For example, the Cheil Sugar & Co., a food-processing company, has 
been transformed into a pharmaceutical manufacturing company. Further, Cheil 
Wool Textile Co. and Cheil Synthetic Textiles Co. have been revamped as an 
engineering plastic manufacturer and polyester base film producer (for video films 
and floppy disks) respectively. Further, Samsung Aerospace Co. was designated by 
the Government as a prime contractor for the co-manufacturing of F-16 fighter-planes 
with General Dynamics Co. The restructuring of Samsung as a high-tech enterprise 
was influenced by the Oil Crises of the 1970s, which affected the profit rates of heavy 
and chemical industries, prompting energy-saving and technology-intensive activities, 
and the trade regulations imposed on Korean products by advanced capitalist 
countries, which forced Samsung to improve its competitiveness overseas. 
Another notable move by Samsung during the 1980s was to increase its 
participation in the service sector, particularly finance. When the Korean 
Government privatised its city banks (1981-1983 ), Samsung secured substantial 
shareholdings. Its identified ownership of city banks are as follows: Choheung Bank 
(7.4 per cent), Commercial Bank (11.0 per cent), Cheil Bank (5.3 per cent), Hanil 
Bank (6.3 per cent), Seoul Trust Bank (2.8 per cent), and Korean-American Bank (6.7 
per cent) (Ministry of Finance, 1989). In 1988, Samsung Winners Card Co. was 
established to reinforce its capability in supplying capital. Further, the Group 
increased its capital supply through its overseas subsidiaries. This diversification of 
its capital supply source made Samsung more independent from the Government. 
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1.2 The Growth Strategies of Samsung 
Adhering to the Government's Policy 
One of Samsung's most simple investment strategies has been to follow the 
Government's guidance (OESSG, 1988a: 154). Government's support - capital, tax 
exemption and administrative assistance - was given to entrepreneurs who followed 
its policy directions. Samsung's entry into particular businesses was dictated by 
Government's subsidies. When Samsung's Founder started a new business, he 
detailed its importance to the President of Korea and high-level bureaucrats and 
requested their support. In his autobiography Chairman Lee outlined that the 
development of a particular industry hinged on Government support. It provided 
almost all of the investment capital - foreign and domestic _15 required for the 
construction of firms, such as Cheil Sugar & Co., Cheil Wool Textile Co., and Korea 
Fertiliser Co. Indeed, the close business-government relationship is reflected in 
retired bureaucrats being found positions in the company and popular marriages 
among chaebol families and politicians (Kang, Choe and Chang, 1991: 80-81). 
Among Samsung's recruits have been an ex-Prime Minister (Shin Hyun-Hwack) and 
the ex-Minister of Law and Home Affairs (Hong Jin-Gie, the present Samsung 
Chairman's father-in-law). 
Sometimes, however, Samsung had to reluctantly accept Government's advice 
to maintain a good relationship. Lee, B.C. (1986: 210-211) wrote: 
In 1977, the Government and bank recommended Samsung to acquire 
a medium-size shipbuilding company - Woojin Shipbuilding Co. -
which was about to be liquidated after the Oil Shock. Samsung was 
reluctant to accept this advice because the company had no economic 
merit or technological advantage. However, as the Government's 
recommendation was so strong, I decided to take over it for the 
nation's economic well-being. 
15. As President of the Korean Businessmen's Association (now the Federation of Korean Industries) 
Lee recommended to the Government the repayment certification of foreign loans and the supply of 
domestic capital. The request was accepted (Lee, B.C., 1986: 121). 
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Indeed, the Korean Government recommended the acquisition of improperly-run 
enterprises to avoid negative social repercussions from their liquidation. As the 
invisible subsidies from Government were always larger than the loss, the chaebols 
did not demur. They used the acquisition to diversify and expand their business. 
Number One Policy 
The business philosophy of Samsung's Founder was to make any business he 
developed be number one in Korea and the world. Interestingly, several of Lee's 
initial ventures were named Cheil (number one in Korean) to reflect the Founder's 
desire to be the leader. His zealous desire to be the best often resulted in fierce 
competition to defeat his counterparts as exemplified by: (a) Samsung Electronics 
Corporation and Goldstar; and (b) two seasoning manufacturers - Samsung's 
Meepoong Co. and Meewon Co. (Kim, K.S., 1988: 63-65). A number one company 
derived high profits from its new monopoly position. Most of Samsung's enterprises 
occupy a monopolistic position in the domestic market. In 1990, Samsung was the 
market leader in 21 of designated 127 items.16 Chaebol profits depended primarily 
on increasing their market share rather than on productivity improvements. A 
Chaebol's competitive relationship with small and medium-sized firms was largely 
determined by its diversified business structure. Fierce competition with chaebols 
eliminated many small and medium-sized firms. 
Lee exploited scale economies to make Samsung the market leader in Korea. 
He constructed large factories which satisfied total domestic market demand. This 
strategy was prompted by Samsung's ability to borrow most of the required capital 
and repayment certification from the Government. As Korea had no accumulated 
technology, management skill and other business know-how, the only way Samsung 
16. Every year Government designated market leaders. Concentration occurred when a company's 
market share in a particular business exceeded 50 per cent or when the accumulated market share of 
three companies exceeded 70 per cent. In 1990, Hyundai, Daewoo and Lucky-Goldstar were 
designated as market leaders in nine, fourteen and thirty-two items respectively (Kang, Choe and 
Chang, 1990: 25-26). 
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could increase its productivity was to exploit scale economies.17 The large-scale 
factory provided a number of benefits: high productivity, monopolistic profits and 
more subsidies from Government. If a company failed it would be bailed out by 
Government. If it succeeded the company made a windfall gain. Both Cheil Sugar & 
Co. and Cheil Wool Textile Co. had enough production capacity to cover the whole 
domestic market. Lee constructed the World's biggest fertiliser manufacturing 
factory, Korea Fertiliser Co. Even the electronics parts manufacturing affiliate of 
Samsung - Samsung Electron Devices - was one of the world's biggest cathode-ray 
tube manufacturers. Also, another Samsung's electronics affiliate - Samsung 
Corning Co. - was one of the world's three largest colour TV glass bulb 
manufacturers (OESSG, 1988b: 19-20). All these companies were established with 
borrowed money - Lee's own contribution was small. Indeed, the methods of 
sourcing capital created unique corporate organisations and business environments. 
Business Diversification 
Samsung's business has been diversified ranging from hog farming and flour-
milling through genetic engineering and semiconductors to manufacture of jet-
fighters. The Founder emphasised corporate survival and this depended on an ability 
to restructure a business to meet changing market demand (Lee, B.C., 1986: 245-246). 
Figure 4.1 shows marked shifts in Samsung's industrial structure. The proportion of 
high value-added activities, such as electronics, precision instruments, and service 
sectors, has been increased at the expense of the heavy and chemicals, food, and 
textile industries (see Appendix 4.2). 
Consistently, Samsung's Founder planned all activities on a few sites. In 
starting a new business, huge sites were prepared to house all future related industries. 
After he developed the electronics assembling company, Samsung Electronics Co., he 
17. Due to the benefits of scale economies, the Korea Fertilizer Co. could supply 20 to 40 per cent 
cheaper fertiliser than other Korean counterparts. Compared with the international market price - 95 
dollars per ton - the production cost of Korean Fertiliser Co. was just 65 dollars (OESSG, 1988a: 178). 
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established a number of affiliates, notably Samsung Electro-Mechanics Co., Samsung 
Electron Devices Co. and Samsung Coming Co. Samsung Chemical Co. was 
established to supply the raw material - PTA (purified terephthalic acid) - to 
Samsung Synthetic Textile Co. Also, Samsung established a number of garment-
manufacturing companies to make use of the textiles produced by Cheil Wool Textile 
Co. and Cheil Synthetic Textile Co. 
Samsung's business diversification (or restructuring) process was not limited 
to establishing new affiliates. Individual corporations have restructured their 
businesses to accommodate higher value-added sectors. The most typical case is the 
restructuring of Cheil Sugar & Co. Initially, the sugar-refining company diversified 
into flour-milling. Then, it advanced to canning, seasoning, edible oil, feedstuff, hog 
farming, meat processing, organic fertiliser and frozen foods. Subsequently, it 
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expanded to use their by-products. As all production processes occur within a single 
corporate organisation, the company's relationship to other companies is not 
significant. The vertical integration (and horizontal integration) within the Group 
resulted in fierce competitions with small and medium-sized firms. Since the mid 
1980s, Cheil Sugar & Co. has focused its investment on pharmaceutical and food 
processing businesses by applying genetic engineering technologies. Further, 
Samsung Electronics Co. is revamping its home electronics business structures to 
include semiconductors and computers. Cheil Wool Textile Co. has incorporated 
engineering plastics. Further, Cheil Synthetic Textiles Co. has reduced its initial 
interest in yarns and fabrics to include more profitable and sophisticated activities, 
such as polyester base film manufacturing for video cassette tapes and other industrial 
uses. 
2 ORGANISATIONAL AND LOCATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS 
Samsung Group is composed of more than 40 affiliates in different business 
areas. All of them are closely interconnected by family ownership, intercompany 
shareholding system, family control and intra-organisational transactions. These 
particular organisational characteristics of Samsung (or chaebols) contributed to the 
high intra-Group transactions and locational concentration in a few key industrial 
areas. Again, Samsung's locational agglomeration in the nation's two major 
industrial areas resulted in the locational concentration of its numerous 
subcontractors. Although Korean Government tried to relieve this spatial imbalance 
it was not very fruitful. The business organisational characteristics and their spatial 
consequences had to be considered before the policy-making. 
2.1 Ownership and Control Structure 
Family ownership, family control and intercompany shareholding systems 
were highlighted in Chapter 2 as key characteristics of chaebols. Samsung is no 
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exception. As shown in Figure 4.2, a number of major companies were originally 
owned by the Lee family (column 2). Then these companies obtained the stock of 
other affiliates (column 3). Subsequently, the affiliates controlled their daughter 
companies (column 4). This intercompany shareholding system made it possible for 
the Founder's family to control the entire Group with an initial 10 to 20 per cent 
investment in a number of major companies. By 1989, the Lee family and the 
Group's affiliates owned 6 per cent and 44 per cent of Samsung's total stock 
respectively (Kang, Choe and Chung, 1991: 43). In other words, the family 
controlled the Samsung Group through its initial 6 per cent investment. 
Interestingly, the Lee family and the Group's affiliates have a greater 
shareholding in non-listed companies (plain-line boxes) than in listed companies 
(bold-line boxes). There is a possibility that the owners sacrifice listed companies for 
greater profits in the non-listed companies. Given the high proportion of intra-Group 
transactions this scepticism is not baseless. Indeed, the owners can transfer the profits 
of listed companies to non-listed companies without affecting the rate of profit at a 
Group level. 
This ownership structure gives complete control to the owner. All decision-
making in Samsung is conducted at a regular meeting of affiliate presidents. 
Samsung people refer to this meeting as 'a council in the royal presence' (Kim, K.S., 
1988: 53-55; Baik and Park, 1976: 65-66). This nickname was given because many 
retired high-level officers participate in the meeting. Also, it implies that the 
Chairman exercises supreme power over corporate decision-making.18 Yet Samsung 
is considered to be a model business group because it restrains family participation in 
management and encourages internal promotion. Nevertheless, real control power 
has been always in the family's hands. As in all other chaebols, power has been 
passed on to the Founder's son, Lee Kun-Hee, as detailed in the Chairman's will. The 
18. The absolute control exercised by the founder of chaebols is reflected in the siting of key meetings: 
before the morning shift at Lucky-Goldstar, on the construction site or factory at Hyundai, on Sunday 
at Daesung Wool Textile and at home by Dae Nong (Baik and Park, 1976: 68). 
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Founder established the Office of the Executive Staff of the Samsung Group as a 
control and coordinating organisation of its affiliates.19 The Founder has 
concentrated the Group's elite staff in head office and ensured that it is under his 
absolute control. 
2.2 Linkage Patterns 
In 1988, the proportion of Samsung's intra-Group transactions m total net 
sales was more than 20 per cent. 20 This high proportion has been influenced by the 
Group's interlocking shareholding system, the vertical integration of production, and 
the introduction of the general trading company system. Although the one-set 
production system was developed in the process of overcoming initial deficiencies in 
related industries, it is undesirable from a long-term national economic development 
perspective. Internal transactions shrink the effective market transactions. For 
example, Samsung Insurance Corporation's priority is to make loans to the Group 
affiliates irrespective of the qualifications for the loan. By March 1989, more than 9 
per cent of Samsung Insurance Co.'s total loans were directed to Samsung's affiliates 
(Ministry of Finance, 1989). 
Figure 4.3 shows Samsung's intra-Group transactional pattern. Samsung Co. 
(GTC) is identified as the Group's outside sales channel. Almost negligible intra-
Group forward linkages from the Samsung Co. implies that the company's role as a 
Group's intermediary organisation is not important. Also, the Figure shows the 
vertical integration pattern of electronics affiliates. Parts and components for 
Samsung Electronics Co. are supplied by its three parts-manufacturing companies -
Samsung Coming Co., Samsung Electron Devices Co. and Samsung Electro-
19. Based on a survey of 108 business groups Kang, Choe and Chung (1991: 50) have found that 
almost 96 per cent of chaebols have similar control organisations. 
20. The figure was calculated by the following formula: (the amount of forward linkages within the 
Group of the 21 affiliates (see Figure 4.3) I the total net sales of the affiliates) X 100 (KIS, 1989: 81-
83; KIS and BTSR 1989: 15). According to Lee, K.U. (1990: 43), the proportion of intra-Group 
transactions of top 5, top 10 and top 30 chaebols were 27.5 per cent, 25.5 per cent and 23.3 per cent 
res pee ti vel y. 
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Unit: billion won. 
Note: denotes the affiliates listed on the Korean stock market. 
Source: KIS and BTSR, 1989: 15. 
Figure 4.3 
Intercompany Transactions of the Samsung Group, 1988 
Mechanics Co. Also, Samsung Electronics Co. has transactional relationships with 
Samsung Data Systems Co., Samsung Shipbuilding & Heavy Industries Co., Samsung 
Co. and Samsung Aerospace Industries. Although not illustrated in Figure 4.3, 
Samsung Medical Systems Co., Samsung Hewlett Packard Co. and Samsung Watch 
Co. have close relationships with Samsung Electronics Co. Samsung Construction 
Co. works as the Group's carpenter, while Samsung Shipbuilding & Heavy Industries 
act as its blacksmith. Further, the raw materials produced by Samsung Chemical Co. 
are supplied to Cheil Synthetic Textile Co. for artificial fibre yams. The yams are 
then directed to Cheil Wool Textile Co. for mixed textile production. Again, the 
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textiles are supplied to Samsung Corporation's garment business. Subsequently, the 
garments are sold by the Group's Shinsegae Department Store and exported through 
the Samsung Co. 
2.3 Locational Characteristics 
Samsung's locational decision-making processes are found, at least in part, in 
the Founder's autobiography. With money inherited from his father, Lee travelled to 
major commercial cities such as Seoul, Taegu, Pusan, and Pyongyang (present-day 
North Korea's capital) to search for suitable business and locations. Through these 
trips he knew that business was dominated by big merchants. Realising he could not 
compete with the big capitalists in these cities he concentrated his attention on the 
small rice-exporting port, Masan, which had been neglected by the large capitalist 
organisations. He realised Masan had a shortage in grain-milling capacity (Lee, B.C., 
1986: 25). 
This story provides an interesting insight into Samsung's locational decision-
making. Firstly, it shows how Lee concentrated on large commercial cities with many 
business opportunities before narrowing his search to smaller settlements. Secondly, 
he took into consideration the locational behaviour of competitors before making his 
choice of site. Thirdly, after determining the scale of business he selected a site near 
his home town to capitalize on his local knowledge. Fourthly, it underlines the 
existence of a range of market hierarchies which are suitable for businesses of 
different scales. 
After accumulating capital from his initial businesses, Lee moved his business 
arena to Taegu, the central city of North Kyongsang province. In Taegu, he engaged 
in trade. Soon Lee moved his activities to Seoul and engaged in international trade. 
During the Korean War, however, he retreated to Taegu and recommenced trading in 
Pusan, the provisional wartime capital city. In 1953, he constructed a large-scale 
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sugar-refining factory in Pusan. In 1954, he established the Cheil Wool Textile Co. in 
Taegu. Further, he acquired a canning factory in Kuryongpo and a cement 
manufacturing plant in Samchog, Kangwan province. Up to the 1950s, Samsung's 
factory sites were concentrated around Lee's birth place in Kyangsang provinces 
(Figure 4.4). 
Although, Samsung's investment in the manufacturing sector was not active in 
the 1960s, its spatial organisation was widened. An affiliate, Korea Fertiliser Co., 
was housed in the Ulsan Industrial Estate21 - Korea's first industrial estate. With the 
introduction of industrial estate development, the locational decisions of private 
compames have been strongly influenced by the Government's industrial location 
policies. 
Further, Lee left very interesting information about the reason why he 
preferred Chonju city, North Challa province, as the location site of Chonju Paper 
Corporation. 22 
In the mid 1960s, the mass-media criticised Samsung for avoiding 
Challa provinces. A survey of employees, however, revealed this 
criticism was unfounded. Indeed, Challa provinces contributed the 
highest proportion of Samsung's employecs.23 Nevertheless, this 
criticism prompted Samsung to acquire a factory site at Chonju in 
North Challa province for paper manufacturing (Lee, B.C., 1986: 191). 
This comment reveals two interesting geographical phenomena: the existence of 
barriers restricting locational decision-making within particular areas; and the 
21. The Founder, as the president of the Korean Businessmen's Association, recommended the 
development of large-scale industrial complex and its Ulsan location to the Government (Lee, B.C., 
1986: 125-127). The purpose of industrial complex construction was twofold: the exploitation of 
agglomeration benefits; and the advertisement of Korea's industrialisation which was required in 
introducing foreign capital. 
22. In 1965, Samsung acquired Saehan Paper Co. and renamed it Chonju Paper Co. As the company 
was taken over during construction, it was tantamount to establishing a new company. As the secured 
factory site was inappropriate for a large-scale paper manufacturing plant, Samsung planned to move 
the location to other places (OESSG, 1988a: 204). 
23. The figure was calculated from the following formula: the share of ChOlla-birth in Samsung I the 
proportion of ChOlla population in the nation's total population X 100. As there were no Samsung's 
operating units in ChOlla provinces before Chonju Paper Co., however, it is very difficult to take Lee's 
figure at its face value. 
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negative general opinion from the underdeveloped provinces functions to pressure the 
Government and entrepreneurs to correct the unbalanced development situations. 
In the 1970s, Samsung advanced to electronics and heavy and chemical 
industries. Most new plants were concentrated in the two major industrial centres: the 
Seoul Metropolitan Area and the Southeastern Coastal Area (Figure 4.4). This 
bipolar pattern was influenced by the different locational requirements of the two 
industries - electronics (and other labour-intensive industries), and heavy and 
chemical industries. The electronics industry required a large labour force, big 
markets and related industries as its important locational factors. However, the 
overseas resource-oriented heavy and chemical industry preferred coastal areas which 
provided good port facilities. 
Besides these natural factors, Samsung's bipolar locational pattern was 
strongly influenced by Lee's locational policy. It involved concentrating all related 
firms within or near a few large-scale industrial complexes. Lee considered the 
vertical integration of various production processes as a key factor in raising 
productivity. This policy resulted in Samsung's concentrating its activities within a 
few sites. Samsung's electronics-related companies, for instance, located in the 
Suwon Electronics Complex, while its heavy and chemical industries were in the 
Southeastern Coastal Area. Thus, the locational decision-making of the vanguard 
company in a specific business was of paramount importance for related companies. 
During the 1970s, most of non-heavy industry plants were in the Seoul 
Metropolitan Area. Seoul Metropolitan Area possessed both the largest consuming 
market in Korea and was convenient for negotiations with foreign buyers. Thus, 
Samsung Sugar & Co. stated that: 
Pusan had disadvantages in covering the whole domestic sugar market. 
So, Cheil Sugar & Co. constructed its new factory in Inchon, Seoul 
Metropolitan Area, which is the mass consuming place of sugar 
(OESSG, 1988a: 198). 
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In the 1980s, more emphasis was placed on the high-tech industries producing 
semiconductors, genetic-engineering and computers. Their locational requirements, 
such as high-speed transport systems, information-networks and good amenities, 
forced Samsung to concentrate them in the Seoul Metropolitan Area. In locating a 
semiconductor factory the Founder commented that: 
Besides the complications of the locational factors, above all the 
location must be within one-hour time distance from Seoul. Because, 
if not, it will be almost impossible to recruit high quality technicians 
and scientists (Lee, B.C., 1986: 237). 
A number of other factories were housed in existing local manufacturing centres, such 
as Kumi, Pohang, Masan-Changwan Industrial Estate to interconnect with Samsung's 
related industries. 
During the 1980s, Samsung located its three plants in Challa provinces. In 
siting its affiliate, Kwangju Electronics Co., there Samsung explained that: 
There was a strong recommendation from the Government to locate 
one of Samsung's electronics plants in Kwangju for balanced regional 
development and dissolution of regional antagonism. Although 
Kwangju had the advantage of an abundant labour force, it did not 
offer a good locational environment for electronics as there were no 
parts-supplying companies. However, Samsung accepted the 
Government's recommendation as goodwill and located its vending 
machine manufacturing factory in Kwangju, as did Goldstar (Goldstar-
Alps Electronics Co.) and Daewoo (Daewoo Electronics Co.) (pers. 
comm.). 
For similar reasons Samsung established the two other factories in Challa provinces. 
By the 1980s, the location of Samsung's factories appeared more dispersed. Yet they 
reinforced its concentration on Seoul-Pusan Corridor. 
Samsung's locational decision-making raises a number of issues concerning 
extant explanatory approaches in industrial geography. First, almost all factors 
acclaimed as major forces in locational decision-making have been considered in the 
locational decision-making of Samsung. No particular school of thought, therefore, 
dominates. There are many instances where decision-making has been irrational and 
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uneconomical. On other occasions non-economic factors, such as regional 
development policies, general opinions, regionalism, social justice and personal 
preferences, have predominated. Samsung's activities have also been strongly 
influenced by shifts in industrial structure and the organisational restructuring. As the 
weighting of the factors in locational decision-making has changed as the corporate 
organisation has developed, historical analysis is essential. One paramount consistent 
factor that has governed locational decision-making was interconnection with 
affiliates. The high level of intra-Group transactions underlines its importance. 
2.4 Regional Economic Implications 
Samsung's regional economic impact is a question of locational shift, linkage 
patterns, relationships with other companies and business restructuring. As noted, its 
manufacturing facilities were concentrated in Korea's two major industrial centres. In 
some sense, Samsung contributed to Korea's bipolar regional economic development 
patterns as evidenced by its vertically-integrated production system centred on the 
company city of Suwon.24 Dominated by a few activities this company city has a 
number of regional economic problems. When its specialist industry loses its 
competitiveness the company city loses its vitality - a condition aggravated by the 
chaebol's interlocking ownership structure and propensity for rapid industrial 
restructuring in Korea.25 Further, as exemplified by Ulsan, Hyundai Group 
dominated city, conflicts between the business group and labour unions harmed the 
regional economy. The damage is not limited to chaebol companies but spreads to 
subcontracting companies who are often hurt more than their parent companies. 
As witnessed by Samsung's acquisition of Taegu University, Korean 
entrepreneurs have sought to contribute to the economic development of their birth-
24. There are a number of company cities in Korea whose economies are dominated by one large 
business organisation. Typical examples are Hyundai's Ulsan, Pohang Steel's Pohang and Daewoo 
Shipbuilding & Heavy's Koje. 
25. The poor business performance of Daewoo Shipbuilding & Heavy Industries Co., for instance, 
means that Koje' s fate is like a flickering candle in the wind. 
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places once they have succeeded in business. The transformation of Kumi into one of 
Korea's major industrial centres is one example. According to Lee, C. (1985: 323-
337), the development of Kumi Industrial Estate was led by entrepreneurs born in 
Kyongsang provinces.26 They included: Lee, W. M. (Kolong Group), Kwag, T.S. 
(Korean-Japanese entrepreneurs), Lee, B.C. (Samsung Group), Suh, G. H. (Korean-
Japanese entrepreneur) and the then Chairman of Lucky-Goldstar Group. Although 
Kumi was an inappropriate location for an electronics industrial complex, this home-
town bias clinched its development. 27 Indeed, K yongsang provinces' economic 
growth has been largely affected by the endeavours of its home-grown chaebol 
entrepreneurs. It is because chaebol is the most adequate organisation that it can 
overcome the disadvantages of an inappropriate location. 
Another regional economic feature is the concentration of capital, human 
resources and control in the Seoul Metropolitan Area. As instanced by Cheil Sugar & 
Co., the headquarter's share of total employees has increased from 3 per cent in 1955 
to almost 35 per cent in 1983 (CSC, 1983: 516). While factory employment has been 
progressively reduced through automation, headquarter staff has been increased by 
growth of the sales and control sectors (CSC, 1983: 309). Further, most newly 
established high-tech and service sector ventures have been located in the Seoul 
Metropolitan Area. This shifting locational pattern has been influenced by the change 
from hardware-oriented to software-centred locational factors. Samsung's interest 
has shifted to technology-intensive and information-oriented industries focused on 
large cities. As seen in Table 4.2, most of Samsung's research centres were 
established in the 1980s. More than 91 per cent of their employees were concentrated 
in the Seoul Metropolitan Area. Between 1984 and 1988, the number of research 
personnel in provincial areas has been reduced or remained static whereas it has 
26. Kmni was the then President Park's birth-place. Although it influenced their locational decision-
making, there was no over compulsion. Indeed, it attracted a number of Korean-Japanese 
entrepreneurs who had no close relationship with the President. 
27. All other chaebols were affected in the same way. 
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increased markedly in the Seoul Metropolitan Area. Together with high-tech 
industries it has boosted the further concentration of population in the Seoul 
Metropolitan Area. 
Above all, Samsung's regional economic impact must be seen in relation to its 
subcontracting companies (i.e., Korea's 'cooperative companies'). In December 
1986, Samsung had 1,156 cooperative companies with a fixed capital of more than 
100 million won and more than three years' business relationship with the Group 
(OESSG, 1988a: 651). Of those with less than a three year connection with Samsung, 
several thousand companies are involved. Between 1977 and 1978, for example, 85 
per cent of Cheil Wool Textile Corporation's garment production was subcontracted 
(CWTC, 1984: 279). Following Samsung's locational pattern, its cooperative 
companies were concentrated in the two major industrial centres - the Seoul 
Metropolitan Area and the Southeastern Coastal Area. Samsung has only negligible 
business linkages with companies located in Kangwon, North Chungchong, South 
Chungchang, North Challa and South Challa (Table 4.3). 
3 INTERNATIONALISATION OF SAMSUNG 
Samsung started as a small rice-processing factory in 1936, but has grown into 
a global network corporation. In December 1989, it had twenty-four overseas 
production subsidiaries (including confirmed projects), thirty sales subsidiaries, 141 
branch offices and three overseas research and development centres (Table 4.4 ). 
Almost half of its products are exported. This transformation raises a series of issues: 
why has Samsung internationalised; how has it been accomplished; and what impact 
has it had on corporate growth? 
Samsung's internationalisation has occurred spasmodically in many business 
fields. Initially, it used foreign loans to establish import-substitution industries. Then 
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Table 4.3 
The Location of Samsung's Cooperative Companies3 , 1987 
Province Samsung Co. Cheil Sugar Electronics Shipbuilding & Engineering & Wool & Synthetic Other 
& Co. affiliates Heavy Industries Construction Textile affiliatesb 
Total 
no. no. no. no. no. no. no. no., per cent 
Seoul 126 50 87 32 176 21 64 556 49.2 
Pusan 16 9 2 99 12 6 3 147 13.0 
Kyonggi 26 33 122 9 25 4 14 233 20.6 
Kang won 4 1 6 0.5 
....... 
North ChungchOng 2 2 2 6 0.5 
0\ 
\0 South ChungchOng 5 1 1 7 0.6 
North ChOlla 1 2 3 0.3 
South ChOlla 1 1 1 3 0.3 
North Kyongsang 26 4 5 8 5 32 81 7.2 
South Kyongsang 12 5 5 49 2 3 12 88 7.8 
Total 213 108 225 198 223 68 95 1, 130 100.0 
18.9 9.6 19.9 17.5 19.7 6.0 8.4 100.0 
Note: aThe companies whose fixed capital is 100 million won and have more than three years' business relationship with Samsung as of 1986. 
bother affiliates include Chonju Paper Co. (3 firms), Samsung Aerospace Co. (18 firms), Samsung Petrochemical Co. (8 firms), Samsung 
Watch Co. (19 firms), Shinsaegae Department (26 firms), Hotel Shilla (4 firms) and Cheil Planning (17 firms). 
Source: OESSG, 1988a: 850-876. 
Table 4.4 
Samsung's Overseas Sales Operating Units, 1989 
Company North Latin Europe Southeast Middle East Total 
America America Asia & Others 
no. no. no. no. no. no. 
Samsung Co. 6 (3) 5 (2) 8 (4) 14 (4) 12 (3) 45 (16) 
Cheil Sugar 1 1 2 3 7 
Cheil Wool Textile 1 1 3 5 
Cheil Synthetic Tex. 1 2 3 
Chonju Paper 2 2 
Samsung Electronics 6 (4) 6 (1) 7 (4) 6 (2) 6 (1) 31 (12) 
Samsung Electron (1) 1 2 1 4 (1) 
Samsung Electric 1 (1) 1 1 3 (1) 
Samsung Coming 1 2 3 
Samsung Aerospace 1 1 1 3 
Samsung Watch 1 1 2 
Samsung Chemical 1 1 
Samsung Heavy 4 2 1 7 
Samsung Construction 1 1 2 
Korea Engineering 1 1 
Dongbang Life Insur. 1 1 1 3 
Ankuk Fire Insurance 1 1 2 
Hotel Shilla 1 1 2 4 
Shinsegae Department 1 1 1 3 
Joongang Development 1 1 
Joongang Daily News 1 1 2 4 
Cheil Planning 2 1 1 4 
Executive Office 1 1 2 
Total 32 (9) 12 (3) 30 (8) 48 (6) 19 (4) 141 (30) 
Note: Figures in the parentheses represent overseas sales subsidiaries. They do not 
include off-shore manufacturing subsidiaries. 
Source: Samsung Group (pers. comm.). 
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established joint-venture companies to acquire advanced technologies and overseas 
sales networks before developing as an aggressive exporter. Since the early 1980s, its 
emphasis has shifted to overseas manufacturing and finance. Its outward direct 
manufacturing investment is of paramount interest to researchers attempting to 
explain direct foreign investment. 
3.1 International Involvement 
The Korean economy during the late 1940s and the 1950s was affected by the 
shortage of consumer goods following liberation from Japan (1945) and the Korean 
War (1950-1953). As virtually all businesses were Japanese-managed during the 
colonial period ( 1910-1945), their withdrawal disrupted commodity production. 
Further, the remaining production facilities were devastated during the Korean War. 
The only strategy available to the Korean Government to relieve this urgent problem 
was to attract more foreign aid and to encourage the import of consumables. 
Samsung took advantage of these conditions and made a great fortune. 
The Government, however, could not rely permanently on overseas supplies. 
During the 1950s and early 1960s, it developed import-substitution industries. As 
Korea had only limited investment capital, technology, manufacturing facilities and 
raw materials, the Government had to import them. Samsung pioneered the 
construction of import-substitution industries. For instance, Cheil Sugar & Co. 
(1953), Cheil Wool Textile Co. (1954), Korea Fertiliser Co. (1964) and the Chonju 
Paper Co. (1965) were created with foreign capital and technology. 
By the mid 1960s, import-substitution activities were confronted with a 
fundamental problem - the small domestic market. Samsung had to exploit overseas 
markets for further growth. When the military government (1961-1979) created 
better business environments for export-oriented and heavy and chemical industries, 
Samsung participated in their development. Besides investment capital and 
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technology, the acquisition of overseas sales networks was essential for developing 
export-oriented industries. Samsung, therefore, had to cooperate with foreign 
multinational corporations which had global sales networks. Specifically, Samsung 
entered into joint-ventures with Japanese general trading companies to utilise their 
overseas networks. 
As the names suggest, Samsung-Sanyo Electric Co. (1969), Samsung NEC 
Co. (1970), Samsung Sanyo Parts Co. (1973), Samsung Coming Co. (1973), Samsung 
GTE Telecommunication Co. (1977), Samsung Hewlett Packard Co. (1984), Samsung 
United Aerospace Co. (1985) and Samsung Clark Co. (1987) were established as 
joint-ventures. Although the names of foreign partners were not added to the 
company names of Cheil Synthetic Textiles Co. (1972), Samsung Heavy Industries 
Co. (1974), Samsung Petrochemical Industries Co. (1974), Samsung Medical Systems 
Co. (1984), Samsung Data Systems Co. (1985) and Samsung Watch Co. (1983) they 
were all established as joint-ventures. This international involvement and cooperation 
with foreign MNCs had a decisive effect on Samsung's growth. 
3.2 International Transactions 
In 1938, Samsung commenced international trading by establishing the 
Samsung Store in Taegu. It exported fruit and dried fish to Manchuria and northern 
China. After the liberation, Samsung expanded its trade area to Hong Kong, Macao, 
Singapore and U.S.A. It imported consumer goods and exported seafoods and 
Korea's indigenous specialities. Samsung secured its initial investment capital for 
import-substitution industries through international trade. Once the Korean economy 
created import-substitution industries the import business lost its attraction. Further, 
the Government regulated imports to protect its fledgling industries. 
Since the early 1960s, Samsung has strengthened its export activities in 
concert with the Government's increased subsidies. Initially, Samsung redirected its 
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import-substitution products as export commodities and then participated in the 
electronics industry to develop export commodities. As Samsung did not have 
overseas sales networks it had to rely on foreign trading companies and its joint-
venture partners for overseas marketing. Reflecting this situation, these export 
activities were dispersed to individual affiliates until the export channels were 
integrated into Samsung Co. (GTC) in 1975.28 
The introduction of the GTC system produced marked changes in Samsung's 
international trade activities. In 1975, Samsung's exports as a proportion of total 
sales sky-rocketed (Figure 4.5). In the process it expanded its overseas networks from 
16 offices in 1975 to 61 (including 16 overseas subsidiaries) in 1989. The enormous 
increase in exports was prompted by various kinds of subsidies from Government. 
Above all, the 'export finance' was the prime catalyst. Exporters could be supplied 
finance up to 90 per cent of the total amount of exports concurrently with the 
acquisition of a letter of credit. As the interest rate was extremely low compared with 
the nominal loan rate, it was a major advantage (see Appendix 2.1). With this 
abundant supply of capital the chaebols took over many small and medium-sized 
firms which experienced great difficulties following the Oil Shock in 1973. 29 
3.3 Manufacturing Direct Foreign Investment 
After the first 'Oil Shock' (1973-1974) Samsung sought overseas raw material 
processing sites. In 1977, the first outward direct investment of Samsung in 
manufacturing was made between Chonju Paper Co. (20 per cent) and its New 
Zealand partner Winston Co. (80 per cent). Chonju Paper Co. established the joint-
venture company, Winston-Samsung Industries Ltd., to secure a stable raw material 
supply. Chonju Paper Co. utilised 70 per cent of the thermo-mechanical pulp 
products. In 1987, Samsung's first overseas venture ended as a failure. This has been 
28. Although Samsung had tried to centralise its export channels to Samsung Co. since 1964, the 
unification was realised by Samsung Co.' s designation as General Trading Companies. 
29. Between 1975 and 1984, eleven Korean GTCs acquired 312 companies (Lee, J.N., 1985: 126). 
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Figure 4.5 
The Proportion of Overseas Sales of Samsung, 1962-1988 
attributed to lack of overseas venture experience, overestimation of the required raw 
material supply, labour disputes, heightened interest rates, a weakened New Zealand 
dollar and precipitous rise in electricity prices which accounted for one third of the 
production cost 
In 1981, Samsung's second overseas venture - Goulbum Wool Processors 
Proprietary Ltd. (GWP) - was established between Cheil Wool Textile Co. (49 per 
cent) and its Australian partner FGC (51 per cent). Its main purpose was to secure a 
steady supply of wool. In 1984, it also failed. According to Samsung this was due to 
incorrect forecast of the wool supply required, high capital supply cost (main reason), 
low operation rates, low quality of the final products, high utility costs and general 
management failure by misunderstanding host country's social and cultural 
characteristics. The poor performance of GWP is well represented by the low 
operation rates and the extremely high production cost (Table 4.5). 
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Table 4.5 
Performance of the Goulburn Wool Processors Proprietary, 1982-1984 
Scoured wool Wool top 
First year Second year First year Second year 
Production (ton) 1,950 3,613 85 334 
Production capacity (ton) 4,500 4,125 750 688 
Operation rate (per cent) 43 88 11 48 
Production cost (A$ per Kg) 84 46 429 295 
International price (A$ per Kg) 32 32 70 70 
Source: Samsung (pers. comm.). 
Except for the two initial overseas ventures, all of Samsung's direct foreign 
investments in manufacturing were established after 1981 (Table 4.6). The 
subsequent rapid increase suggests the strong influence of external forces, such as 
trade regulations, rather than internal forces, such as labour cost increases. Initially, 
Samsung's direct foreign investment was focused in advanced capitalist countries to 
overcome the trade regulations of the host countries. However, as Samsung had no 
comparative advantage over its developed country counterparts, it had to discover 
alternative overseas locations which had lax trade regulations and offered high labour 
productivity rate per unit cost. 
Most joint-ventures were established in tariff-free developing countries. 
Almost all DFI was carried out by Samsung Electronics Co. and Samsung Co. Yet, 
Samsung Co. is not a manufacturing company but a trading company (OTC). When 
Samsung Co.' s export activities were interrupted by the quota imposition, the 
company moved its commodity-supply activities to overseas. 
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Table 4.6 
The Samsung Group's Overseas Manufacturing Subsidiaries3 , 1982-1989 
Affiliates Year Country Overseas subsidiaries Main products Employees Samsung's 
shareholding 
no. per cent 
Samsung Electro- 1989 Egypt SEEC Electronics parts 138 60 
Mechanics Co. 
Samsung Co. 1988 Costa Rica Samsung Costa Rica S.A. Men's wear 633 100 
1988 Guatemala Star Garment, S.A. Women's wear 400 50 
1989 Indonesia Star Garment Doogo, S.A. Blouses 280 30 
1988 Indonesia P.T. Starwin Indonesia Shoes 2,531 95 
....... 1989 Indonesia P.T. Campnesia Apparel Jackets 496 48 
-....) 
OI 1989 Indonesia P.T. Star Garment Coats 514 95 
1989 Indonesia P.T. Sun Star Brassieres 613 30 
1989 Indonesia Indonesia Sweater Plant Sweaters 541 28 
Cheil Sugar & Co. 1988 Indonesia Cheil Samsung Astra Resin, Seasoning 470 75 
Cheil Synthetic 1989 Indonesia Y asam Textile Textile 155 70 
Textiles Co. 
Note: a The manufacturing direct foreign investment of Samsung Electronics Co. will be reviewed in Chapter 6. 
Source: Samsung Group (pers. comm.). 
As a large proportion of Samsung Co.' s export commodities were supplied by 
domestic small and medium-sized firms, its overseas ventures were conducted as 
joint-ventures with them. They included: Star Garment S.A. (Taejong Synthetic 
Textile: 50 per cent), Star Garment Doogo (Doogo: 70 per cent), P.T. Sun Star (lljin: 
70 per cent) and Indonesia Sweater Plant (Taeho Garment: 67 per cent). The overseas 
joint-ventures including Samsung Co. and associated subcontracting companies 
highlights its role as a general trading company. Samsung Co. supported the outward 
direct investment of small and medium-sized firms by providing its overseas market 
information and sales network to associated companies. Like Japanese GTCs, 
Samsung Co. has facilitated the overseas relocation of matured industries. It supplied 
raw materials to overseas joint-venture companies and marketed the products in 
developed countries. Since 1990, Samsung Co. has established five manufacturing 
plants in Caribbean countries. All of them were joint-ventures with its associated 
companies. 
In 1988, Cheil Sugar & Co. established Cheil Samsung Astra Co.30 to raise its 
international competitiveness by moving out to a country with lower production costs 
and abundant raw materials. In Indonesia, Cheil Sugar & Co. is planning to establish 
another overseas venture, vaccine manufacturing, with its local partners, Parma (30 
per cent) and Wigindo (19 per cent). Further, in 1989, Cheil Synthetic Textile Co. 
established an overseas manufacturing joint-venture in Indonesia with Samsung Co. 
(30 per cent) and Indonesian partner, Yasonta (30 per cent). Also, Samsung Electro-
Mechanics Co. is planning to construct an overseas plant in Egypt to supply parts and 
components to Samsung Electronics Co.' s overseas assembly plants. Samsung Co. 
has worked as a midwife company in facilitating Samsung's overseas manufacturing 
production and direct foreign investment by associated companies. 
30. The proportion of shareholdings are: Cheil Sugar & Co. (65 per cent), Samsung Co. (10 per cent) 
and Astra Co. (25 per cent). 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This chapter has outlined Samsung's growth process, organisational 
characteristics, linkage pattern, locational behaviour and internationalisation of its 
activities. Since the opening of the rice-processing factory in 1936, Samsung has 
experienced a remarkable transformation of its fortunes. Until the 1950s, Samsung's 
business was concentrated on processing agricultural materials and importing daily 
consumer necessities. In the 1960s, its investment was shifted to capital-generating 
service sectors because of decreasing profit-rates in its import-substitution industries 
and the nationalisation of its city banks. In the 1970s, Samsung's interest was 
focused on heavy and chemical and electronics industry sectors prompted by 
Government's subsidies in these activities. Since the early 1980s, Samsung's 
attention has shifted to high-tech industry and business globalisation to cope with 
intensified international competitiveness. 
The major growth strategies of Samsung have been: adhering to the 
Government's policy direction; pursuing monopoly profits by exploiting scale 
economies; and the diversification of its business activities as an insurance against 
economic fluctuations. Together with these corporate strategies, Samsung's family-
oriented ownership and control structure has resulted in the high degree of intra-
Group linkages and locational concentration in a few key industrial areas. Further, 
changes in the location of its activities have been strongly influenced by industrial 
restructuring generated by Government policy. These developments have had a 
marked impact on Korea's regional economies. 
The growth of Samsung has been strongly affected by foreign influences. 
Initially, it made a great fortune by importing consumer goods and processing aid 
materials. Most of its manufacturing factories were established as joint-ventures with 
foreign multinationals which were relied upon for their technologies and sales 
networks. Since Samsung was nominated as the first Korean general trading 
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company in 1975, it established its own overseas business networks. When the trade 
regulations in advanced capitalist countries were strengthened Samsung established 
manufacturing subsidiaries in them to circumvent trade restrictions. Further, the 
restrictions on the import of spare parts from Korea prompted Samsung to move its 
production sites to tariff- and quota-free developing countries. A large proportion of 
Samsung's DFI was vested in joint-ventures with its commodity-supplying 
subcontractors. Thus, the internationalisation of small- and medium-sized firms could 
be initiated by connecting them to Samsung's global business network. 
Samsung's history incorporates most of chaebol's general characteristics 
discussed in the previous two chapters and provides number of theoretical insights for 
industrial geographers. First, almost all factors acclaimed by extant models as major 
locational decision-making forces have been reflected in Samsung's locational 
determinations. Further, there were many instances where non-economic factors, 
such as regional policies, general opinions, regionalism, social justice and personal 
preferences, functioned as decisive forces in locational decision-making. Thus, cross-
fertilisation between existing research approaches is a more realistic and practical 
approach than trying to develop a single cure-all model. This is particularly true of 
the locational pattern of chaebols which is characterised by extreme business 
diversification, family ownership, close relationship with Government, and unity of 
ownership and management. 
Secondly, the weighting of locational factors has changed as the corporate 
organisation has developed. The initial plant location has had an enormous impact on 
the subsequent locational decision-makings of related industries. This rationale is 
reflected in the high proportion of intra-Group transactions. Indeed, the paramount 
factor governing Samsung's locational decision-making has been the interconnections 
between operating units and Group affiliates. Thus, the identification of the corporate 
growth process and organisational restructuring are essential ingredients in the 
analysis of the contemporary locational patterns of chaebols. 
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Thirdly, the growth of Samsung has been strongly affected by foreign 
influences, such as international capital flows, cooperation with foreign MNCs and 
the trade policies of foreign countries. The sudden increase in the Group's direct 
foreign investment mirrors the stronger influence of external forces, such as trade 
restrictions, rather than internal forces, such as labour cost increases. The outward 
direct investment of Samsung is understood as the 'second best choice' decision. It is 
designed to secure its export markets rather than to exploit the firm-specific 
advantages assumed of existing models. This assertion is bolstered by Samsung's 
general trading company's direct foreign investment - a joint-venture arrangement 
with small- and medium-sized firms supplying the commodities. This research result 
implies that the behaviour of an individual business organisation is largely affected by 
the state of the global economic systems. The collective research results derived from 
this chapter demonstrate the usefulness of the conceptual framework developed in 
Chapter 1. It interconnects three distinct scales of explanation - corporate 
organisational, political and social - and links different geographical scales - local, 
regional, national and international. 
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CHAPTERS 
SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CORPORATION 
In 1969, Samsung Electronics Corporation (SEC) was established, coinciding 
with the Korean Government's electronics industry promotion programme. As 
Samsung Group's star company, the Corporation accounts for more than 15 per cent 
of its Group's total sales, about 41 per cent of manufacturing sales, more than 41 per 
cent of exports and almost 30 per cent of net income (OESSG, 1989: 2-5). By 1989, 
the Corporation was the largest integrated electronics corporation in Korea with total 
sales of US$ 6 billion and 43,000 employees (SEC, 1990b: 7). Reflecting its pivotal 
position most decisions involving the Corporation occurred at the Group's highest 
levels. 
As the preceding chapter conducted Group level' s analysis this chapter 
focuses its attention on the Group's component company, Samsung Electronics 
Corporation. I The main issue of this chapter is: how the business behaviour of SEC 
has been affected by the Group level's decision-making. Initially, attention is focused 
on the Corporation's growth process, Government's influences and its growth 
strategies (Section 1). Following discussions on the Corporation's growth, interest is 
shifted to its organisational structure, linkage patterns and locational behaviour 
(Section 2). Finally, the internationalisation of technology acquisition, capital supply, 
transactions and production are detailed. Discussions are focused on the 
Corporation's responses to trade regulations imposed by developed countries (Section 
3). 
1. Samsung Electronics Corporation's affiliates are often grouped together because of their close 
interconnection. The Corporation is both the founder and major shareholder. 
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1 GROWTH OF SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CORPORATION 
The growth of Samsung Electronics Corporation has been largely influenced 
by: Group level's growth strategies; Government's support; foreign multinational 
corporation's globalisation strategies; and the behaviour of its major rival companies 
in domestic market. The Corporation's adaptation to these major influential factors 
has been reflected to its growth processes and corporate strategies. 
1.1 History of Samsung Electronics Corporation 
In the late 1960s, when SEC was established, Korea's electronics industry was 
still rudimentary. Domestic electronics companies were assembling vacuum tube 
radios and black and white television sets with fully imported parts. At that time, 
more than 70 per cent of electronics parts were imported (SEC, 1989: 111). The 
Corporation created a number of joint-venture companies for the acquisition of the 
necessary technology - a plan resisted by its counterparts. The latter insisted that 
large-scale investments by the Corporation's joint-venture companies would trigger 
excessive competition and devastate the fragile domestic electronics industry. The 
Government accepted their plea and suggested that Samsung export all the products 
produced by the joint-venture companies as a precondition of granting a business 
licence.2 Ultimately, the Corporation accepted the condition and established two 
joint-venture companies: Samsung Sanyo Electric Co.3 (SEC, 50 per cent; Sanyo, 40 
per cent; Sumitomo Co., 10 per cent) in 1969; and Samsung NEC Co.4 (SEC, 50 per 
cent; NEC, 40 per cent; Sumitomo Co., 10 per cent) in 1970. 
2. Since 1971, the 100 per cent export bondage imposed on the joint-venture companies have been 
loosened gradually. Initially, the Government approved domestic sales equivalent to the Korean 
partners shareholding. Then it withdrew that restriction on industrial electronics, parts and raw 
materials (OESSG, 1988a: 412). This policy shift was influenced by the sharp increase in bad debts of 
foreign loan companies in the late 1960s. Since then, the Government had attracted more direct 
foreign investments which had no repayment burden. 
3. In 1977, Samsung Sanyo Electric Co. was merged into Samsung Electronics Corporation. 
4. Samsung NEC Co. was renamed as Samsung Electron Devices Co. 
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Originally, Samsung Electronics Corporation planned to build up its domestic 
sales network by selling the products from its two joint-venture companies. When the 
plan was aborted by the 100 per cent export condition, the Corporation changed its 
strategy to selling products from other domestic companies under its brand name. 5 In 
1971, Samsung Electric Co.6- the Corporation's daughter company- was established 
to undertake manufacturing as a countermeasure. Soon, its own factories were 
constructed in Suwon (Kyonggi province) and Kachon (South Kyongsang province). 
SEC reorganised the Group's electronics industry and specialised in home electronics. 
In 1974, two more joint-venture companies - Samsung Sanyo Parts Co.7 and 
Samsung Coming Co. - were established to procure all parts from within the Group. 
Then the Corporation moved the isolated Kachon plant into the Suwon Estate to boost 
organisational efficiency. Also, the Seoul head office was relocated to Su won so that 
production and administration were integrated on the same site. Originally the head 
office had been housed in Seoul to facilitate contact with foreign companies and to 
negotiate with the Government (SEC, 1989: 153). 8 
Since the mid 1970s, Samsung Electronics Corporation has diversified the 
Group's electronics business by adding semiconductors and telecommunications. In 
197 4, the Corporation took over 50 per cent of the stocks of Korea Semiconductor 
Co. (KSC) from Korea Engineering & Manufacturing Co. In 1978, after securing the 
remaining 50 per cent of stocks of KSC from the Integrated Circuit International Inc., 
the Corporation changed its name as Samsung Semiconductor Co. 9 In 1977, the 
Corporation established Samsung GTE Telecommunications Co. In 1980, it took 
over the government-run Korea Telecommunications Co. (KTC). Since the mid 
5. Since 1972, Samsung Electronics Corporation bas sold the products from its joint-ventures within 
the Government's guidance. 
6. In 1973, Samsung Electric Co. was merged into Samsung Electronics Corporation. 
7. The name of Samsung Sanyo Parts Co. was changed from Samsung Electric Parts Co. to Samsung 
Electronics Parts Co. and then to Samsung Electro-Mechanics Co. 
8. However, SEC bas maintained its branch office in Seoul for the continuation of business 
connections. 
9. In 1980, Samsung Semiconductor Co. was merged into SEC. In 1982, however, the company was 
separated and incorporated into Korea Telecommunications Co. which was renamed as Samsung 
Semiconductor & Telecommunications Co. (SSTC). In 1988, SSTC was merged into SEC again. 
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1980s, the corporation diversified its investments in computer and software 
development for the full-scale integration of the electronics industry within the 
Group. In 1984, the Corporation established Samsung Hewlett Packard Co. to 
manufacture computers. Subsequently, it established a software joint-venture 
company - Samsung Data Systems Co. - with IBM. Later, the Corporation made 
substantial contributions to the establishment of other electronics-related affiliates -
Samsung Precision Industries Co.10, Samsung Watch Co., Korea Security System 
Co., and Samsung Medical Systems Co. 
1.2 Government's Influence on Corporate Growth 
As noted, Samsung Electronics Corporation was established when the 
Government enacted the 'Electronics Industry Promotion Law (EIPL)' 11. The 
Government considered the electronics industry as an ideal export industry, 
particularly for the resource-poor and labour-rich Korean economy. The Government 
provided substantial support in finance, taxation and administration. In tum, the 
Samsung Electronics Corporation secured US$ 2 million from the Korea 
Development Finance Corporation, Asia Bank and Korea Foreign Exchange Bank. 
Further, a large proportion of the domestic capital necessary. for the construction of 
the Kachon and Suwon plant was supplied from the Machinery Industry Promotion 
Fund. The law allowed the Government to designate the National Industrial 
Laboratory, the Korea Institute of Science and Technology, and the Korea Precision 
Machinery Research Centre as institutions to promote the electronics industry. They 
provided research and development, quality testing, vocational training, information 
collection and investigation of overseas markets. The law's enactment facilitated the 
introduction of overseas technologies and establishment of joint-venture companies. 
10. Samsung Electronics Corporation provided its sales networks to Samsung Precision Industries Co., 
until its own were established. 
11. In 1966, the Korean Government announced the 'Five Year Electronics Industry Promotion Plan 
(1967-1971)' to provide the legal framework developing electronics as major strategic export industry. 
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Figure 5.1 
Market Structure of Korea's Electronics Industry, 1966 and 1971 
The law paved the way for the Kumi Electronics Industrial Estate, which was 
established in 1971. 
Until the early 1970s, Government's domestic market share in the electronics 
industry was four to five times larger than that of private individual consumers 
(Figure 5.1). Due to the small domestic market, the Government pushed electronics 
as an export-oriented industry and provided substantial support. When its electronics 
companies experienced great difficulties with trade regulations - quotas and anti-
dumping taxes - of advanced capitalist countries, the Government created new 
domestic markets by enhancing its colour TV broadcasting schedule. Further, it 
reduced consumption taxes substantially.12 Also, the Government, a big domestic 
12. Between 1980 and 1982, the Government reduced consumption tax rates of electronics 
commodities substantially. Tax reductions for the major items were: black and white TVs (from 30 per 
cent to 5 per cent); colour TVs (from 40 per cent to 28 per cent); microwave ovens (from 40 per cent to 
less than 3 percent); and VTRs (from 40 per cent to4 per cent) (SEC, 1989: 318-319). 
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consumer, detailed its plans to purchase electronics commodities so that long-term 
investment plans could be developed by companies. As the Government controlled 
the introduction of technology and business participation its influence over corporate 
growth was paramount. Designated companies, particularly in public sector 
businesses such as telecommunications, were guaranteed monopolistic profits. 
Further, the government-run Korea Telecommunications Co. was sold to Samsung 
Electronics Corporation at an extraordinarily cheap price - 2 billion won - in a long-
term payment arrangement. According to Lee, J.N. (1989: 21), its real price was tens 
of billions at that time. Through the privatisation of public enterprises, some 
companies emerged as major players in particular industries. 
1.3 Corporate Growth Strategies 
As noted, Samsung Electronics Corporation's principal growth strategies 
were: the establishment of large-scale electronics industrial estates; the vertical 
integration of production processes; and the quick acquisition of capabilities to 
develop technology. Although the Corporation established many joint-venture 
companies to acquire the requisite technologies only matured and standardised skills 
could be introduced. Multinational corporations headquartered in advanced capitalist 
countries transferred their second-hand technologies to developing countries to secure 
better rates of labour productivity per unit cost. Further, they favoured direct foreign 
investment rather than the complete transfer of production. On the other hand, 
developing countries welcomed joint-ventures to acquire overseas sales networks. In 
the late 1960s, the proportion of foreign companies (including joint-venture 
companies) in domestic electronics production was almost 70 per cent. By 1988, the 
proportion had dropped to 29 per cent (SEC, 1989: 111). 
Contrary to the technologies in their early stage of development, matured and 
standardised ones required the exploitation of scale economies as the most important 
factor for their business success. The only way for Korean companies to compete 
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Table 5.1 
The Oligopolistic Market Structure of Korea's Electronics Industry, 1989 
Commodities SEC's global share Domestic market share 
per cent per cent 
Television 6 Samsung( 44) Goldstar (35) 
V1R 10 Samsung(41) Golds tar (37) 
Microwave oven 16 Samsung( 45) Goldstar (38) 
Personal computer n.a. Daewoo(34) Samsung (15) 
Semiconductor 2 Samsung(30) Hyundai (10) 
TDX n.a. Samsung(33) Goldstar(n.a.) 
PABX n.a. Samsung( 45) Goldstar(n.a.) 
Note: Abbreviations: TDX (time division exchanger); PABX (private automatic 
branch exchange). 
Source: NRI, 1990: 10. 
with their advanced capitalist counterparts was to fully exploit economies of scale 
(Bae, Yoon and Cho, 1990: 31-45). In this context, the Corporation established large-
scale manufacturing factories which far exceeded domestic demands. Not 
surprisingly, Korea's domestic electronics market was quickly oligopolised by a few 
large companies (Table 5.1). In 1988, Samsung's annual production capability was: 5 
million microwave oven units; 5 million colour TV units; almost 4 million VTR units; 
5 million CRT (cathode-ray tube) glass bulb units; 5 million picture tube units; 11 
million TV tuner units; and 1 million motor units. Through mass production the 
production cost of colour television sets has reduced between 12 to 30 per cent (SEC, 
1989: 314). Aggressive overseas market development was inevitable for mass 
production. Indeed, the export proportion of the Corporation's total sales has 
increased from 10 per cent in 1975 to almost 73 per cent in 1987 (Figure 5.2). 
Further, this export-oriented marketing strategy has been influenced by the 
oligopolistic domestic market structure. As a new entrant in electronics business, the 
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Figure 5.2 
The Proportion of Overseas Sales of Samsung Electronics 
Corporation and Goldstar, 1979-1988 
1990 
Corporation had to avoid being disadvantaged by the early participants, notably 
Goldstar, while its power was still not strong enough. 
Starting from the simple assembly of radios and black and white television 
sets with fully imported parts, Samsung Electronics Corporation has grown into a 
self-sufficient entity. The Corporation has accelerated the vertical integration of 
various production processes. The integration was necessary to achieve high value-
added rates, stable and independent parts supply and transaction cost savings. To 
obtain vertical integration the Corporation has housed the parts-producing sister 
companies - Samsung Coming Co., Samsung Electron Devices Co. and Samsung 
Electro-Mechanics Co. - in the Suwon Complex and the computer and semiconductor 
plants in its immediate vicinity. Indeed, the construction of large-scale electronics 
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complex within the Seoul Metropolitan Area and the vertical integration of production 
are considered to be the major factors which made the Corporation Korea's No. 1 
electronics company (Business Korea, 1988: 31). 
The Corporation's mam products have been changed over time. 
Diversification has been strongly influenced by the short product life cycle of 
introduced technologies (Figure 5.3). As most of transferred technologies from 
advanced capitalist countries were matured and standardised, the Corporation had to 
diversify its products to ensure stable growth. Until the mid 1980s, diversification 
occurred within the home electronics sector. Since then, the Corporation has 
diversified its business into other electronics sectors. In 1989, the home electronics 
sector contributed less than 58 per cent of its total production compared with 80 per 
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Samsung Electronics Corporation's Production Structure by Sector, 
1985-1992 
cent in 1985. Contributions by other electronics sectors have increased substantially 
over the same period: semiconductors (from less than 4 per cent to more than 21 per 
cent); information technologies (from less than 10 per cent to almost 14 per cent); and 
computers (from about 6 per cent to more than 7 per cent) (Figure 5.4). 
Simultaneously, the Corporation has increased the proportion of subcontracting 
production to ensure that the restructuring process has run smoothly. 
Another important factor which influenced the Corporation's decision-making 
has been the domestic market's oligopolistic structure. When the Corporation 
introduced certain technologies from overseas, Goldstar countered. When the 
Corporation participated in the semiconductor business, Goldstar did likewise. When 
Goldstar established an overseas manufacturing subsidiary, the Corporation followed 
immediately. The Corporation's 'follow-the-leader' behaviour was inevitable 
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because the decision-making behaviour of its rival companies directly affected 
business performance. Further, the two companies were the 'star companies' among 
the major chaebols - Samsung Group and Lucky-Goldstar Group. Hence, their 
decision-making was very important in the Groups' growth strategies. In this context, 
the Corporation's management behaviour was extremely similar to that of other major 
electronics companies. 
2 ORGANISATIONS, LINKAGES AND LOCATIONAL PATTERNS 
Organisational structures, ownership characteristics, linkage patterns and 
locational behaviours are closely interrelated. As firms have grown up, their 
organisational structure has been changed from functional to divisional. The 
integration of production systems between these divisions (or Group's other affiliates) 
made Samsung Electronics Corporation concentrate all the related industries within 
its core production place. Indeed, Samsung Electronics Corporation showed high 
intra-Group or intra-organisational transactions. 
2.1 Organisational and Ownership Structure 
The corporate organisation of Samsung Electronics Corporation has been 
restructured in concert with expansion in the scope of its business areas. This 
restructuring was not merely for the Corporation's efficiency but for the Samsung 
Group as a whole. Three major areas of organisational restructuring can be identified. 
Before 1974, the Corporation's structure comprised five sections: general affairs; 
supply; sales; production; and technology development (SEC, 1989: 175). In 1974, a 
divisional structure was developed which had five business centres: management; 
electronics; home electronics; parts; and sales. Each division was treated as an 
autonomous decision-making profit centre. The divisional system clarified 
responsibilities and enhanced managerial dynamics (SEC, 1989: 209-214). In 1988, 
the divisional system was supplanted by a 'bigger divisional system' to accommodate 
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the incorporation of Samsung Semiconductor & Telecommunications Co. In the 
process the Corporation was restructured into four industrial sectors: home 
electronics; information and telecommunications; computers; and semiconductors. 
Although each division is controlled by the General Planning Office it has an 
independent structure for planning and management, research and development, 
overseas business and sales (Figure 5.5). Even though this change suggested 
decentralisation of decision-making, this was not the case. The chaebol's centralised 
control system and vertically integrated production system ensured that the self-
supporting divisional structure was little more than a profit-and-loss accounting unit. 
The Corporation's relationships with other Group affiliates is reflected in the 
ownership structure (Table 5.2). It does not deviate from the chaebol's ownership 
structures, noted in Chapter 2, which are characterised as an interlocking shareholding 
system. Initially, more than 27 per cent of its total stocks were owned by Lee's 
family and Group's other affiliates. Then the Corporation acquired a substantial 
proportion of stocks belonging to the Group's other nineteen affiliates which, in turn, 
are owned by the Group's other affiliates (see Figure 4.2). Most of the Corporation's 
affiliates are electronics-related companies except for Samsung Winners Card Co., 
Samsung Lions Co., Samsung Construction Co. and Hotel Shilla Co. 
2.2 Linkage Patterns 
Reflecting the interlocking ownership structure and vertically integrated 
production system, the Corporation displays a high proportion of intra-Group 
transactions (see Figure 4.3). In the home electronics sector, for instance, 28 per cent 
of the parts and components are supplied from affiliates - 28 per cent from associated 
subcontracting companies, 24 per cent from ordinary subcontracting companies and 
other domestic electronics companies, and 22 per cent from overseas (SEC, 1989: 
881). As a large proportion of raw or intermediate materials used by subcontractors 
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Table 5.2 
Samsung Electronics Corporation's Ownership Structure, 1989 
Company names 
Samsung Electro-Mechanics Co. 
Samsung Shipbuilding & Heavy Industries Co. 
Samsung General Chemicals Co. 
Samsung Data Systems Co. 
Samsung Winners Card Co. 
Samsung Hewlett Packard Co. 
Samsung Medical Industries Co. 
Cheil Industries Co. 
Samsung Lions 
Samsung Information Systems America 
Comport Corporation 
Samsung Aerospace Industries Co. 
Samsung Electron Devices Co. 
Samsung General Construction Co. 
Samsung Coming Co. 
Samsung Petrochemical Co. 
Hotel Shilla Co. 
Samsung Watch Co. 
Cheil Planning Co. 
Source: SEC (pers. comm.). 
Shareholding ratios 
27.3 
35.3 
50.0 
36.7 
40.0 
45.0 
25.0 
23.0 
27.5 
99.8 
34.2 
19.7 
8.5 
4.8 
11.2 
9.9 
9.1 
10.0 
14.8 
are supplied from the Corporation and its parts-manufacturing affiliates, the 
proportion of intra-Group transactions is probably higher than 28 per cent. 
Given the huge production capacities of the parts-manufacturing affiliates the 
proportion of intra-group transactions is not substantial in a sense. For example, 
Samsung Electro-Mechanics Co. exported more than 70 per cent of its products and 
Samsung Electron Devices Co. more than 90 per cent (SEMC, 1990: 32; SED, 1990: 
194 
420). Further, almost 90 per cent of the raw or intermediate materials used in 
producing semiconductors were imported. The balance was procured from domestic 
suppliers who, in turn, draw 90 per cent of their raw or intermediate materials from 
major semiconductor manufacturers. Although there are fifty-nine associated 
subcontractors in the semiconductor division, their relationships with the Corporation 
were negligible (SEC, 1989: 884). 
2.3 Locational Patterns 
As noted, the Samsung Electronics Corporation has pursued scale economies 
and vertical integration of production as key growth strategies. Based on these 
strategies, the Corporation has created large-scale factory sites to accommodate the 
various production processes. The Samsung Group's late Founder purchased huge-
scale factory sites in Suwon in Kyonggi Province (450,000 pyong) and in Kachon in 
South Kyongsang Provincel3 (750,000 pyong) because in his words: 
Electronics business takes a long time. The penetration of world 
markets with technological superiority and scale economies advantages 
are the key points to business success. The size of factory site may be 
too big at the moment However, the day will come when more land is 
needed. The size of Sanyo Electric Co.' s Tokyo Industrial Estate is 
400,000 pyong. We have to build up a larger industrial complex than 
Sanyo. So, I decided the size of Suwon Electronics Complex should 
be 450,000 pyong (SEC, 1989: 119). 
Consequently, the Founder located his newly established electronics affiliates 
Samsung Electronics Co., Samsung Electron Devices Co., Samsung Electro-
Mechanics Co., Samsung Corning Co. and Samsung Medical Systems Co. - in the 
Suwon Complex. 
In the Suwon Complex, most of the parts and components are produced and 
supplied to the Corporation's assembly lines on conveyer-belts. As part of the 
vertical integration of production the Corporation selected Buchan and Kihiing near 
13. Apart from the construction of the Samsung Electron Devices Co. in 1970 the Kachon factory site 
was not developed until the late 1980s because it was not as well situated as Suwon. 
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the Suwon Complex as sites for computer, information and semiconductor factories. 
The geographical integration of production was to the fore in locating the colour 
picture tube manufacturing plant of Samsung Electron Devices Co. in the Suwon 
Complex. Although, the Kumi Complex in North Kyongsang province was superior 
in industrial water, electricity, land acquisition and transport (for export commodities) 
these were outweighed by the advantages derived from close proximity to other 
affiliates (SED, 1990: 200).14 
Kumi is spatially separated from the Corporation's main manufacturing centre 
because its plants were acquired from another company. Since 1971, Korean 
Government has commended the Kumi Complex as the site for new entrants to 
electronics industry to exploit agglomeration benefits. Unless the entrants conformed, 
a business licence was not forthcoming. Consequently, Samsung Electron Devices 
Co. had to change its planned location for the Kachon Estate to Kumi Complex to 
obtain the necessary business licence (SEC, 1990: 212-213).15 
Further, the Corporation concentrated different products at each location: 
Suwon specialised in consumer electronics; Kumi in telecommunications equipments; 
Kihung in computers, information systems and semiconductors; and Buchan Plant 
solely in semiconductors (SEC, 1990a: 8-9). As the Corporation's decision dictates 
locations for subcontractors and sales agencies, it had important regional economic 
implications. The number of sales agencies of SEC has been increased from six in 
1969 to 364 in 1981 and to 1,122 in 1989. As these agencies are distributed 
throughout the nation they have important regional economic impacts (Table 5.3). 
14. The colour picture tube requires three times more parts than the monochrome picture tube. 
15. Its computer plans were withdrawn because of changes in the Corporation's investment priority and 
the Government's regulation of factory sites. 
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Table 5.3 
Distribution of Samsung Electronics Corporation's Sales Agencies, 1989 
Province Sales agency Province Sales agency 
Seoul 245 North Challa 60 
Pusan 127 South Challa 88 
Kyonggi 130 North Kyongsang 175 
Kangwon 65 South Kyongsang 86 
North Chungchong 78 Cheju 17 
South Chungchong 51 
Total 1,122 
Source: SEC, 1989: 989. 
3 BUSINESS INTERNATIONALISATION 
As the 'midwife' within the Group's electronics industry, Samsung 
Electronics Corporation established seven joint-venture companies and three 
domestically-owned electronics affiliates. Cooperation with foreign multinational 
corporations was obligatory to acquire the necessary advanced technologies and the 
access to overseas markets. Starting life as a simple home electronics assembler for 
foreign companies the Corporation has constantly upgraded its position within the 
global division of labour. Originally, the Corporation had established sales 
subsidiaries overseas to make customers conscious of its brand name. Subsequently, 
the Corporation set up manufacturing subsidiaries in developed countries to overcome 
the trade regulations from advanced capitalist countries. Since 1988, most of its 
overseas manufacturing investments have been concentrated in developing countries 
and the Socialist bloc. This redirection of direct foreign investment was influenced 
by the low profit rates in developed countries and the urgent need for market 
diversification. By 1989, the Corporation had become one of the world's leading 
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electronics compames with thirteen manufacturing subsidiaries, thirteen sales 
subsidiaries, three research centres, and thirty-one branch offices in overseas locations 
(Figure 5.6). 
3.1 Introduction of Foreign Capital and Technology 
The internationalisation of Samsung Electronics Corporation has been 
influenced by: Korea's small and oligopolistic market structure; the industrial 
restructuring strategies of foreign multinational corporations; and the trade regulations 
of advanced capitalist countries. Initially, the electronics industry was developed by 
the advanced capitalist countries after the Second World War. During the 1950s, 
USA had enjoyed absolute advantages in the industry. In the 1960s, when the 
domestic labour cost sky-rocketed, USA companies moved their labour-intensive 
home electronics sectors overseas and concentrated on higher value-added industrial 
electronics sectors. Conversely, Japan's electronics industry, buoyed by these 
transferred technologies, enjoyed a great boom during the 1960s but was soon 
threatened by the USA's anti-dumping regulations (SEC, 1989: 110). As a means of 
overcoming this barrier Japanese companies sought production bases overseas. 
Simultaneously, Samsung decided to herald its participation in the electronics 
industry. As the small domestic market was choked by early entrants, the Corporation 
had to rely on overseas markets. It searched for foreign electronics giants to supply 
the requisite technologies and overseas sales networks. The Corporation selected 
Japanese partners to compete with Goldstar, the domestic electronics giant. 
As a founding company of the Group's electronics industry, Samsung 
Electronics Corporation established a series of joint-venture companies including: 
Samsung Sanyo Electric Co. (1969); Samsung NEC Co. (1970); Samsung Sanyo Parts 
Co. (1973); Samsung Corning Co. (1973); Samsung GTE Telecommunication Co. 
(1977); Samsung Hewlett Packard Co. (1984); and Samsung Data Systems Co. (with 
IBM in 1987). Apart from the acquisitions of Korea Semiconductor Co. and Korea 
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Overseas Operating Units of Samsung Electronics Corporation, 1989 
Telecommunications Co., a former public enterprise, all electronics affiliates were 
established as joint-venture companies. In 1969, 169 trainees were dispatched to 
Sanyo Electric Co. and NEC to acquire the necessary technical skills. Also, Japanese 
technicians were stationed in the joint-venture companies to facilitate the transfer of 
technology. All royalties, management rights, export privileges and raw materials 
and parts supply were given to the overseas partners as the price for transferring the 
required technology (SEC, 1989: 122)_16 Advanced capitalist countries, however, 
avoided transferring the core technologies of high-tech commodities. 
Until the Corporation's own research centre was established in 1980, almost 
all technologies were introduced from overseas. Further, its sister companies 
established their own research centres: Samsung Semiconductor & 
Telecommunications Co. (1981); Samsung Electro-Mechanics Co. (1982); Samsung 
Coming Co. (1984); Samsung Electron Devices Co. (1983); Samsung Data Systems 
Co. (1985); and Samsung Hewlett Packard Co. (1984) (see Table 4.2). Another way 
of acquiring technology, other than through royalty payment, included obtaining 
production licences from the overseas electronics giants - a strategy favoured by the 
Corporation_ 17 The Corporation acquired licences to produce video tape recorders, 
microprocessors, computer peripherals and micro controllers on behalf of overseas 
companies. 
The Corporation obtained a large proportion of investment capital from 
overseas through the Government's assistance. It secured more than US$ 3 million 
from the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) for its 
compressor factory construction through the Korea Development Finance 
Corporation. Samsung Coming Co. used a US$ 43 million commercial loan for its 
CRT bulb glass factory from the Morgan Bank and Boston Bank (SEC, 1989: 165). 
In 1985, the Corporation issued convertible bonds worth US$ 20 million - a major 
16. Initially, all parts were supplied by its Japanese partners. 
17. Under licensed production the order-placing manufacturers supplied technologies to the licensee so 
that they could produce identical products (Choo, D.Y., 1989: 16-25). 
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turning point in capturing overseas capital. The bonds, with an annual interest rate of 
5 per cent and a 15 year maturity, were under the management of Warburg Co. (UK) 
and Goldman Sachs Co. (USA). The overseas convertible bonds issue diversified 
sources of capital; freed the Corporation from redemption obligations when 
converted; provided a cheap supply of capital at a low exchange risk; and heralded the 
arrival of Samsung Electronics Corporation as a major international company (SEC, 
1989: 437-438; OESSG, 1988b: 14). In 1988, Samsung Semiconductor & 
Telecommunications Co., which was later merged into the Corporation in 1988, 
issued a US$ 30 million Floating Rate Note (FRN) at London Inter-Bank Offered 
Rate (LIBO) + 0.25 per cent and redeemable in 10 years.18 The Corporation's 
heightened international credibility made it possible for Samsung Semiconductor & 
Telecommunications Co. to issue the FRN at this low interest rate in the Euromarket 
(OESSG, 1988b: 14). 
Also, a large proportion of the investment capital used for establishing the off-
shore manufacturing subsidiaries was supplied from overseas. The Corporation 
supplied US$ 9 million of the total investment US$ 25 million to establish Samsung 
International Inc. by issuing the Industrial Revenue Bond (IRB) in USA. Further, the 
Corporation supplied US$ 3 million of the US$ 5 million required to create Samsung 
Electronics Manufacturing United Kingdom (SEMUK) from the local financial 
market (SEC, 1989: 515). The financial assistance of host countries was a major 
factor in locating manufacturing subsidiaries off-shore. 
3.2 International Transactions 
As noted, Samsung Electronics Corporation's export-oriented marketing 
strategy was prompted by the industry's small and oligopolistic domestic market 
18. The Floating Rate Note (FRN) is a corporate bond issued when the interest rates of international 
finance fluctuate. The London Inter-Bank Offered Rate (LIBOR) is the rate at which major London 
banks lend funds to each other. It is used as a money market index, and loans are often expressed as 
LIBOR plus a percentage. LIBOR is used, in Eurodollar loans, as an equivalent to Prime Rate in the 
United States. 
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Figure 5.7 
Type of Exports from Samsung Electronics Corporation, 1984-1989 
structure. Further, market development in overseas was essential to exploit 
economies of scale. These were the most important factors enabling companies in 
developing countries to maintain their international competitiveness. As a later 
participant in the monopolistic domestic market, Samsung Electronics Corporation's 
dependency rate on overseas market has been much higher than that of its arch-rival, 
Goldstar (see Figure 5.2). The export-oriented strategies of later entrants can be seen 
in Hyundai Electronics Co. and Daewoo Electronics Co. 
The proportion of original equipment manufacturer (OEM) exports in the 
Corporation's total exports have been very high since its inception. Initially, the 
Corporation started its business by exporting black and white television sets to 
Mitsubishi on an OEM basis (OESSG, 1988a: 412). Since then, the Corporation has 
expanded OEM exports to advanced capitalist countries. Until the mid 1980s, they 
accounted for more than 80 per cent of total exports (SEC, 1989: 1037). Although the 
Corporation increased its own brand name exports in markets within developing 
countries, the proportion of OEM exports was still 62 per cent in 1989 (Figure 5.7). 
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Table 5.4 
OEM Exports from Samsung Electronics Corporation 
Order-placing companies 
Casio (Japan) 
Toshiba (Japan) 
Crown, AKAI (Japan) 
Micro Five (USA) 
Siers (USA) 
General Electric (USA) 
Sony 
CE (Brazil) 
JASK (Japan) 
NCR, Vendex (USA) 
IBM, Apple (USA) 
Micro Five, Franklin (USA) 
Singclair (UK) 
Delta (USA) 
South Western (USA) 
Harris 3M (USA) 
NCR(USA) 
NITSUKO (Japan) 
Vendex (USA) 
Intel (USA) 
TI (USA) 
Commodities Notes 
Desk calculators 1986 
Refrigerators, Washing machines 
VTRs 
Room aircon., Refrigerators, M/W ovens 1986 
VTRs 
M/W ovens, VTRs, CTVs 
Radio cassettes 
CTVs 
VTRs 
Personal computers 
Monitors 
Personal Computers, Monitors 
Personal computers 
Personal computers 
Telephones 
Facsimiles 
Personal computers 
Key phones 
Personal computers 
Micro processors, EPROMs 
256KDRAMs 
1985 
1986 
1986 
1986 
1987-1992 
1986 
Source: Choo, D.Y., 1989: 44-51. 
The high proportion of OEM exports was also strongly influenced by the outstanding 
nature of the electronics industry as a global industry.19 Because of the globalisation 
of the electronics industry the World's electronics market has been dominated by 
leading electronics multinational corporations. Most of the Corporation's products 
have been exported as the brand names of these electronics giants (Table 5.4). 
19. According to Porter (1984), a global industry is defined as one in which the competitive position of 
a firm in one country is significantly affected by its position in other countries or vice versa. Such a 
firm obtains its competitive advantage by resorting to economies of scale and scope rather than 
exploiting the different national demands of each target market. A global industry is strongly 
contrasted with its domestic-oriented counterpart, therefore, whose competitiveness is essentially 
independent of overseas competition (adapted from Jun, Y.W., 1988: 5). 
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Table 5.5 
Samsung Electronics Corporation's Export Markets, 1981-1990 
Year North Europe Latin Southeast Middle East Oceania 
America America Asia & Africa 
per cent per cent per cent per cent per cent per cent 
1981 50.0 9.8 17.7 13.2 7.6 1.7 
1982 62.1 7.1 9.3 8.2 11.1 2.2 
1983 76.2 6.4 4.2 5.9 5.9 1.4 
1984 75.6 6.5 6.0 6.9 3.4 1.6 
1985 67.9 11.9 6.6 9.4 2.6 1.5 
1986 62.4 19.1 7.3 6.2 3.4 1.6 
1987 63.0 17.5 6.1 8.5 3.3 1.6 
1988 35.5 26.0 8.0 20.0 8.6 1.5 
1989 51.4 20.0 4.9 14.6 5.0 1.8 
1990 48.3 23.6 5.4 16.0 5.0 1.7 
Source: SEC, 1989: 496, 1036; SEC (pers. comm.). 
The Corporation's dominant export market has been the United States. 
Before the introduction of the quota regulation on Korean colour television sets in 
1978, the dependency rate on the USA market was 85 per cent (SEC, 1989: 332). 
Between 1974 and 1978, about 96 per cent of the colour television sets produced were 
exported to USA.20 Consequently, the export markets have been vulnerable to shifts 
in USA trade policies. In 1981, quota regulations on Korean colour television sets 
resulted in decline in North America's market share to 50 per cent. 21 With the 
withdrawal of quota regulations in late 1982, exports rebounded to 76 per cent. In 
1984, the introduction of a new type of trade regulation - the imposition of high rate 
anti-dumping taxes - resulted in exports plummeting. Conversely, European and the 
Southeast Asian markets have increased markedly (Table 5.5). This diversification of 
20. Between 1974 and 1978, television sets (including black and white television) accounted for 80 per 
cent of exports (SEC, 1989: 344). 
21. In 1980, the 'operating rates' of colour television sets manufacturing factories by the Korea's big 
three electronics companies declined to 20 per cent (SEC, 1989: 313-314). 
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Table 5.6 
Samsung Electronics Corporation's Overseas Sales Subsidiaries, 1989 
Country Year Subsidiaries Employees 
Dispatches Local recruit Total 
no. no. no. 
USA 1978 SEA 23 223 246 
USA 1983 SSP 19 407 426 
USA 1988 SISA 14 90 104 
Canada 1987 SECA 6 10 16 
Panama 1989 SEPA 3 3 6 
UK 1984 SEUK 15 70 85 
UK 1989 SEUKb 5 0 5 
Germany 1982 SEG 10 51 61 
Germany 1987 SSEG 7 41 48 
France 1988 SEFC 1 3 4 
Australia 1987 SEAU 5 20 25 
Hong Kong 1989 SEHK 6 7 13 
Japan 1989 SEJ 23 20 43 
Note: assI comprises three different functions: research, production and sales. 
bEurope Headquarter; CJoint-venture company (Samsung 34 per cent, KED 
Group 66 per cent). 
Source: SEC (pers. comm.). 
export markets and commodities was inevitable if the Corporation was to maintain its 
stable growth. 
In 1978, the Corporation set up its first overseas sales subsidiary - Samsung 
Electronics America Inc. (SEA) - to establish its brand name in the United States. 
Although the Corporation could grow up by exporting its commodities through other 
companies' brand names (OEM), its further growth would be handicapped by a low 
brand image and poor profit rate. Between 1978 and 1989, twelve sales offices were 
transformed into overseas sales subsidiaries with 1,082 employees (Table 5.6). The 
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Table 5.7 
Technology Exports of Samsung Electronics Corporation, 1979-1987 
Country Year Company Products Conditions 
Iran 1979 Cafard B/W TVs royalty, facility, parts 
India 1980 B/WTVs royalty, facility 
Pakistan 1981 Mahomet B/WTVs parts 
Nigeria 1982 Daddy Bord B/WTVs royalty, facility, parts 
Turkey 1982 Telra CTVs parts 
Indonesia 1983 Telesonic B/W TVs, CTVs royalty, facility, parts 
South Africa 1983 Barlows B/WTVs parts 
Brazil 1985 CCECo. CTVs royalty, facility, parts 
Malaysia 1985 APS Co. VTRs royalty, facility, parts 
Dominica 1986 Corripio CTVs royalty, parts 
Malaysia 1986 Industry Co. CTVs royalty, brand, facility, parts 
Philippines 1987 Solid Group CTVs royalty, brand, facility, parts 
Indonesia 1987 Sapporo W machines royalty, facility, parts 
Source: EIAK, 1989: 272; SEC, 1989: 426, 427, 504. 
Corporation established them to form sales networks for export commodities and as a 
preliminary move for establishing its own overseas production subsidiaries. 
Since 1979, the Corporation has increased technology exports to developing 
countries. Their subsequent aversion to finished goods imports has pressured the 
Corporation to increase exports of both parts and components. It has responded by 
expanding the transfer of technology - the Extended Supply of Commodities 
Originated by Releasing Technology (ESCORT) (Table 5.7).22 This maximisation 
strategy is closely linked to the exploitation of scale economies by its parts-
manufacturing affiliates in Korea. The increasing base load requirements of 
22. ESCORT effect is the obverse of the Boomerang effect, which results in an increase in exports of 
parts and components through the transfer of technology. 
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electronics parts production made the Corporation accelerate the export of parts and 
components. According to Turner (1982: 51), the base load of cathode-ray tube 
(CRT) manufacturing has been steadily increased to one million units per annum. In 
1987, there were only eleven CRT makers in the world.23 Further, the Corporation 
adopted an international subcontracting production system to increase its parts exports 
and to exploit higher labour productivity per unit in developing countries. In 1985, 
the Corporation made a subcontracting contract with Malaysia's Siong Co. This 
company produces colour television sets for American market with parts supplied 
solely from Korea. 
3.3 Direct Foreign Investment 
Direct foreign investment by Korean electronics companies was prompted by 
USA's quota on colour television sets in 1978. This regulation was a great threat to 
Korean electronics manufacturers. Samsung Electronics Corporation's dependency 
rate on the USA market declined immediately. In late 1982, regulation shifted from 
quotas to anti-dumping tax impositions. Although the anti-dumping rates imposed on 
Korean colour television sets were dropped from 16 per cent in 1984 to 3 per cent in 
1987, it pressured the Corporation to reduce its USA exports (Table 5.8). 
Trade regulations in advanced capitalist countries pressured the Corporation to 
diversify its export markets and commodities. The nature of export commodities 
changed markedly with television sets declining from 80 per cent in 1978 through 58 
per cent in 1982 to less than 17 per cent in 1985. By 1988, VTR (almost 25 per cent) 
and microwave ovens (almost 20 per cent) had emerged as major exports. Also, the 
proportion of unclassified electronics goods rose from less than 6 per cent in 1982 to 
almost 44 per cent in 1985 (SEC, 1989: 422, 1,027-1,032). 
23. As of 1987, eleven CRT makers as of 1987 are as follows: Philips (Netherlands), RCA (USA), 
Hitachi (Japan), Toshiba (Japan), Matsushita (Japan), Sony (Japan), Mitsubishi (Japan), Samsung 
(Korea), Goldstar (Kore~), Orion (Korea) and Tatung (Taiwan) (Jun, Y.W., 1988: 28). 
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Table 5.8 
The United States' Anti-dumping Rates on Korean Colour Television Sets, 
1984-1987 
Year Goldstar Samsung Electronics Daewoo Electronics 
per cent per cent per cent 
Feb. 1984 14.8 16.0 16.6 
Dec. 1984 7.5 12.2 14.9 
Nov. 1986 1.4 2.1 3.5 
June 1987 2.3 3.2 23.3 
Source: EIAK, 1989: 244-248. 
Diversification of both export markets and commodities were temporary 
measures to overcome immediate difficulties. The fundamental solution was to 
establish manufacturing factories in the countries imposing trade regulations. 24 The 
Corporation turned its concern to Europe which constituted the second largest colour 
television set market (12 million units in the early 1980s; compared 13 million units 
for the USA). This market was also blocked by high tariff rates, quotas and strict 
protection of the patent rights of its PAL-system. 25 The only way the Corporation 
could penetrate it was to establish manufacturing plants there. In 1982, the first off-
shore plant - Samsung Electronica Portuguesa Sarl. (SEP) - was established in Estoril 
City, Portugal (Table 5.9). Its aim was to capitalize on its: cheap labour costs;26 low 
popularisation of colour television sets;27 participation in the European Common 
24. In the case of Japanese colour TV exports to USA, the proportion of local production increased 
from less than 36 per cent in 1976 to almost 78 per cent in 1986 (Company Report of the Lucky-
Goldstar Group, 1989: 47). 
25. PAL-system (phase alternation by line) is one of the TV broadcasting mode together with SECAM 
(sequential couleur a memoire) and NTSC (national television systems committee). Except France, 
other EC countries were adopting PAL-type TV broadcasting system. The patent right of PAL-type 
broadcasting system was in the Telefunken Co. of West Germany and its use was permitted only to the 
countries which were adopting PAL-type broadcasting system (SEC, 1989: 344). 
26. Portugal's labour cost by the hour was 1.7 dollars which was almost four times cheaper than that of 
the United Kingdom and West Germany (OESSG, 1988a: 663). 
27. The colour TV supply rate of Portugal was 26 per cent as of 1986 while that of other EC countries 
were about 90 per cent (OESSG, 1988a: 663). 
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Table 5.9 
Overseas Manufacturing Plants of Samsung Electronics Corporation, 1982-1991 
Year Location Overseas plants Products Employees a Shareholding ratio 
of SEC 
no. per cent 
1982 Portugal SEP (Samsung Electronics Portuguesa Sarl.) CTVs 211 55 
1984 USA Sii (Samsung International Inc.) CTVs 179 100 
1987b USA SSI (Samsung Semiconductor Inc.) Semiconductors 426 100 
1986 UK SEMUK (Samsung Electronics Manufac. U.K.) MWOs, VTRs 134 100 
1988 Mexico SAMEX (Samsung Mexicana S.D DE CV.) CTVs, Parts 178 100 
N 1989 China Shenzhen Plant CTVs 
0 
V) 1989 Spain SEESA (Samsung Electronics EspaM.ola S.A.) VT Rs 76 100 
1989 Thailand TSE (Thai-Samsung Electronics) CTVs, VTRs 103 49 
1989 Canada Canada Ontario Plant Media Facilities 20 
1990 Turkey SETAS (Samsung Electronics Ticaret A.S.) CTVs 4 20 
1990 Indonesia SMI (PT. Samsung Maspion Indonesia) Refrigerators 178 49 
1990 Hungary SEH (Samsung Electronics Hungarian) CTVs 192 50 
1991 Malaysia Malaysia Selangojoo Plant MWOs, Audio 1 100 
1991 China Peking Plant Refrigerators 
1991 China Zhuhai Plant VT Rs 
Note: a As of December 1989; bYear of manufacturing plant construction. 
Source: Samsung Electronics Co. (pers. comm.). 
Market scheduled in 1985; and high utility value as a new market base not only for 
Europe but also for Africa and the Middle East (SEC, 1989: 345). Samsung 
Electronica Portuguesa was established as a joint-venture business between the 
Corporation (55 per cent), Emacet Co. of Portugal (35 per cent) and MRI of UK (10 
per cent). Its annual production capacity was 300,000 PAL-system colour television 
sets. The Corporation's contract promised royalty for the technology and the right to 
supply 50 per cent of parts from Korea.28 Emacet Co. had the sales rights in Portugal, 
Spain and their African colonies. On the other hand, MRI had the sales rights in the 
UK. 
In 1984, after accumulating some overseas business experiences by managing 
its Portugal venture, the Corporation established its second overseas manufacturing 
subsidiary - Samsung International Inc. (SII) - in Roxbury, New Jersey, USA. In 
1986, its initial annual production capacity - 360,000 units of colour TVs - was 
expanded to 600,000 units (SEC, 1989: 511 and 1,071). In the same year the 
Corporation established its third overseas manufacturing subsidiary - Samsung 
Electronics Manufacturing United Kingdom (SEMUK) - in Billingham, United 
Kingdom. Its annual capacity was 300,000 microwave ovens, VCRs and colour TVs, 
respectively. In 1987, the fourth overseas manufacturing subsidiary - Samsung 
Semiconductor Inc. (SSI) - was established in the Silicon Valley, USA. Originally, 
established as an export and research institute in 1983, it became the Corporation's 
first overseas subsidiary covering three different functions - sales, research and 
production. 
Until 1987, all the four off-shore manufacturing subsidiaries had been 
established in developed countries to circumvent trade regulations, and by doing so, 
to keep the export markets. The Corporation's limited competitiveness against its 
counterparts in advanced capitalist countries remained as a major problem 
contravened. Indeed, the four initial overseas subsidiaries have laboriously managed 
28. Equivalent to 2.1 per cent of the total sales in case of domestic sales and 3 per cent in export. 
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their weak international competitiveness by deriving a large proportion of their parts 
from Korea. This strategy soon confronted host country regulations governing 
imported parts and components. Since 1986, the USA had imposed anti-dumping 
taxes on the imported Korean-made parts equivalent to finished goods. Local content 
ratios imposed on overseas manufacturing subsidiaries have been increased. In 1987, 
Samsung International Inc. derived about 40 per cent of parts from Korea (Korea 
Economic Daily, 25 August 1987). In producing colour television sets it incurred a 
deficit of US$ 10 per unit. In 1988, it established Samsung Mexicana Semex De 
Tijuana S.A. De Cv (SAMEX) as its daughter company in Mexico to overcome 
USA's regulation on imported parts. Its Mexico plant produces colour television 
chassis29 - the bulkiest parts - for Samsung International Inc. in USA. Indeed, the 
latter's limited competitiveness prompted it to relocate its two colour TV production 
lines in Mexico leaving only one in the USA. Its Mexico plant is supplying small-
size colour television sets to the sales subsidiary in USA - Samsung Electronics 
America Inc. (SEA) - using the country's advantages as a duty-free area and high 
productivity per unit labour (SEC, 1989: 1,071-1,07 4 ). This relocation boosted 
SAMEX's annual colour TV production capacity from 200,000 units in 1988 to 
600,000 units in 1989. 
Regulations by advanced capitalist countries on imported parts pressured the 
Corporation to establish further parts-manufacturing plants in developing countries. 
Following the Mexico plant, the parts-manufacturing sister companies - Samsung 
Corning Co. and Samsung Electro-Mechanics Co. (SEM) - are planning to establish 
their overseas parts manufacturing plants for the Corporation's overseas assembly 
factories.30 Samsung Electro-Mechanics Co.'s parts-manufacturing plants in Portugal 
and Thailand will supply television, audio and video tape recorder parts to the 
Corporation's Portugal and Thailand manufacturing subsidiaries. In 1992, the 
29. SAMEX is planning to diversify. 
30. In the same line with SEC, Goldstar established colour TV chassis manufacturing plants in Mexico 
in 1988 as a joint-venture with the local company, SYM. 
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European Common Market plans to increase local content ratio of parts supply from 
45 per cent to 60 per cent. This requirement has forced Samsung to establish a parts-
manufacturing plant in Portugal. Samsung Electro-Mechanics is also planning to 
supply parts not only to the Corporation's subsidiaries but to the manufacturing plants 
of Goldstar and Daewoo. Until 1989, SEC has supplied 80 per cent of VCR parts and 
45 per cent of microwave oven parts from Korea (Business Korea, June 1989). The 
regulations on imported parts have also encouraged direct investment by small and 
medium-sized parts-manufacturing firms. 
Since 1988, the Corporation's major direct foreign investment area has shifted 
to developing countries and the Socialist bloc. This shift was influenced by the poor 
performance of its ventures in advanced capitalist countries. The Corporation sought 
to realise moderate profits and overcome trade regulations by establishing overseas 
manufacturing subsidiaries in Mexico, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and Turkey 
(Samsung Electronics Ticaret AS.: SETAS). Further, the Corporation directed its 
market development endeavours to Socialist countries. In 1990, it established 
Samsung Electronics Hungarian (SEH) as a base for penetrating the Socialist bloc. 
The Corporation is planning to establish three manufacturing plants in China and one 
in Yugoslavia. Most of these overseas subsidiaries were established as joint-venture 
companies: Thai-Samsung Electronics (SEC, 51 per cent; Saha Pathana Interholding 
Co., 49 per cent), Samsung Electronics Ticaret AS. (SEC, 51 per cent; Tatis Group, 
49 per cent), PT Samsung Maspion Indonesia (SEC, 49 per cent; Maspion Group, 51 
per cent) and Samsung Electronics Hungarian (SEC, 50 per cent; Orion Co., 50 per 
cent). 
Another very important but unrevealed factor that pressured the Corporation 
to establish overseas plants was the establishment of the overseas manufacturing 
subsidiary of Golds tar - Golds tar America Inc. - in 1981, as an extension of the 'Star 
Wars' between the two companies (i.e. the three stars of Samsung and Goldstar). 
Later, Hyundai Electronics Co. and Daewoo Electronics Co. participated in the 'Star 
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Wars'. As the imprinting of a high-tech enterprise image was a crucial point in 
Group-levels' growth strategies, a defeat in the 'Star Wars' was perceived as fatal to a 
Group's growth potential. The importance of the electronics industry to a Group's 
growth strategies pushed chaebol-based electronics companies to establish their initial 
overseas manufacturing subsidiaries in the advanced capitalist countries - a good 
advertisement of their high-tech image. 
The unique ownership structure of chaebols and the oligopolistic market as a 
whole functioned also to make a high exit barrier in the electronics business. The 
close interrelationship between the Groups' other affiliates meant that a closure of one 
company triggered a chain reaction. As suggested by Jun, Y.W. (1988: 48): 
If they withdraw from the electronics business, it will not only have an 
adverse impact on the financial performance of the group as a whole, 
but also tarnish their Groups' images. This is especially so in the 
Korean business community where the competition among major 
business groups to be No. 1 in terms of size is very intense. 
Indeed, the advertisement of the Samsung Group has been focused on raising the 
Group's high-tech image. 
The 'follow-the-leader' behaviour of the two Korean electronics 
manufacturing giants in direct foreign investments is well supported by 
Knickerbocker's (1973) assertion. He stresses that firms in highly-concentrated 
industries exhibit the 'follow-the-leader' oligopolistic reaction pattern in direct 
foreign investment to a greater extent than firms in less-concentrated industries. Due 
to the substantial interdependent relationship between a few oligopolistic firms, initial 
direct investment by one firm pushes other competitors to make a counter investment. 
A competitive imbalance in an overseas market has a direct impact on competitive 
positions in the domestic market - the real money-making market. Indeed, Korean 
firms have used the domestic market for profit generation, and foreign markets for 
volume generation (Jun, Y.W., 1988: 58). 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This chapter has examined different aspects of Samsung Electronics 
Corporation's activities - its growth process, business strategies, organisational 
structures, linkage patterns, locational behaviour, and internationalisation of its 
operations. Originally, the Corporation was established and supported by the 
Government to develop strategic export commodities. It established many 
electronics-related joint-ventures to acquire overseas technologies and sales networks. 
Most production activities were concentrated in the Suwon Complex and its 
immediate vicinity. Further, the production process was vertically integrated to 
exploit economies of scale in a bid to boost international competitiveness. 
From its inception the Corporation has relied heavily on its connections with 
multinational corporations and overseas markets. Until the late 1980s, 60 to 80 per 
cent of the Corporation's export commodities was produced under the brand name of 
foreign multinationals. Due to the heavy dependency on foreign markets and limited 
competitiveness overseas, SEC's internationalisation thrust, particularly through the 
direct foreign investment, has been tuned to the changing trade policies of advanced 
capitalist countries. In the process of adapting to the shifting international business 
environment SEC has transformed itself into a multinational corporation. 
Given the close interrelationships with the Group's other affiliates, the 
Corporation's decision-making has been strongly influenced by Group's growth 
policies. The Corporation's high intra-Group linkages, interlocking shareholding 
systems, locational concentration support this argument. This is well illustrated in the 
'Star Wars' between the Corporation and Goldstar and their 'follow-the-leader' 
behaviour. Indeed, these findings stress the importance of pursuing a corporate 
organisational approach in research within industrial geography. 
This story of Samsung Electronics Corporation provides information for 
testing a number of theoretical arguments in industrial geography. First, the 
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Corporation's business activities have been influenced by numerous factors rather 
than a single dominant factor. The growth of the Corporation has relied heavily on: 
foreign capital, overseas technologies, foreign MNCs' sales networks and Korean 
Government's subsidies. As the transferred technologies from developed countries 
require the exploitation of the economies of scale as a precondition for business 
success, the Corporation has established large-scale factories which far exceed 
domestic demands. Aggressive overseas market development has been inevitable for 
the exploitation of economies of scale. In this process, Korea's domestic electronics 
quickly became an oligopolistic market. Samsung's decision-making was strongly 
affected both by this structure and the Group's growth strategies. Thus, the 
development of a comprehensive conceptual framework which encompasses all of 
these key factors is required for an analysis of Korea's industrial geography. 
Secondly, the exploitation of economies of scale has been the pnme 
instrument through which the Corporation has increased its international 
competitiveness. Flexible specialisation theories have limited application in Korea. 
Lower costs and quality considerations, as argued by Sayer and Walker (1992: 204), 
are as important as the range of products. Further, they claim the diversity of 
products available within a given national market depends largely on the degree of 
internationalisation rather than the production of an increased range of goods. 
Contrary to its counterparts in Western advanced capitalist countries, which have 
adopted flexible specialisation systems, Samsung has diversified its products by 
developing hierarchical subcontracting systems. 
Thirdly, development of the New International Division of Labour through the 
direct foreign investment is only partially applicable to multinationals headquartered 
in Newly Industrialising Economies. Indeed, a large proportion of their direct foreign 
investment is being concentrated in advanced capitalist countries to defend their 
export markets against trade restrictions. Further, Samsung has relied heavily on its 
business in OEM exports (60 to 80 per cent). Thus, production under contract, such 
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as OEM manufacturing and licensing, should be incorporated as a major explanatory 
variable in addition to direct foreign investment which is facilitating the New 
International Division of Labour. 
Finally, the growth of the Samsung Electronics Corporation has been strongly 
influenced both by the global restructuring of the electronics industry and capital 
accumulation. Initially, the Corporation grew by cooperating with multinational 
corporations headquartered in developed countries. When the relationship shifted 
from being cooperative to competitive, it shifted its interests to higher value-added 
sectors and transferred its 'matured' technologies either to less developed countries or 
its subcontractors. More recently, it has increased capital supply from major global 
finance markets to boost its competitiveness in international markets. Capital supply 
from the major financial markets has been a major decision-making factor in direct 
investment off-shore. As exemplified by Korea, therefore, industrial restructuring 
within a specific nation state is closely related to global developments. 
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CHAPTER6 
SUBCONTRACTING ARRANGEMENTS OF SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS 
CORPORATION 
Electronics, like most other industries, consists of two maJor sub-sectors 
which have significantly different organisational structures - the assembly sector and 
the parts- and components-supplying sector. The former is characterised by a large, 
capital-intensive and highly unionised corporate organisation. On the other hand, the 
latter is represented by a small, labour-intensive and less-militarised business entity. 
The assembly company has two options: to produce any input within its internal 
organisation or purchase it from the free market. There lies a spectrum of 
intermediate inter-firm arrangements, however, between the two extremes. In fact, 
the intermediate modes, such as subcontracting, are more typical than the extreme 
cases (Sheard, 1983: 51). 
Following the discussion of the key features of Samsung Electronics 
Corporation, this chapter deals with its parts-supplying subcontractors. I Four key 
issues are highlighted: (a) why and how has the subcontracting system been 
developed and expanded; (b) what are the characteristic organisational structures, 
linkage patterns and locational behaviour of subcontractors; (c) what are the 
transactional characteristics of a subcontracting system; and (d) what impact does it 
have on labour market dynamics? In considering these issues Section 1 reviews the 
general situation of Korean electronics-parts industry and the evolution of the 
industry's subcontracting system. With this general background, Section 2 analyses 
the organisational structures, linkage patterns and locational behaviour of the 
1. This study included not only Samsung Electronics Corporation's subcontractors but also that of 
Samsung Electron Devices, Goldstar and Goldstar-Alps. It was necessary to complement data 
deficiency of Samsung Electronics Corporation's subcontractors and to carry out comparative analysis. 
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subcontractors. Finally, Section 3 examines the motivations of subcontractors, their 
relationships with parent firms, and influences on labour market changes. 
1 KOREA'S ELECTRONICS-PARTS INDUSTRY 
Subcontracting patterns vary between industries and countries, and over time -
a reflection of differing industrial structures, technologies and labour-supply 
conditions (Rubery and Wilkinson, 1981: 129). Korea's subcontracting system has 
been affected by its particular socio-economic conditions, such as its government-led, 
export-oriented and chaebol-dominated economic environment. This is illustrated by 
a discussion of Korea's electronics-parts industry and evolution of its subcontracting 
system. 
1.1 General Situation 
Korea's electronics-parts industry was led initially by multinational 
corporations and then domestic large corporations (including joint-ventures). In the 
early 1960s, multinationals, such as Signetics Co., Fairchild Co., Motorola Co., 
advanced into Korea to take advantage of lower wage rates. 2 All of their production, 
mostly IC and transistor parts, were shipped to overseas assembly plants without 
domestic consumption. In the early 1970s, the chaebols entered electronics-parts 
production by establishing joint-ventures with the MNCs. They have contributed to 
substituting wholly imported parts and components. However, as the Korean 
Government sought to boost exports, most of the parts not produced locally were 
imported to raise the quality of the final product. 
This export-oriented, assembly-centred industrial structure resulted in the 
early oligopolisation of domestic market and the 'underdevelopment' of the 
electronics-parts industry. Allocation of governmental loans and import licences 
favoured large enterprises unfairly and discouraged them from using subcontractors 
2. When Korea's labour costs sky-rocketed in the mid 1970s, most production was relocated to 
Southeast Asian Countries. 
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Table 6.1 
National Concentration Indices for Major Electronics-Parts Manufacturers, 
1981 and 1986 
Top company Top three companies Top five companies 
Production Export Production Export Production Export 
per cent per cent per cent per cent per cent per cent 
1981 45.9 65.0 78.9 90.0 89.7 96.6 
1986 43.8 53.9 82.9 89.7 92.9 96.6 
Source: Electronic Industries Association of Korea cited by KIET, 1988: 450-452. 
(Watanabe, 1971: 73). Further, the heavy reliance on foreign MNCs during the 
inception period weakened the interrelationship between assembly and parts-
manufacturing sectors. As a result, Korea's electronics industry revealed much higher 
'import inducement indices' compared with Japan (Bae, Yoon and Cho, 1990: 35).3 
As most parts and components could be imported at subsidised prices, participation in 
the parts-manufacturing industry was limited to in-house production by large 
assemblers. Consequently, it has been led by the Big Three - Goldstar, Samsung 
Electronics Corporation and Daewoo Electronics Corporation. In 1986, the Big Three 
accounted for 83 per cent of production and 90 per cent of exports (Table 6.1).4 
Further, the chaebols' octopus-like participation in many parts-manufacturing sectors 
squeezed smaller firms from the industry (Bae, Yoon and Cho, 1990: 41). 
Considering Korea's extraordinary economic growth since the 1960s smaller firm 
3. The import inducement index denotes the proportion of imported parts required for the production of 
commodity - it was 0.15 in 1980 for Japan and 0.47 in 1985 for Korea. 
4. Reflecting the huge base load required for the manufacturing of major electronics parts, a large 
proportion of the produced parts has been exported. So, the extremely high concentration rates of the 
production does not mean that only the rest of the percentage is other companies' domestic market 
share. 
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participation m the parts-manufacturing industry was virtually insignificant (KDI, 
1986: 267-268). 
Since the early 1980s, this position has been reversed. Major chaebols have 
voluntarily transferred production lines to subcontractors. This about face was 
influenced by: (a) avoidance of supplying parts by advanced capitalist countries; (b) a 
sharp increase in the price of imported parts brought about by the reevaluation of the 
Japanese yen;5 (c) a rise in union activity and sky-rocketing wage increases; and (d) 
intensified price competition. This deteriorating business environment reduced the 
profits of assembling companies, particularly in the home electronics sector. These 
difficulties prompted the major electronics assemblers to restructure their activities to 
include higher value-added industrial sectors and reorganise their production 
processes to reduce costs. 
1.2 Subcontracting Transactions 
In 1988, eighty-three per cent of the 4,290 small and medium-sized firms in 
Korea's electrical and electronics machinery industry6 were engaged m 
subcontracting.7 In 1988, eighty-eight per cent of subcontractors relied on their 
businesses subcontracting more than 81 per cent (Table 6.2). Most major 
subcontractors were engaged by the Big Three electronics assemblers. Together with 
the Big Three they used smaller firms as lower-layer subcontractors. This 
arrangement is supported by information on subcontractors dealing with single parent 
firms. In 1971, when the Big Three commenced full-scale investment, less than 3 per 
cent of subcontractors dealt with a single parent firm. By 1985, twenty-nine per cent 
were involved. Since the mid 1980s, this situation has changed as major assemblers 
5. In 1986, 80 per cent of imported electronics-parts were derived from Japan. 
6. An exclusive analysis of the electronics industry is not possible as available statistics are for both 
electrical and electronics industry. 
7. In the early 1970s, two out of every three small and medium-sized firms investigated in Sweden 
were subcontractors (Fredriksson and Lindmark, 1979: 164). Similar high proportions were reported in 
England, Italy and Japan (Atkinson, 1985; Bagnasco, 1981; Brusco and Sabel, 1981; Sheard, 1983). 
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Table 6.2 
Subcontracting Transactions in the Electrical and Electronics Machinery Industry, 1971-1988 
Type of firms placing orders Subcontracting ratiob 
Year Small and Share of 
medium-sized subcontractinga 
firms SMFs Large firms Both - 40 41 - 80 81 -
no. per cent per cent per cent per cent per cent per cent per cent 
1971 455 27.0 13.0 35.0 52.0 17.2 14.5 68.3 
1981 1,613 61.0 20.7 37.7 41.6 5.9 13.1 81.0 
N 
N 
1985 2,775 76.8 33.0 33.1 33.9 9.8 1.8 88.4 
1988 4,290 82.9 10.1 8.2 81.7 6.7 5.1 88.2 
Note: a'Share of subcontracting' represents the proportion of subcontractors in the total number of small and medium firms. 
b'Subcontracting ratio' denotes the percentage of subcontracting production in the total shipments of subcontracting firms. 
Source: MTI and KFSB, 1972-1989. 
have organised 'cooperative associations of (major) subcontractors' and strengthened 
their role. Subsequently, major assemblers have concentrated their orders on 
associated subcontractors to reduce administrative costs and foster loyalty. Other 
subcontractors excluded from the association were reorganised as lower-layer 
subcontractors of associated subcontractors. In 1988, reflecting this change, the 
number of subcontractors dealing with single parent firms declined to 5 per cent (MTI 
and KFSB, 1972-1989).8 
Besides pure economic factors, the expansion of Korea's subcontracting 
system was prompted by governmental policies. In 1975, the Government enacted 
the 'Small and Medium-sized Firm's Interconnection Promotion Law'. It designated 
the 'subcontracting items' which had to be produced by smaller firms. In providing 
financial, administrative and taxation subsidies the Government gave its highest 
priority to firms with established subcontracting connections. Further, the 
Government encouraged each parent firm to establish a 'cooperative association of 
subcontractors' to prevent unfair transactions and to strengthen subcontracting 
relationships. Major electronics assemblers established as exemplified by Hyobsong 
Hoe (Samsung Electronics Corporation), Songryok Hoe (Goldstar) and Hyobwu Hoe 
(Daewoo Electronics Co.). 
In 1988, Samsung announced the 'Three Year Plan for Expanding 
Subcontracting Production'. In 1989, Samsung's three electronics arms - Samsung 
Electronics Co., Samsung Electron Devices Co. and Samsung Electro-Mechanics Co. 
- transferred 363 items under the plan.9 It selected 241 firms from 2,521 applicants 
as its subcontractors to produce the transferred items. They included 137 existing 
subcontractors, seventy-five newly-linked firms, nineteen enterprises established by 
retired employees, and ten newly-established firms. An estimated 394 billion won has 
8. A similar pattern is found in the Table 6.2 on the 'type of firms placing orders'. 
9. They include: finished goods (51 items), semi-finished goods (173 items), parts and components 
(117 items), and others (design, dies, delivery, cargo work, vehicle management, cleaning and box 
collecting: 22 items). 
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been transferred - 360 billion won in the Suwon Complex and 34 billion won 
elesewhere. They include: 300 billion won at Samsung Electronics Co.; 60 billion 
won at Samsung Electro-Mechanics Co.; and 34 billion won at Samsung Electron 
Devices Co. (Samsung, pers. comm.). 
As noted, a major reason prompting the transfer of these assemblers' 
production lines to subcontractors was the rapidly worsening profit rates in the home 
electronics sector. This changing business environment pressured the major home 
electronics makers to incorporate higher valued-added sectors, such as industrial 
electronics. At the expense of the home electronics sector Samsung Electronics 
Corporation is planning to increase the contribution of industrial electronics and 
semiconductors from 38 per cent in 1989 to 50 per cent in 1991 (Dong-Ah Ilbo, 4 
January 1990). This transformation has been facilitated by the recognition that 
subcontracting can be used to facilitate restructuring - a strategy not appreciated by 
Samsung's late Founder. 
1.3 Data Collection 
The information on subcontractors is derived from questionnaires, telephone 
surveys and interviews. Initially, 245 questionnaires were sent to Samsung 
Electronics Corporation's associated subcontractors. Only twenty-seven 
questionnaires were returned. A second questionnaire was necessary to compensate 
for the poor response and to obtain information on other parent organisations. The 
second questionnaire covered: Samsung Electron Devices Co. (sixty-six firms), 
Goldstar (179 firms), and Goldstar-Alps (Kwangju plant: seventeen firms). Thirty-
three questionnaires were returned. Another forty-nine were returned with a sticker 
advising 'address unknown' .10 Telephone surveys were then required to fill in blanks 
and to correct misunderstandings. Six questionnaires were excluded from the analysis 
because either telephone contact could not be established or the answers were patently 
10. The survey used the 1989 addresses, just one year before the survey. 
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Table 6.3 
Details of the Data Collection on Associated Subcontractors 
Subcontractors Total Unknown Returned Usable 
company addresses questionnaires questionnaires 
no. no. no. no. 
Samsung Electronics 245 20 27 25 
Samsung E. Devices 66 2 13 12 
Golds tar 179 23 17 15 
Goldstar-Alps 17 3 3 2 
Total 507 49 60 54 
Source: Fieldwork. 
incorrect (Table 6.3). Interviews were arranged to obtain more detailed information 
on the Samsung Electronics Corporation's associated subcontractors (five firms) and 
their lower-layer subcontractors (four firms).11 
The poor response had many roots. At the time of the fieldwork Korea was 
gripped by a Government investigation into real estate speculation, and chaebols - as 
prime suspects - were most reluctant to be interviewed. As subcontractors are reliant 
on their parent firms they too did not want to be involved. Even when they responded 
to the questionnaire, addresses and telephone numbers were omitted. The telephone 
and interview surveys did not resolve the fundamental problem of non-response. As 
all of the surveyed firms had similar attributes this limitation, however, did not 
prevent the identification of general characteristics. 
11. However, the four lower-layer subcontractors were not included in the data analysis due to their 
heterogeneous characteristics to the associated subcontractors. 
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Table 6.4 
Samsung Electronics Corporation's Subcontracting Linkages, 1985-1989 
Year Total Associated Amount of Proportion of 
subcontractors subcontractors subcontracting subcontracting 
no. no. billion won per cent 
1981 39 30 7.8 
1982 36 13.8 
1985 490 130 432 22.1 
1986 550 123 659 29.9 
1987 594 170 951 31.2 
1988 599 181 1,168 n.a. 
1989 n.a. 246 n.a. n.a. 
Source: SEC, 1989: 295, 308, 490 and 885. 
2 SUBCONTRACTING SYSTEMS 
Electronics requires thousands of different kinds of parts and components. 
Samsung Electronics Corporation is one company which produces finished goods by 
assembling the parts and components derived from numerous manufacturers. It 
purchases them from more than a thousand companies including affiliates, 
subcontractors and overseas manufacturers. It increased its dependency rate on 
subcontracting from less than 8 per cent in 1981 to more than 31 per cent in 1987. 
Further, it organised a cooperative association of its major subcontractors, Hyobsong 
Hoe. The number of the associated subcontractors increased from 39 companies in 
1981 to 246 companies in 1989 (Table 6.4). The Corporation concentrated its orders 
on associated subcontractors. By forming the cooperative association, Samsung 
Electronics Corporation restructured its subcontracting system into a hierarchical one. 
An examination is now made of this system by focusing on four issues: (a) what is the 
organisational structure of subcontracting systems; (b) what is its linkage patterns; 
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(c) what are locational characteristics; and (d) what factors affect these three 
elements of the subcontracting system? 
2.1 Organisational Structure 
Subcontracting firms can be classified according to a variety of indices 
employed. Using their productive activities three types of subcontractors are 
identified: (a) parts-manufacturing firms; (b) raw material-processing firms; and (c) 
combination firms carrying out both activities. Among the fifty-four firms 
investigated, twenty-eight firms were parts-manufacturers, thirteen were processors 
and thirteen undertook both activities. Employment varied between firms: less than 
20 employees to more than 200 employees. Mostly they were established in the 
1970s and the 1980s though there were marked differences according to type of firm. 
Over three-fifth of the parts-manufacturing firms were established before the 1980s 
but less than one-third of the processors and combination firms were created during 
that period. Another three types of subcontractors were identified by the types of 
goods they supply to parent firms: finished goods (3 firms), parts and components (48 
firms) and both of them (3 firms). This figure indicates that OEM production system 
is not yet developed in the Korean electronics industry. However, when the major 
assemblers' production lines transfer plans are carried out smoothly, the proportion of 
finished goods-supplying subcontractors will be increased substantially. 
The survey' s key finding was confirmation of the existence of the hierarchical 
subcontracting structure. About two-thirds of the associated subcontractors 
subcontracted lower-layers or home-based workers.12 On average each associated 
subcontractor had connections with over seven lower firms and the 'sub-
12. This figure is quite higher than that of Yoon and Hong's (1989: 2) survey on the Big Three's 
associated subcontractors. According to them, about 20 per cent and 45 per cent of the associated 
subcontractors utilised lower-layer subcontractors in 1983 and 1986, respectively. This implies that 
multiple-layer subcontracting structures were developed during the 1980s. 
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Table 6.5 
Hierarchical Subcontracting Structures 
Subcontractors Sub-subcontracting Average Average 
lower-layer sub-subcontracting 
subcontractors ratio 
no. per cent no. per cent 
Samsung Electronics 18 72.0 8.6 21.0 
Samsung E. Devices 3 25.0 3.3 13.3 
Golds tar 12 80.0 6.2 19.6 
Goldstar Alps 1 50.0 3.0 60.0 
Total 34 63.0 7.5 21.0 
Source: Fieldwork. 
subcontracting' ratio was 21 per cent (Table 6.5).13 As anticipated, subcontractors of 
finished goods assemblers, such as Samsung Electronics Corporation and Goldstar, 
showed higher proportion of sub-subcontracting ratios than the subcontractors whose 
parent firms were parts-manufacturers (Samsung Electronics Devices and Goldstar-
Alps). 
Case studies were made of four of Samsung Electronics Corporation's 
associated subcontractors to highlight the operation of multi-layered system (Figure 
6.1). These case studies demonstrate how Samsung orchestrated its three-layer 
subcontracting structure to employ scattered, fragmented, home-based, female and 
low-wage labour sources. 
13. As there is no appropriate tenninology widely accepted or used, this study uses the 'sub-
subcontracting' as the term which denotes the phenomenon that first-layer subcontractors give part of 
their subcontracted works to lower-layer subcontractors or to home-based workers. 
227 
N 
N 
00 
Case I Case II 
Parent firm SEC SEC 
100% Patronage 10% Patronage 
First-layer 
subcontractors 
Second-layer 
subcontractors 
Households. 15 households 
Note : @) denotes first-layer subcontractor's offspring. 
Source : Fieldwork. 
000@©0000 
Figure 6.1 
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Hierarchical Structure of Selected Samsung Electronics Corporation's Subcontractors 
CASE I: An associated company (A), located in Seoul, concentrated all its 
businesses on Samsung Electronics Corporation. It had eight permanent second-layer 
subcontractors (seven in Seoul, one in Kyonggi) and fifteen casual lower-layer 
subcontractors (twelve in Seoul, three in Kyonggi). Most second-layer subcontractors 
were either parts or raw materials-processing firms. Three of the eight regular 
subcontractors were identified as its off-spring. Although, at first, all second-layer 
subcontractors worked exclusively for it they diversified their business linkages to 
other parent firms. An interview with one prime subcontractor (X) shows that orders 
were derived from both (A) and (Y) - a second-layer subcontractor larger than (X).14 
This second-layer subcontractor relied on family labour (the owner, his wife and 
sister-in-law) and part-time use of housewives. After basic processing, parts were 
shipped to fifteen households for finishing. 
CASE II: The second company (B), with 319 workers, dealt with three major parents 
(SEC, Daewoo Electronics Co. and Anam Electronics Co.) and forty-five small and 
medium-sized firms. It had nine second-layer subcontractors whose locations were 
widely dispersed throughout Seoul (two), Kyonggi (two), Kangwon (four) and North 
Chungchong (one). Two of these firms were its own off-spring. As the subcontracts 
used Fordist processing methods the firm needed both a large working space and 
complement of full-time workers (about 50 persons per production line). Most 
subcontractors were located outside Seoul to overcome full-time workforce shortages 
and the high rent rates in Seoul. Reflecting the nature of the work, the subcontracting 
transactions were finished in second-layer subcontractors .. The company was using 
one trucking company with other subcontractors by organising their transportation 
schedules. 
CASE Ill: More than half of company (C)' s business was with Samsung Electronics 
Corporation. A further 26 per cent was with Samsung Electro-Mechanics Co. and the 
14. Initially, (X) firm's owner worked for Samsung Electronics Corporation. Later, he was recruited 
by (A) firm with better payment conditions for the good business relationship with Samsung. Then, he 
spun-off his own business. 
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balance with five other firms. In tum, the company gave 13 per cent of its work to 
five second-layer subcontractors. Among them, two firms were off-spring. 
According to the manager these second-layer subcontractors employed home-based 
female workers. 
CASE IV: The fourth company (D), started by a retiring from the Samsung 
Electronics Corporation, processed parts and raw materials supplied by parent firms. 
It received 30 per cent of its orders from Samsung Electronics Corporation and 
another 60 per cent from an associated company (Z). Also, the company received 
five per cent of its orders from Goldstar's subcontractors. Almost two-fifths of 
material was given to 50 households. 
Initially, Samsung Electronics Corporation manufactured most of its parts and 
components within its large factories. This method was economic and efficient when 
cheap and skilled labour for complicated tasks was able to be exploited. This 
arrangement had to be restructured when the business environment changed with: (a) 
consumer tastes becoming more diversified; (b) automation enabling unskilled 
workers to undertake complex tasks; (c) sky-rocketing labour costs as younger 
workers sought tertiary and quaternary jobs. Samsung Electronics Corporation's 
multi-layer subcontracting structure is its response to these changes. 
2.2 Subcontracting Linkages 
Most geographical studies of industrial linkages have concentrated on the 
correlation between spatial patterns and various corporate attributes, such as plant size 
and ownership. With few exceptions they concluded that both plant size and external 
ownership were positively correlated with non-local linkages (Scott, 1983: 14-15). 
With these findings, researchers proceeded to assume, quite deterministically, that the 
regional impact of large externally-owned plants on host areas was small compared 
with locally-owned firms. Yet they could not interpret this phenomenon because they 
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Table 6.6 
Forward Linkages of the Subcontractors by Parent Firms 
Subcontractors Sales markets of subcontractors 
Samsung Goldstar Daewoo Other Market 
Electronics Electronics parent firms 
per cent per cent per cent per cent per cent 
Samsung Electronics 50.3 4.8 5.4 29.5 10.0 
Samsung E. Devices 92.9 1.7 3.3 2.1 
Goldstar 1.0 80.5 0.7 16.5 1.3 
Goldstar-Alps 100.0 
Source: Fieldwork. 
concentrated on discovering linkages and neglected the causal processes producing 
them (Holmes, 1984: 5-6). A study of subcontracting linkages, however, will 
illuminate 'causal processes' underlying industrial linkage patterns. 
The sales of Samsung Electronics Corporation's subcontractors were directed 
to: SEC (including its affiliates: 50 per cent); Goldstar (5 per cent); Daewoo 
Electronics Corporation (over 5 per cent); other smaller parent firms (30 per cent); 
and free markets (10 per cent). Goldstar's subcontractors showed higher dependency 
rates on their top parent firm (almost 81 per cent) than those dealing with Samsung 
Electronics Corporation. Further, subcontractors of the parts-manufacturing affiliates 
(Samsung Electron Devices and Goldstar-Alps) revealed much higher dependency 
rates on their parent firms than finished goods-producing parent firms. In parts-
manufacturers, more than 93 per cent of subcontractor's sales were directed to their 
parents. Contrary to normal economic theories, transactions through the free market 
were almost negligible (Table 6.6). 
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The backward linkages of associated subcontractors were: parent firms (36 per 
cent), domestic market (53 per cent), and overseas (12 per cent). Subcontractors of 
the finished goods assemblers - Samsung Electronics Corporation and Goldstar -
relied 18 per cent and 36 per cent respectively on their major parent firms for 
backward linkages. Conversely, subcontractors of the parts-supplying affiliates 
revealed much stronger backward linkages with their parent firms, Samsung Electron 
Devices (62 per cent) and Goldstar-Alps (100 per cent), than that of the finished 
goods assemblers. Goldstar's greater dependency stems from its dispersed locational 
patterns in peripheral areas. There are fewer alternative parent firms there. 
The geographical linkages of subcontractors were closely correlated with the 
locational patterns of parent firms. While the forward linkages of Samsung's 
subcontractors reflected the firm's concentration in Kyonggi Province (63 per cent) 
those with parent firms widely dispersed outside Seoul revealed strong forward 
linkages to other areas (Goldstar: 74 per cent; SED: 59 per cent; Goldstar-Alps: 100 
per cent). While Samsung's subcontractors relied on 10 per cent of their sales being 
in other parent firms located in Seoul, Goldstar' s equivalent figure was one per cent. 
The high dependency on parent firms could be found more clearly in their backward 
linkages. While Samsung's subcontractors purchased a large proportion of raw or 
intermediate materials from Seoul (32 per cent) and Kyonggi Province (24 per cent), 
Goldstar's subcontractors supplied only 4 per cent and 3 per cent from the same areas 
(Table 6.7). 
This linkage analysis of associated subcontractors demonstrates that their 
patterns are affected by production organisations, such as subcontracting and 
licensing, rather than company size and ownership types. Most small and medium-
sized firms are locally-owned subcontractors of the externally-owned larger firms and 
rely on local-linkages. Sheard (1983: 49) argued that various subcontracting levels 
functioned as extensions of their parent's assembly plants particularly with the 
application of the just-in-time (JIT) delivery system. By forming 'regional production 
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Table 6.7 
Forward and Backward Linkages Involving Subcontractors 
Seoul city 
Parent firms 
per cent 
10.4 
0.4 
1.0 
5.2 
3.6 
7.6 
3.7 
Market 
per cent 
1.8 
0.4 
1.0 
1.2 
32.8 
9.2 
3.8 
18.4 
Kyonggi province 
Parent firms 
per cent 
63.2 
32.4 
22.8 
42.7 
14.2 
16.7 
8.2 
50.0 
14.5 
Market 
per cent 
3.0 
1.4 
23.6 
3.3 
3.4 
12.7 
Others 
Parent firms 
per cent 
14.2 
58.5 
73.9 
100.0 
43.9 
0.3 
45.0 
20.1 
50.0 
17.6 
Market 
per cent 
1.0 
8.3 
1.3 
2.7 
9.3 
21.7 
45.2 
21.5 
Overseas 
market 
per cent 
6.4 
3.0 
16.2 
4.2 
11.7 
11.7 
systems', subcontracting systems prompted strong intra-regional linkages and 
contributed to regional economic development. Although Samsung is using a ITT 
delivery system it has yet to be stabilised because first-layer subcontractors do not 
excercise complete control over lower-layer subcontractors and home-based workers. 
2.3 Locational Behaviour 
Subcontractor's locational patterns exhibit a high degree of spatial clustering 
around their parent firms stemming from: (a) the need for close contact; (b) a desire to 
minimise transport costs; and (c) frequent delivery requirements in the just-in-time 
delivery system (Sheard, 1983: 61-62). Another contributing factor is the off-spring 
mechanism. Although physical distance has become less important in subcontracting 
transactions, the JIT delivery system still requires frequent small-scale deliveries 
which increases costs (Holmes, 1984: 26; Storper and Christopherson, 1987: 115). 
This phenomenon has prompted Ono (1978) to reconceptualise subcontracting as a 
'regional production system': 
The just-in-time system is an extension of the principles of the Ford 
conveyor belt system of factory production to the regional 
production system of assembly plants and subcontractors (adapted 
from Sheard, 1983: 61-62). 
Almost 90 per cent of the Samsung Electronics Corporation's subcontractors 
were located in Seoul Metropolitan Area (Table 6.8). This close interrelationship has 
an enormous impact on the locational pattern of subcontractors (Figure 6.2 and 6.3). 
According to one interviewee, a one-way delivery distance of one hour was marginal. 
Thus, the initial locational decision by the parent company has widespread 
repercussions on the subcontractor and the host area's labour market dynamics. 
This strong interdependent relationship between parent firms and 
subcontractors has been identified in industrial estate developments within peripheral 
areas. Although planners had difficulty in attracting large (parent) firms to industrial 
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Table 6.8 
Locational Pattern of Samsung Electronics Corporation's Subcontractors, 
1986 and 1989 
Regions Total subcontractorsa (1986) Associated subcontractorsb (1989) 
no. per cent no. per cent 
Seoul 216 41.1 85 34.7 
Pusan 16 3.0 
Kyanggi 254 48.5 148 60.4 
Chungchong 10 2.0 4 1.6 
Challa 4 0.8 
Kyongsang 25 4.8 8 3.3 
Total 525 100 245 100.0 
Note: asubcontractors of Samsung Electronics Corporation's Suwon Plant. 
hTotal SEC' s associated subcontractors. 
Source: SEC, 1989: 1218-1221; Park, Y.H., 1987: 292. 
estates, there were greater problems housing parts-supplying smaller firms as 
instanced by the Kumi Electronics Complex. When large electronics firms responded 
to the Government's recommendation and their assembly plants constructed in the 
vast empty plain, there were no parts-supplying subcontractors. Although many 
subcontractors were attracted to the Complex during the past twenty years the 
problem has not been resolved (Lee, C., 1985: 331). A similar phenomenon is 
exhibited in the Hanam Industrial Estate in Kwangju, South Challa province. Since 
the early 1980s the Big Three electronics manufacturers have constructed their plants 
in the industrial estate influenced by the Government's strong recommendation. In 
1986, Daewoo Electronics Co. still relied on the Seoul Metropolitan Area for almost 
81 per cent of its parts-supply. South Challa provided only 11 per cent. Though this 
is higher than the 0.4 per cent local linkage of Samsung Electronics Corporation's 
Suwon plants (Park, Y.H., 1987: 294-295). To overcome the problem the Kwangju 
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Note : 245 firms. 
Source: SEC, 1989: 1,218 - 1,223. 
Figure 6.2 
Locational Pattern of Samsung Electronics Corporation's Plants and its Associated Subcontractors, 1989 
Note : 179 firms. 
Source: Goldstar (pers. comm.) 
Figure 6.3 
Locational Pattern of Goldstar's Plants and its Associated Subcontractors, 1989 
Table 6.9 
Willingness of Subcontractors to Relocate Following a Move by 
Their Parent Firm 
Subcontractors Accompany Adhere present Total 
parent firms locations subcontractors 
no. per cent no. per cent no. per cent 
Samsung Electronics 8 32.0 17 68.0 25 100.0 
Samsung E. Devices 3 25.0 9 75.0 12 100.0 
Golds tar 6 40.0 9 60.0 15 100.0 
Goldstar-Alps 1 50.0 1 50.0 2 100.0 
Total 18 33.3 36 66.7 54 100.0 
Source: Fieldwork. 
plant of Goldstar-Alps has created seventeen subcontractors to increase its local 
supply. 
Over two-thirds of the 54 firms had relocated. Almost all of the resitings 
involved short-distance moves within the same city or provinces (nineteen firms) and 
adjacent city or provinces (seventeen firms). Proximity to parent firms was the key 
factor in relocation. IS One-third of those examined (18 firms) were prepared to 
relocate if their parent firms moved to another city or province (Table 6.9). 
Subcontractors located in less-industrialised peripheral areas showed the highest 
willingness to relocate because they are more dependent on their major parent 
firms.16 Moreover, the survey underlined that the introduction of just-in-time 
delivery systems pressured for subcontractors to locate around the parent firms. 
15. Labour supply (21 firms) and cheap rent rates (18 firms) were raised as another major influential 
factor which affected subcontractors' relocation decision-makings. However, as most of these 
relocations are short-distance movements it is difficult to say which factors are more influential on the 
long-distance locational movements. 
16. Provincial area (7 firms among 18); Kyonggi (8 firms among 23); Seoul (2 firms among 7); and 
Pusan (1 firm among 6). 
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Almost one-third of those tested answered that the delivery system was a major factor 
in persuading them to locate near their parent firm. 
3 SUBCONTRACTING AND LABOUR MARKET CHANGES 
Most research on subcontracting has examined either industrial organisation 
and labour market segmentation, without many links between them. Wilde and Fagan 
(1988: 142), however, have stressed the importance of social and gender relations in 
creating potential workers for restructured industries. Identifying the underlying 
relationships between organisational restructuring and labour market shifts is a critical 
issue for industrial geographers as understood in Linge's (1984: 320-322) comment 
on the issue of incorporating the household into locational analysis: 
Modern industrial geography has become 'dehumanized' ... [It] has 
emphasized the positive role of capital, firms, corporations, 
government, planners and so on. In contrast, people tend to be 
categorized impersonally as 'labour power', subdivided into groups 
labelled white-collar ... unskilled ... the impact on the individual of 
social modernization and the individual's responses to it have not been 
adequately incorporated into industrial location theory. 
This problem can be resolved by examining: (a) why subcontracting systems have 
expanded; (b) what is the nature of their transactional relationships; and (c) what 
mechanisms are used to exploit 'scattered', 'cheap' and 'home-based' labour. 
Initially, the motivations of subcontracting are examined. Then the relationships 
between parent firms and subcontractors are detailed. Finally, the socio-economic 
implications of subcontracting are discussed. 
3.1 Rationale for Using Subcontractors 
Examining the motivation of subcontractors is essential to comprehending 
their behaviour. The development of Korea's subcontracting system in the mid 1970s 
was largely influenced by the introduction of the General Trading Company System 
and heavy machinery industry promotion targeting defence needs. Major chaebols 
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expanded subcontracting to secure export commodities and to overcome shortfalls in 
productive capacity. Since the mid 1980s, they increased their subcontracting activity 
to cope with continued labour shortages and deteriorating profit rates. 
The United States government experienced problems during the First World 
War in organising the procurement of military goods. It resolved the problem by 
deploying small enterprises as subcontractors and suppliers to parent firms operating 
under Army contracts. Government's preference was given to the parent firms which 
make maximum use of subcontractors. Further, the USA government asked the prime 
contractors to submit intended subcontracting plans (Watanabe, 1971: 69). Japan 
exhibited similar historical trajectory to Korea and the United States. Similarly the 
Japanese subcontracting system was expanded during the 1930s to accommodate 
defence needs. It drew on craft workers and even housewives. The Japanese 
Government encouraged firms to simplify production tasks so that unskilled labourers 
could carry them out (Minato, 1985: 6). 
The motivation of thirty-four associated subcontractors in using lower-layer 
subcontractors were quite diverse. They included: (a) lower-layer subcontractors' 
special technology (9 firms); (b) insufficient productive capacity (22 firms); (c) the 
lower production prices of lower-layer subcontractors (16 firms); (d) avoidance of 
labour disputes (1 firm); and (e) safeguards against economic recession (7 firms). As 
highlighted by the case study the prime motivation of the lower-layer subcontracting 
was to overcome labour shortages and to exploit lower-wage workforces. Buffers 
against economic fluctuations and avoidance of labour disputes were insignificant in 
the rationale of lower-layer subcontractors. Thus, there is divergence in the 
motivation of lower-layer subcontractors. 
Generally, subcontracting occurs at the beginning and end of product cycles. 
As explained by Holmes (1984: 15-16): 
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The firm developing the product will often subcontract its initial 
production to firms who already have installed capacity to produce 
the product or at least its major subcomponents, in small batches. 
As soon as the product is established in the market and a certain 
minimum volume of demand has been attained then the parent firm 
will take the production of the product in-house. At the other end of 
the product cycle, cost minimization is often crucial to firms seeking 
to retain a toehold in a declining market and again such firms may 
well resort to subcontracting in order to survive. 
This argument coincides with Samsung Electronics Corporation's rationale. When it 
was without production facilities it derived its commodities from OEM suppliers (see 
Chapter 5). Then it substituted in-house production with subcontractors. When their 
home electronics sector declined, the Corporation boosted its subcontracted content. 
Now, the Corporation is transferring production lines to subcontractors while 
confining its own activities to higher value-added sectors. This behaviour underlines 
the fact that the subcontracting system plays a vital role in industrial restructuring. 
These findings differ from most research results on flexible specialisation 
production systems in Western advanced capitalist countries. 17 As argued by Nielsen 
(1991: 43-44): 
The production methods of Fordism are found in traditional industrial 
production while ... the flexible production systems are especially 
prevalent within the area of 'high-tech', the most advanced of the 
industries and the service sector (Atkinson, 1986; Scott and Storper, 
1987; Morris, 1988) .... the flexible production structure is bound to the 
dynamic development of the most advanced section of the post-
industrial production structure. 
Their arguments are acceptable if flexible specialisation production is a phenomenon 
at the initial development stage of a specific 'high-tech' industry. If flexible 
specialisation production is used in the declining stages of the product life cycle these 
assertions are unacceptable. Samsung Electronics Corporation, for instance, has 
widely used the contractual production in the home electronics sector rather than in 
the semiconductor or industrial electronics - the most 'advanced' and 'high-tech' 
17. According to Scott and Storper's (1987) definition, the flexible production forms are characterised 
by 'a well developed ability both to shift promptly from one process to another and to adjust quantities 
of output rapidly up or down over the short run without any strongly deleterious effects on level of 
efficiency' (adapted from Nielsen, 1991: 43). 
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sectors. Subcontracting and flexible specialisation production in the high-tech 
industry sectors were almost negligible due to the oligopolistic market structure, 
technology protection and huge initial investment capital. Actually, they have relied 
heavily on Fordist mass production methods in a limited number of major products. 
All entrepreneurs use their core technologies within the organisation while offering 
simple, labour-intensive processes to subcontractors and licensees. Attempts to link 
flexible specialisation production methods in high-tech industry with local labour 
market dynamics are illogical in Korea. 
3.2 Relationships between Parent Firms and Subcontractors 
As noted, subcontracting transactions are characterised by 'persistent', 
'structural', and 'cooperative' attributes (SMIB, 1989: 16-18). However, due to the 
oligopolistic market structure of Korea's electronics industry subcontractors' 
relationship with parent firms is largely 'dependent' (Jun, Y.W., 1988: 49-51). This 
is highlighted by major assemblers supplying key parts from their affiliates. 
According to the case study, Samsung Electronics Corporation provided the following 
assistance to subcontractors: technical instruction (20 firms); managerial guidance (12 
firms); financial assistance (8 firms); and provision of production facilities (7 firms). 
Eleven of the twelve subcontractors of Samsung Electron Devices, for example, were 
provided with production facilities. Further, most parent firms had an exclusive 
arrangement whereby they dispatched technicians to subcontractors. The Samsung 
Electronics Corporation's associated subcontractors, for instance, sold 50 per cent of 
their products to the parent company but provided less than 5 per cent to Goldstar. 
Conversely, Goldstar's subcontractors supplied 81 per cent of their products to their 
parent but provided only 1 per cent to Samsung Electronics Corporation (see Table 
6.6) Questioned about their parents' response to this practice brought divergent 
responses. Four subcontractors were prevented from contract and another twenty-six 
firms were actively discouraged from contract. Conversely, another twenty-two 
242 
Table 6.10 
Off-spring from Parent Firms 
Subcontractors No Yes Total 
no. per cent no. per cent no. per cent 
Samsung Electronics 19 76.0 6 24.0 25 100.0 
Samsung Electron Devices 9 75.0 3 25.0 12 100.0 
Goldstar 9 60.0 6 40.0 15 100.0 
Goldstar-Alps 2 100.0 2 100.0 
Total 39 72.2 15 27.8 54 100.0 
Note: 'Parent firms' include all the Big Three electronics assemblers (including 
their electronics affiliates) with whom subcontractors deal. 
Source: Fieldwork. 
subcontractors claimed that their parents made no recommendation and two actively 
encouraged contract. 
Subcontracting relationships, according to the case study, were stable and 
persistent. Forty-seven of the fifty-four subcontractors had regular contracts - an 
observation supporting Asanuma's (1986) research on subcontracting in Japan. 
According to Asanuma (1986: 15-16), Japanese home electronics manufacturers 
changed their models almost every year. Although parent firms examined and 
selected subcontractors when new models were developed, they rarely changed them 
during the life of the new model. Also, the parent firm did not shift any work to its 
own facilities or another supplier once this arrangement had been confirmed. 
The state of off-spring is another important indication of the relationships 
between parent firm and subcontractor. Of the twenty-five Samsung Electronics 
Corporation's associated subcontractors, six were its off-spring. In total, fifteen of the 
fifty-four studied were conceived in similar circumstances (Table 6.10). According to 
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one interviewee, an estimated 26 of the Samsung Electronics Corporation's 171 
associated subcontractors (home electronics sector) were the Corporation's off-spring. 
Their relationship was patently paternalistic. Only two firms had financial 
connections with their parents in marked contrast to the 20 per cent recorded m 
Sheard's (1983: 52) study on subcontracting in the Japanese motor car industry. 
Subcontracting relationships have been characterised as 'persistent' but they 
are not necessarily fixed. Linkages are subject to change depending on variations in 
the bargaining power of subcontractors and parent firms. Only ten of the fifty-five 
subcontractors responded that their technology levels were more sophisticated than 
their parents. Nevertheless, the technology levels of thirty-four subcontractors were 
higher than comparable firms. Another ten subcontractors suggested they were 
similar to their counterparts. These responses highlight that the subcontractors have 
only limited bargaining power. This implies that the major rationale of 
subcontracting transactions by the parent firm is subcontractor's lower unit 
production costs rather than possession of special technologies. 
A key feature of the case studies has been a question designed to ascertain the 
factors determining the number of orders subcontracted by a parent firm. 
Specifically, five aspects were investigated: 
(a) Shifting demands affected by international business fluctuations: 
46 firms 
(b) Demand-decrease because of the parent firm's automation of 
production: 10 firms 
(c) Parent firm's managerial strategy to control their subcontractors: 
11 firms 
(d) Subcontractor's competitiveness m technology and price: 21 
firms 
(e) Parent firm's overseas production expansion: 6 firms 
Results show that the number of orders is largely affected by international business 
fluctuations rather than the relative competitiveness of the subcontractor. Parent 
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firms use subcontractors to buffer fluctuations in international business. Most of the 
work subcontracted is not automated and requires manual operations (see b). 
Subcontracting, therefore, has a high potential in creating jobs. Further, there is a 
ready supply of smaller firms wishing to be subcontractors (see c ). This was 
underlined by the huge number of applicants willing to accommodate work previously 
undertaken by Samsung Electronics Corporation's production lines. The impact of 
overseas expansion by parent firms on subcontractors was insignificant (see e). 
Indeed, thirty-six of the subcontractors tested found no change in the number of order. 
Fifteen firms, however, discovered it decreased orders. Conversely, only three 
subcontractors questioned found that it increased orders. Only nine subcontractors 
had experience of international subcontracting. Most international subcontracting. 
was ephemeral and small-scale, having only a marginal effect on production. 
3.3 Implications for Labour Market Dynamics 
As noted, the key rationale of subcontractors has been to use dispersed, lower-
wage labour typified by home-based female workers. This suggests a reciprocal 
relationship between the reorganisation of production and labour market restructuring. 
According to Rubery and Wilkinson (1982: 123), subcontracting acted as a 
mechanism ensuring wage discipline and labour force segmentation: 
Outwork (or subcontracting) provides an important means of 
minimizing employment costs. If labour supply is not 
homogeneous, and labour can be purchased at different prices, 
outwork may be a means of exploiting supplies of the cheapest 
labour. These differences in labour-supply conditions stem from the 
structure of social reproduction. 
Further, subcontracting can be used to mobilise labour that is unavailable for full-time 
'factory work' because of commuting and childcare. Home-work enables firms to use 
cheap labour by employing women tied to the home by family commitments. In the 
garment industry, Johnson and Johnson (1983) reported, many women have resorted 
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to it so that they could simultaneously care for children and work for wages (cited by 
Holmes, 1984: 21). 
Thirty-three of the associated subcontractors investigated had reduced their 
work force during the past three years. Given the substantial increase m 
subcontracting by major electronics assemblers this figure is quite contradictory. It 
stemmed from the rapid growth of lower-layer subcontractors and use of home-based 
workers. This organisational restructuring of production is a marked feature of the 
emergence of a post-industrial society - diminishing workers in manufacturing and 
increasing numbers in tertiary and quaternary activities. Consequently, the entrance 
gates of small and medium-sized firms carried advertisements for employees. One 
company owner was unable to recruit one employee over the past six months. The 
problem was most intense during major holidays as large numbers of employees did 
not return to their jobs after the holiday. According to KIET's (1988: 442) 
investigation, only 40 per cent of the technicians in the electronics-parts industry had 
more than three years service with a particular firm. 
Reflecting the shortage of full-time factory workers, first-layers have 
increased orders to lower-layer subcontractors reliant upon part-time, home-based, 
female and handicapped workers. Most lower-layer subcontractors are located in 
poor-class residential areas to capture their scattered and segmented labour.18 They 
used basements and residential houses as workshops. Further, Samsung Electronics 
Corporation established joint-ventured parts-processing company, Chongrib 
Electronics Co., to use handicapped people. By employing them as industrial 
workers, the subcontracting system contributed to boosting their welfare. 
Labour-supply was a major factor which prevented smaller firms in major 
cities moving to local industrial estates. If they moved from an inner to an outer 
18. According to the Kyonggi Daily (25 August 1988), almost half of the 397 parts-manufacturing and 
processing finns in Suwon city were unauthorised. In Kyonggi province (excluding InchOn city), there 
were 2,020 unauthorised parts-supplying firms. 
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Table 6.11 
Samsung Electronics Corporation's Dormitory Facilities, 1989 
Male Female Total 
no. no. no. 
Suwon Plant 750 8,450 9,200 
Kihung Plant 984 2,619 3,603 
Buchan Plant 376 836 1,212 
Kumi Plant 1,551 1,167 2,718 
Total 3,661 13,072 16,733 
Source: SEC, 1989: 1,090-1,091. 
location they had to spend extra money, beside wages, to cover either accommodation 
or commuting costs. In 1989, for instance, Samsung Electronics Corporation 
accommodated more than 16,000 employees in dormitories. Most were unmarried 
female workers (Table 6.11). Also, the Corporation provided schooling and 
commuting services for employees. Samsung Electronics Corporation has increased 
subcontracting at the expense of full-time factory workers. Thus, the Corporation's 
restructuring of production resulted in an increase in job opportunities in the Seoul 
Metropolitan Area at the expense of local peripheral areas. The search for lower-
wage workers by Korean entrepreneurs will be intensified if avoidance by younger 
workers to manufacturing jobs increases further. Indeed, long-running arguments on 
'jobs to workers or workers to jobs', 'top-down or bottom-up' and 'who is flexible in 
regard to whom' largely depend on the stage of industrialisation and the nature of 
society. 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This chapter has analysed the way in which small and medium-sized 
subcontractors have been incorporated into large business organisations and local 
labour markets have been restructured. Most geographical research on small firms 
has focused attention on the sector itself and neglected relationships with larger firms 
and labour market conditions. In 1988, for instance, almost 83 per cent of small and 
medium-sized firms m Korea's electrical and electronics industry were 
subcontractors. The final customers of this hierarchical subcontracting structure were 
a handful of large electronics assemblers, notably the Big Three. 
Fifty-four associated subcontractors (25 for Samsung Electronics; 12 for 
Samsung Electron Devices; 15 for Goldstar; and 2 for Goldstar-Alps) were examined. 
In 1987, Samsung Electronics Corporation used subcontractors to supply more than 
31 per cent of its inputs. Seventy-two per cent of associated subcontractors 
investigated had lower-layer subcontractors (average 8.6 firms) and sub-subcontracted 
21 per cent of their works to them. The Corporation's associated subcontractors 
relied on it for more than 50 per cent of their business whereas the comparable figure 
for Goldstar was almost 81 per cent. About 28 per cent of the total subcontractors 
examined were off-spring of their parent companies. Given the close business 
relationship, most subcontractors were located near their parents and were willing to 
be relocated at their behest. 
The key motivation for using subcontracting was to exploit lower-wage 
workers who are scattered, part-time, home-based, female and unavailable for full-
time factory work. One subcontractor interviewed used 50 households in home-based 
processing. To draw upon home-based female workers most of the lower-layer 
subcontractors of associated subcontractors were located in low-income residential 
areas. By increasing the production of subcontracts most of Korea's major electronics 
assemblers have also shifted to higher value-added sectors and, in the process, 
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restructured local labour markets. Thus, the changing relationships among large 
business organisations, smaller firms and local labour markets is the key to 
understanding the dynamics of industrial structure, location and linkage patterns. 
Samsung Electronics Corporation's subcontracting system provides 
information relevant to a number of theoretical debates: subcontracting versus flexible 
specialisation; division of labour (or labour market segmentation); and industrial 
restructuring. First, organisation of production in Korea (i.e., large business group 
and hierarchical subcontracting structure) is more rigid than that of Western advanced 
capitalist countries (i.e., flexible specialisation). In Korea, the Fordist labour process 
is still dominant in both parent firms and subcontractors. Samsung Electronics 
Corporation has raised the degree of 'flexibility', however, by using hierarchical 
subcontracting organisations (inter-firm flexibility) rather than by introducing multi-
tasking machinery and flexible labour organisation systems (intra-firm flexibility). 
Indeed, the nature of flexibility in subcontracting and flexible specialisation is quite 
different. Contrary to Western experience business relations between parent firms 
and subcontractors in Korea are largely unequal and dependent. 
Secondly, the development of hierarchical subcontracting structures in Korea 
has extended the division of labour beyond individual firms to encompass inter-firm 
arrangements and even entire production systems. As the main purpose of 
subcontracting is to use workers on lower wages and home-based labour, the division 
of labour in Korea is contrary to the characteristics of flexible specialisation (i.e., 
skilled, innovative, multi-tasking, specialised and cooperative labour relations). 
Production under contract has been almost negligible in Korea's high-tech industry 
sectors. The rosy labour relations advanced by flexible specialisation theorists has not 
been found in this case study. The labour practices in the subcontracting firms were 
characterised by: substandard work environments; low job security; lower-wages; and 
low-skilled, temporary and home-based female workers. 
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Lastly, the multi-layered subcontracting structure has played a vital role in the 
restructuring of industry and labour markets. Samsung Electronics Corporation has 
restructured its activities by adding higher value-added sectors while simultaneously 
shifting the supply of lower-profit commodities to subcontractors. Almost all 
production under contract has been confined to labour intensive, mature and less 
profitable sectors. By restructuring its productive organisation, the Samsung 
Electronics Corporation has had an enormous impact on labour markets. 
Continuously, it has substituted internal labour with external labour and reorganised 
the latter hierarchically. The expansion of the niche market highlighted by flexible 
specialisation specialists has occurred but has been largely concentrated on the mature 
and lower value-added industry sectors. Only limited qualitative changes in the 
relationships between large enterprises and smaller firms has occurred. The 
substitution of large enterprises (associated with Fordist mass production system) in 
Korea by small (flexible) firms is not expected in the near future. 
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CONCLUSION 
This thesis has examined the processes and mechanisms through which 
Korea's large business organisations have emerged and the resultant regional patterns 
of industry and labour markets they have generated. Since the late 1950s, the large 
business organisation has been highlighted by industrial geographers, influenced by 
McNee's 'geography of enterprise', as the dominant institution in modem urban-
industrial society. Korea is no exception as a few large conglomerates (chaebols) 
dominate the nation's economy and society. As chaebols have grown up, their 
business networks have expanded from local to regional, national, international and 
global scales. They have integrated small and medium-sized firms into their 
production systems. In the process, they have had an enormous influence not only on 
economic matters but also in social and political spheres. 
The geography of the chaebol has been changed continuously since its 
creation during the 1950s. The key factors have been: the government's economic 
policies, industrial restructuring of chaebols themselves, the character of the owner, 
capital flows, trade regulations, regional policies, labour markets, and inter-
organisational connections. This thesis' main findings are: (a) the nature of the 
industrial structure, production and organisational structure of the chaebol and its 
business environment - labour markets, government policies and trade regulations -
have changed markedly over time; (b) the production systems of chaebols have been 
closely interlinked with thousands of firms ranging from global enterprises to 
household workshops with very different levels of bargaining power; (c) the 
weighting of factors involving locational decision-making has varied as corporate 
organisations have expanded; and (d) the business strategies of the chaebol have been 
altered dynamically to cope with the strategies of its major competitors. 
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These research findings provide a number of useful suggestions for model 
building in industrial geography. An ideal model would: (a) identify the processes 
and mechanisms through which aspatial dynamics create spatial patterns; (b) 
incorporate political and social factors to analyse industrial dynamics; (c) clarify 
changing interrelationships between different types of organisations and labour 
markets; and (d) integrate different geographical scales into one analytical framework. 
By simplifying the complex interrelationships between chaebols with other 
organisations and their intricate implications for regional economies this study has 
uncovered the mechanisms which generate and transform the Korean space economy. 
The Korean economy has been seen as a system within which chaebols interact over 
time and at different geographical scales with government, smaller firms and 
multinationals. Industrial restructuring, regional development patterns, locational 
adjustments, labour market dynamics and population movements have been 
interpreted in terms of the changing organisational (or institutional) relationships 
involving chaebols. The conceptual model's utility has been tested through case 
studies of chaebols. Most attention, however, has been focused on the Samsung 
Group, Samsung Electronics Corporation (SEC), and SEC's subcontractors. Given 
the dominant role of the Korean Government on the nation's economic 
transformation, the changing geography of the chaebol is reviewed according to shifts 
in industrial policies (see Table X.l). 
During the 1950s, most chaebol founders boosted their business by: importing 
consumer goods; processing aid materials; and participating in the Government's 
import-substitution industrialisation projects. Most of the requisite funds for these 
projects were secured from foreign aid. The Government redistributed this scarce 
capital to a limited number of experienced entrepreneurs who were deemed to be the 
most productive users. Most chaebol founders started their businesses in their 
hometown and then expanded their business arena to major market areas (Seoul and 
major local cities). Although the huge foreign aid boosted Korea's industrialisation it 
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Table X.1 Changing Geography of Chaebol 
Government's Chaebol's Chaebol's Location dicision- Foreign capital Regional policy Labour markets Relations with 
economic policy industrial structure location making factors introduction smaller firms 
Import-substitution Daily necessities Seoul city Major markets Commodity/ Laissez-faire Out-migration of Competitive 
(before 1960s) Major local cities (owner's hometown) money capital rural population 
(foreign aid) 
Export-oriented Light industry Seoul city City facilities Money capital Laissez-faire Labour pool in Competitive 
light industry Major local cities (trade information) (foreign loan) Seoul metro. and 
(1960s) major local cities 
N 
VI 
w Export-oriented Heavy industry Southeastern Large plant sites Investment capital Growth pole Labour disperse to Cooperative 
heavy industry (strategic industry) Coastal Area Infrastructures (inward DFI) local industrial (subcontracting) 
(1970s) Inter-unit linkages complexes 
Technology- High-tech industry Seoul's hinterland Cooperation with Investment/ Balanced develop. Home-based labour Cooperative 
intensive industry other firms/units finance capital Technopolis Reconcentration into (hierarchical 
(1980s) (outward DFI) metropolitan areas subcontracting) 
Globalisation of Service industry Seoul city Trade regulations Finance capital Balanced develop. Labour exploitation Joint-ventured 
economy Overseas labour (inward DFI in (high-tech/high- in global scale outward DFI 
(1980s and 1990s) service sectors) touch city) 
devastated the nation's rural economy and triggered the people's migration from rural 
areas to major cities. The ostracized farmers created a huge reservoir of unemployed 
labour in major cities and further accelerated Korea's industrialisation. As the 
business activities of both chaebols and smaller firms were identical, the competitive 
relationship had a resulted in negative effect on small firms. 
In the early 1960s, Park's military government proposed a series of Five Year 
Economic Development Plans to legitimate itself through rapid economic 
development. As further economic development based on an import-substitution 
approach was difficult to achieve due to the small domestic market, the new 
Government adopted an outward-looking development strategy. The drastic 
curtailment of foreign aid since the late 1950s was another major reason for this shift 
in policy. As domestic savings were insufficient, most of the requisite funds were 
introduced from overseas as either public or commercial loans. The import-
substitution industry was transformed as export industry and new export commodities 
developed. As the exploitation of scale economies was the most feasible means of 
raising the international competitiveness of Korean export commodities, most 
national resources were further concentrated on a few giant business groups. The 
chaebol's business activities were concentrated in Seoul for easy contact with 
international business and government organisations. 
In the 1970s, the Government fostered heavy and chemical industries: to 
strengthen the national defence by producing weapons domestically; to develop new, 
higher value-added export commodities; and to promote autonomous economic 
development. Together with foreign loans, the attraction of direct foreign investment 
through joint-ventures was necessary to acquire advanced technologies. As heavy 
industry required large factory sites, port facilities and close forward/backward 
linkages, most of the factories in these industry sectors were accommodated in large 
industrial complexes in the Southeastern Coastal Area. Besides these huge industrial 
complexes, numerous local industrial estates were established as local growth poles. 
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This growth pole policy was established to check the concentration of population in 
the Seoul Metropolitan Area. As the chaebol was the most feasible organisation for 
dispersing activities to local areas it played a key role in the local dispersion of 
industrial activities. The spin-off effects of heavy industry on other industries and the 
rapid growth in exports prompted large firms to use smaller firms as suppliers of 
intermediate goods and export commodities. Influenced by this policy shift the 
Southeastern Coastal Area experienced rapid economic growth while the other areas 
declined and stagnated. 
In the 1980s, the nation's policy was focused on economic liberalisation and 
the growth of technology-intensive industries. This policy switch was essential to 
cope with increased international competition. Chaebols restructured their business 
towards high-tech industry while transferring mature technologies to their 
subcontractors. As high-quality transportation and communication facilities were the 
key locational decision-making factor in this industry, most of these industries were 
concentrated in the Seoul Metropolitan Area. The development of hierarchical 
subcontracting systems and increasing international competitiveness have restructured 
labour markets and increased the use of home-based and overseas labour to save 
labour costs. As the growth pole policy resulted in a bipolar regional development 
pattern, the government's regional policy shifted towards balanced development by 
trying to disperse technology-intensive activities to peripheral areas. However, the 
balanced regional development policy has not been effective because these new 
business activities need to be near the large metropolitan area. 
Together with the high-tech industrialisation, the globalisation of Korean 
economy has been intensified since the early 1980s. Chaebols' new investment has 
concentrated on the so-called soft sectors, such as research and development, finance, 
insurance, information and communication and leisure industries. Most of these 
business activities have concentrated in Seoul city while the manufacturing activities 
have dispersed to Seoul's hinterland, Kyonggi province. Influenced by the 
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development of hierarchical subcontracting systems, small firms have reagglomerated 
into the Seoul Metropolitan Area for easy contact with chaebol organisations. 
Further, the ever-intensifying trade regulations on Korean products have encouraged 
direct foreign investment by Korean firms. Initially, direct foreign investment by 
chaebol was concentrated in advanced capitalist countries due to the trade regulations 
of host countries and their capital supplies. The host countries' regulations on the 
parts-supply from Korea and sky-rocketing domestic wage increases, however, have 
prompted the relocation of labour-intensive industries to late-industrialising countries. 
Direct foreign investment by small firms has been assisted by the established global 
business networks of chaebols. 
The research results of this study also provide additional insights into current 
debates on theoretical development within industrial geography. Besides the need to 
reconsider the assertions of existing models, this study argues that the application of 
extant models in the Korean case requires great caution and, in some cases, a 
fundamental new start is imperative. The key arguments are: 
(a) The restructuring of Korean economy has been largely influenced by 
international capital flows searching for better profit from investments. Over time, 
the inflows of capital have changed from commodity capital through money capital, 
and productive capital to finance capital. Influenced by these shifts, Korea's 
industrialisation process has progressed from colonial through import-substitution, 
export-orientation to the direct foreign investment phase. 
restructuring is well suited to the circuits of capital model. 
This macro level 
This study argues, 
however, that the shift of capital from one fraction to another is not only due to the 
natural process of capital accumulation but to government mediation of capital flows. 
The speed of capital circulation from one fraction to another, therefore, has been 
strongly influenced by government mediation of international flows of commodity 
and capital. Industrial restructuring within a specific country is closely related to both 
the global realm of capital accumulation and the state's industrialisation policies. 
256 
(b) The rationale for direct foreign investment (micro-level) by Korean firms 
differs from theoretical explanations. Initially, a large proportion of direct foreign 
investment by Korean firms was concentrated in Western advanced capitalist 
countries to avoid their trade regulations. As Korean firms had limited firm-specific 
advantages compared to their counterparts, they concentrated on assembly line 
activities in host countries. They supplied most parts and components from their 
Korean subsidiaries. Thus, they transferred their 'home country's comparative 
advantages' to the host countries through intra-firm transactions to minimise their 
disadvantages involved in pursuing business overseas. (As the price competitiveness 
of parts-supply from Korea relies on both the parent firm's technological superiority 
and the productivity of its subcontractors derived from special technologies and lower 
waged workers, this study distinguishes between 'firm-specific' and 'national 
comparative' advantages). The implication is that theories of direct foreign 
investment based firm-specific advantages as a necessary precondition are virtually 
irrelevant in a Korean context. 
(c) The distinctive characteristics of direct foreign investment by Korean firms 
is matched by the high proportion of OEM production in total exports. Together they 
prompt a reconsideration of the New International Division of Labour model. This 
study argues that the NIDL concept is only partially applicable to Third World 
multinationals as the main purpose of their direct foreign investment activities is to 
overcome trade regulations in host countries rather than to exploit firm-specific 
advantages or cheap labour. Even a large proportion of Korean investment in late-
developing countries is to by-pass trade restrictions rather than to exploit local 
supplies of cheap labour. In Korean firms, the proportion of production under 
contract (OEM and licensing) is much higher than direct foreign investment - the 
component that theorists argue results in the New International Division of Labour. 
Thus, domestic production under contract by foreign multinationals should be 
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incorporated as another key component in addition to direct foreign investment 
inducing the New International Division of Labour. 
(d) Locational decision-making by Samsung has been influenced by almost all 
of the key factors outlined in extant models as major decision-making forces. As the 
key political, organisational and social factors are not directly interconnected in any 
short-term perspective any attempt to develop a single, all-consuming model is 
impractical and unrealistic. Greater cross-fertilisation between different theoretical 
traditions, as recommended by Dicken (1990), is more acceptable. Thus, the research 
results derived from this study of Samsung has demonstrated the usefulness of a 
conceptual framework which incorporates three distinct scales of explanation -
political, organisational and social - and local, regional, national and international 
geographical scales and their variations over time. 
(e) The production system used by Korean firms - the multi-layered 
subcontracting structure - is different from the Western system of flexible 
specialisation. Korean firms, large and small, still adopt Fordist mass production as 
the dominant mode of production. Rather than broaden their range of products 
Korean firms have sought lower costs and better quality products to raise their 
international competitiveness. Increasing international trade, rather than flexible 
production, is considered as the major force of product diversity available for 
consumers. Although there are many border line cases, Korean firms have pursued 
inter-firm flexibility through hierarchical subcontracting systems. Thus, the flexible 
specialisation system which seeks intra-firm flexibility and autonomous inter-firm 
relationship is only partially relevant to Korean firms. 
(f) The development of hierarchical subcontracting organisations in Korea has 
had a substantial impact on the restructuring of industry and labour markets. As 
noted, Samsung has restructured by adding higher value-added sectors and divesting 
lower profit rate sectors to subcontractors. Contrary to the arguments of flexible 
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specialisation theorists, niche markets have not expanded substantially and have 
largely been restricted to mature and lower value-added sectors. Consequently, there 
has been no qualitative transformation in relationships between large firms and 
subcontractors. Further, the development of hierarchical subcontracting structures has 
extended the division of labour beyond individual firms to incorporate inter-firm and 
entire production systems. This hierarchical and dependent inter-firm relationship in 
Korea has created quite different labour market structures to those employed in the 
flexible specialisation system. As the main purpose of subcontracting is to exploit 
cheap labour and use home-based workers, the hierarchical subcontracting system has 
encouraged the segmentation of the labour market. The Samsung Group has reduced 
internal labour markets by increasing the use of external labour markets. 
The influence of chaebols on Korean society is ubiquitous but, surprisingly, 
very little research has been conducted on them in either geography or in related 
social science disciplines. Most research and journalistic efforts have centred on 
exposing the negative aspects of chaebol behaviour: the concentration of activities in 
a few centres; preferential subsidies from Government; concentration of economic 
power in a few hands; extreme diversification of their business activities; and unfair 
transactions with small and medium-sized firms. Conscious of this negative criticism 
the Korean Government has adopted a number of measures. These have included 
attempts to persuade chaebols relocate the production facilities and headquarters; 
enactment of a fair trade law; compulsory listing on the stock market; the need to 
establish subcontracting linkages with small and medium-sized firms; and the 
requirement to specialise on a few major activities. The Korean Government's 
industrial dispersion policies, however, have had little success because it has not 
considered: the interrelationships between large organisations and small and medium-
sized firms; local business environments; spatial implications of macroeconomic 
policies; and corporate organisational characteristics. 
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Given the absence of substantial research on chaebols by industrial 
geographers there are many avenues still to be explored. They include further work 
on: 
(a) The industrial restructuring of chaebols and its implications for 
changes in industrial location with reference to the concentration of 
investment in high-tech and service sectors in large metropolitan 
areas. 
(b) The transactional (or subcontracting) relations between large 
business organisations and smaller firms and their implications for 
the restructuring of local labour markets as they have increased the 
employment opportunities of dispersed, part-time, home-based, 
female workers at the expense of full-time factory workers. 
Consideration needs to be given to the long-term implications of this 
change. 
(c) The globalisation of business (trade and overseas production) 
and its regional economic impacts as most of Korea's international 
trade is controlled by chaebols. Specifically, interest needs to be 
focused on pressure from host governments to increase local 
content. 
(d) The locational and linkage patterns of chaebols and their impact 
on regional economies. Particularly, the decentralisation of 
activities to targeted areas has been a major weapon used by 
Government to lessen unbalanced regional development. Special 
attention will have to be focused on both the lack of effectiveness of 
these forced relocation methods and the socio-economic problems 
of company cities. 
Finally, there is a pressing need to discuss the role of chaebols in the economic 
reunification of the Korean Peninsular and its implications for regional development. 
There is little doubt that they will spearhead the North's economic rehabilitation and 
determine the location of industries and the nature of labour markets. Already, 
chaebols have developed a number of projects and trading activities involving North 
Korea. 
As chaebols are the most important space-organising institution in Korea their 
changing relationships with major external environments need to be studied. The key 
relationships involve Government, subcontractors, multinationals and local labour 
markets. Over time their involvement with Government has changed from the 
farmer's dominance to an uneasy symbiosis. This shift has been triggered by 
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diversifying the sources of capital prompted by the internationalisation of finance 
because chaebols have been able to draw on alternative sources through their overseas 
subsidiaries. Also, Korea's political and economic liberalisation has made 
Government's control over business more difficult. Further, the inherent relationship 
between chaebols and their subcontractors has also shifted from the former' s 
dominance to symbiosis. This cooperative phenomenon has been identified in the 
transfer of production lines by chaebols to their major associated subcontractors. 
Through the formation of this hierarchical subcontracting structure, Korean labour 
markets have been restructured. Furthermore, the chaebols' relationships with 
multinationals has moved from being complementary to being competitive. The new 
situation has motivated chaebols to develop their own technologies and compete with 
their former 'masters'. Collectively, these changing relationships have had a marked 
impact on industrial location and labour markets. Thus, the most important issue in 
industrial geography, as highlighted by this thesis, is to identify the processes by 
which aspatial dynamics generate marked spatial consequences. 
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Appendix 0.1 
Exchange Rates of Korean Won to U.S. Dollar 
Year Exchange rate Year Exchange rate 
1951 2.5 1975 484.0 
1953 18.0 1976 484.0 
1955 18.0 1977 484.0 
1960 50.0 1978 484.0 
1961 100.0 1979 484.0 
1964 270.9 1980 659.9 
1965 271.5 1981 700.5 
1966 270.9 1982 748.8 
1967 271.3 1983 795.5 
1969 303.9 1984 827.4 
1971 373.2 1985 890.2 
1972 398.9 1986 861.4 
1973 397.5 1987 792.2 
1974 484.0 1988 684.1 
Source: BOK, 1988:213; EPB, 1990. 
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Appendix 2.1 
Trends of Interest Rates in Korea, 1961-1980 
Year Inflation Nominal loan Special loan rate Real loan rate 
rate (A) rate (B) 
Export(C) Key industry(D) (B-A) (C-A) (D-A) 
per cent per cent per cent per cent per cent per cent per cent 
1961 15.1 17.5 13.9 8.3 2.4 - 1.2 - 6.8 
1962 18.4 15.7 9.1 7.0 - 2.7 - 9.3 - 11.4 
1963 24.3 15.7 8.0 6.8 - 8.6 - 16.3 - 17.5 
1964 30.0 16.0 8.0 8.5 - 14.0 - 22.0 - 21.5 
1965 6.2 26.0 6.5 8.2 20.0 0.3 2.0 
N 1966 14.5 26.0 6.5 10.5 11.5 - 8.0 - 4.0 0\ 
1967 15.6 26.0 6.0 8.7 10.4 - 9.6 - 6.9 w 
1968 16.1 25.8 6.0 7.9 9.7 - 10.1 - 8.2 
1969 14.8 24.5 6.0 9.2 9.7 - 8.8 - 5.6 
1970 15.6 24.0 6.0 9.1 8.4 - 9.6 - 6.5 
1971 8.8 23.0 6.0 9.4 14.2 - 2.8 0.6 
1972 19.2 17.7 6.0 8.1 - 1.5 - 13.2 - 11.1 
1973 13.2 15.5 6.7 5.6 2.3 - 6.5 - 7.6 
1974 29.6 15.5 9.0 7.0 - 14.1 - 20.6 - 22.6 
1975 24.7 15.5 7.0 7.4 - 9.2 - 17.7 - 17.3 
1976 17.7 17.5 7.0 7.4 - 0.2 - 10.7 - 10.3 
1977 16.3 16.5 7.0 7.9 - 0.2 - 9.3 - 8.4 
1978 20.6 15.5 7.0 7.6 - 5.1 - 13.6 - 13.0 
1979 18.8 18.7 15.0 n.a. - 0.1 - 3.8 n.a. 
1980 37.0 24.7 15.0 n.a. - 12.3 - 22.0 n.a. 
Source: Bank of Korea (per. comm.); Chung, G.H., 1987: 72; Jones, 1987: 146. 
Appendix 2.2 
Supply of Factory Site and Location Type, 1978 and 1986 
Planned site Free site Plants' location type 
1978 1986 1978 1986 Planned location Free location 
Sq. Km Sq. Km Sq. Km Sq. Km per cent per cent 
Seoul 1.7 1.7 17.8 12.4 2.5 97.5 
Pusan 1.5 4.4 12.3 7.8 35.1 64.9 
N 
Taegu 3.1 4.9 3.1 5.3 45.5 54.5 
°' Inchon 1.8 3.9 23.0 17.0 20.2 79.8 .j::.. 
Kyonggi 5.5 7.2 27.8 44.9 8.6 91.4 
Kangwon 1.9 1.3 2.9 4.8 15.4 84.6 
North Chungchong 1.1 2.1 6.3 5.4 21.3 78.7 
South Chungchong 0.6 1.3 9.4 11.4 9.6 90.4 
North Challa 1.6 4.4 5.1 4.9 18.6 81.4 
South Challa 2.5 11.6 8.6 7.4 14.5 85.5 
North K yongsang 19.7 28.0 9.6 13.5 22.3 77.7 
South Kyongsang 29.2 50.3 7.8 13.6 38.5 61.5 
Whole Country 70.3 121.0 134.4 149.2 17.9 82.1 
Note: The survey included 25,234 manufacturing firms which employed more than ten persons. This is equivalent to 84.3 per cent of 
all firms enumerated in the 1985 census. 
Source: KRIHS (per. comm.); MTI, KLDC and KEIC, 1988: 355. 
Appendix 4.1 
The History of Samsung Group 
Year Method Company name Business Note 
1936 Established Hyobdong Rice-processing Factory Grain-processing Joint-stock comapny 
1936 Acquired Ilchul Transportation Company Trucking 
1938 Established Samsung Store Trading Grain-processing as side line 
1939 Acquired Choson Brewery Brewery 
1948 Acquired Choson Hyomo Fermenting 
1948 Established Samsung Moolsan Company Trading Dismantled by the Korean War 
1951 Established Samsung Co. Trading Designated to GTC in 1975 
1953 Established Pungkug Alcohol Co. 
1953 Established Cheil Sugar & Co. Sugar refining Flour-milling as side line 
N 1954 Established Cheil Wool Textile Co. Textiles 0\ 
U't 1955 Established Taehan Sugar Sales Co. Sales Disorganised in 1957 
1956 Acquired Kuryongpo Canning Plant Canning Cheil Sugar & Co. 
1957 Acquired Hungob Bank Banking Nationalised 
1957 Acquired Commercial Bank Banking Nationalised 
1957 Acquired Dongyang Sugar Co. Sugar-refining 
1957 Established Hyosung Moolsan Co. Trading Transferred in 1963 
1957 Acquired CMnil Securities Co. Stock-dealing 
1958 Acquired SamchOg Cement Co. Cement Transferred in 1958 
1958 Acquired Ankuk Fire & Marine Insurance Co. Insurance 
1958 Established Changmi-rasa Sales Cheil Wool Textile Co. 
1958 Acquired Dongil Textile Co. Textiles Transferred in 1959 
1958 Established Kunyong Moolsan Co. Trading 
1958 Acquired Hankook Tire Co. Tire manufacturing Transferred in 1963 
1958 Acquired Honam Fertiliser Industries Co. Fertiliser 
1959 Acquired Choheung Bank Banking Nationalised 
Year Method Company name Business Note 
1962 Acquired Anbo Fire & Marine Insurance Co. Insurance Merged into Ankuk Fire & Marine Insurance 
1963 Established Radio Seoul Broadcasting Co. Broadcasting 
1963 Established Tongyang TV Broadcasting Co. Broadcasting Merged into the government-run KBS in 1980 
1963 Acquired Dongbang Life Insurance Co. Insurance 
1963 Acquired Donghwa Department Store Sales Renamed as Shinsegae Department Store Co. 
1963 Acquired Tongyang Fire Insurance Co. Insurance Sold out in 1967 
1963 Acquired Taehan Edible Oil Manufacturing Co. Edible oil 
1963 Acquired Donghwa Real Estate Real estate Renamed as Joongang Development Co. 
1963 Acquired Wonhy6ng Industrial Co. Seasoning Renamed as Meepoong Industrial Co. 
1963 Acquired Dongnam Securities Co. Stock-dealing 
1964 Acquired Taegu University Education Transferred to the then Nation's President 
1964 Established Korea Fertiliser Co. Fertiliser Donated to the Government in 1967 
1965 Established Samsung Foundation of Art and Culture Arts & Culture 
N 1965 Acquired S6ngkyunkwan University Education 
0\ 1965 Established Joongang Daily News Co. Newspaper 0\ 
1965 Acquired Saehan Paper Co. Pulp & Paper Renamed as Chonju Paper Co. 
1966 Established Koryo General Hospital Welfare 
1968 Established Samyong Industry 
1968 Opened Anyang Country Club Sports 
1969 Established Samsung Electronics Co. Electronics 
1969 Established Mipoong Sales Co. Sales 
1969 Established Samsung Sanyo Electric Co. Electronics Merged into Samsung Electronics Co. in 1977 
1970 Established Samsung NEC Co. Electronics Renamed as Samsung Electron Devices Co. 
1971 Eatablished Samsung Electric Co. Electronics Merged into Samsung Electronics Co. 
1971 Founded Samsung Employees Aid Foundation Welfare 
1972 Established Cheil Synthetic Textiles Co. Textile 
1973 Established Cheil Planning Co. Planning 
1973 Acquired Imperial Co. Tourism Renamed as Hotel Shilla Co. 
1973 Established Samri Garment Garment 
Year Method Company name Business Note 
1973 Established Samsung Sanyo Parts Co. Electronics Renamed as Samsung Electro-Mechanics Co. 
1973 Established Samsung Coming Co. Glassware 
1974 Established Samsung Petrochemical Industries Co. Chemicals 
1974 Established Samsung Heavy Industries Co. Industrial machinery 
1974 Opened Yonpo Swimming Resort Resort 
1976 Opened Yon gin Farmland Farming 
1977 Acquired Woojin Shipbuilding Co. Shipbuilding Renamed as Samsung Shipbuilding Co. 
1977 Acquired Dongil Construction Co. Construction Renamed as Samsung General Construction 
1977 Established Samsung Precision Industries Co. Industrial machinery Renamed as Samsung Aerospace Industries 
1977 Established Samsung GTE Telecommunications Co. Electronics Merged into Samsung Semi. & Telecom. 
1977 Acquired Daesung Heavy Industries Co. Industrial machinery Incorporated to Samsung Heavy Industries 
1977 Acquired Korea Semiconductor Co. Electronics Renamed as Samsung Semicon. & Telecom. 
1978 Acquired Korea Engineering Co. Engineering 
N 1978 Acquired Shinwon Development Co. Construction Merged into Samsung General Construction 
0\ 
-...J 1980 Acquired Korea Telecommunications Co. Electronics Incorporated to Samsung Semi. & Telecom. 
1981 Acquired Korea Security System Co. Security services 
1982 Established Samsung Lions Sports 
1983 Established Samsung Watch Co. Watches Spun-off from Samsung Aerospace Industries 
1984 Established Samsung Medical Systems Co. Medical equipments Joint ventured with General Electric Co. 
1984 Established Samsung Hewlett Packard Co. Electronics 
1985 Established Samsung United Aerospace Co. Joint-venture with UTC Group in USA 
1985 Established Samsung Data Systems Co. Software development Joint ventured with IBM in 1987 
1986 Established Samsung Economic Research Institute Research 
1987 Established Samsung Advanced Institute of Technology Research 
1987 Established Samsung Clark Co. 
1988 Established Samsung Winners Card Co. Financing 
1988 Established Samsung General Chemicals Co. Chemicals 
Source: Lee, B.C., 1986: 274-286; OESSG, 1988: 878-928; OESSG, 1990: 1988b. 
N 
°' 00 
Year Trade 
per cent 
1979 32.3 
1980 38.8 
1981 39.2 
1982 38.6 
1983 37.6 
1984 32.6 
1985 31.6 
1986 34.6 
1987 35.7 
1988 35.6 
Appendix 4.2 
Changing Industrial Structure of Samsung Group, 1979-1988 
Electronics 
per cent 
19.5 
13.6 
15.2 
13.8 
18.3 
23.4 
19.3 
23.9 
24.3 
22.2 
Heavy, Chemical 
& Construction 
per cent 
8.4 
10.1 
12.5 
15.0 
13.8 
12.8 
9.8 
8.9 
7.6 
8.2 
Precision 
per cent 
0.3 
0.4 
0.6 
0.7 
1.0 
1.0 
0.9 
1.0 
1.2 
1.5 
Food& 
Textiles 
per cent 
17.6 
19.3 
16.2 
12.7 
12.1 
9.4 
6.9 
7.7 
6.9 
6.7 
Note: The portions of overseas subsidiaries were not included in the calculation; based on net sales. 
Source: OESSG, 1980-1989. 
Service 
per cent 
17.8 
14.9 
15.1 
17.8 
19.4 
19.9 
30.7 
22.9 
23.4 
25.0 
Culture & 
Welfare 
per cent 
4.0 
3.0 
1.4 
1.3 
1.3 
1.1 
0.8 
1.0 
0.9 
0.9 
Appendix 6.1 
Questionnaire for Associated Subcontractors 
1. Name of company: 
2. Location: 
3. Telephone: 
4. Name of questionee: 
5. Established year: 
6. Number of employees: 
7. What percentage of employees resign within three years: 
8. Trends of employees during the last three Years: 
(Increased Decreased) 
9. What are the major factors determining the number of orders subcontracted by 
parent firms (multiple answers): 
a. Shifting demands by international business fluctuations 
b. Demand decrease by the parent firm's automation of production 
c. Parent firm's managerial strategy to control their subcontractors 
d. Subcontractor's competitiveness in technology and price 
e. Parent firm's overseas production expansion 
10. Capital links with parent firms: 
(Company names: ) (Share: per cent) 
11. Parent firm's response to its subcontractors' transactions with other parent firms: 
a. Prevent 
b. Discourage 
c. Not intervene 
d. Actively encourage 
269 
12. Major products: 
13. Forward linkages: 
Type of sales 
Subcontracting (Give the name of parent firms) 
a. 
b. 
c. 
d. Others (number: ) 
Free market (including overseas sales) 
Total 
14. Type of products subcontracted: 
a. Finished products 
b. Components and parts 
c. Both 
( 
( 
( 
per cent) 
per cent) 
per cent) 
15. Parent firm's support (multiple answers): 
a. Technical guidance 
b. Management guidance 
c. Financial support 
d. Equipment lease 
per cent 
100.0 
16. Does your company offer subcontracting to lower-layer subcontractors: 
(Yes No) 
17. If 'yes' in question 16, give the number of lower-layer subcontractors: 
18. If 'yes' in question 16, give reasons (multiple answers): 
a. Specialised technology of the company 
b. Insufficient productive capacity of this company 
c. Lower production cost of the company 
d. To avoid labour dispute 
e. To cope with periodical recession 
270 
19. Did the owner previously work for any parent firms: 
(Yes No) 
If 'yes', give company names: ( ) 
20. Technology level of your company: 
a. More sophisticated than parent firms 
b. Higher than comparable subcontractors 
c. Similar to other subcontractors 
21. The stability of parent firm's order: 
a. Semi-permanent 
b. Stable 
c. Non-periodical 
22. The impacts of parent firm's overseas production on the number of order 
subcontracted: 
a. Increased 
b. Decreased 
c. Not changed 
23. Does your company have any experience of international subcontracting: 
(Yes No) 
24. If 'yes' in question 23, what is its proportion in total sales: 
( per cent) 
25. Any relocation experience: 
(Yes No) 
26. If 'yes' in question 25, give reasons (multiple answers): 
a. Proximity to parent firms 
b. Access to workers 
c. Lower rent rate and cheaper land price 
d. Proximity to other related plants 
e. Others ( ) 
27. If 'yes' in question 25, give previous addresses: 
271 
28. If your prime parent firm conducts long-distance relocation, how would you 
respond to that: 
a. Accompany parent firm 
b. Adhere present location 
29. Locational implications of the introduction of JIT delivery system: 
a. Pressure to locate in vicinity to parent firms 
b. Pressure to prepare warehouse around parent firms 
c. No impact 
30. Sources of intermediate materials: 
Area 
Seoul 
Kyonggi province 
Other provinces 
Overseas 
Parent firms 
per cent 
31. Destinations for your products: 
Area 
Seoul 
Kyonggi province 
Other provinces 
Overseas 
Parent firms 
per cent 
272 
Free market 
per cent 
Free market 
per cent 
Subtotal 
per cent 
Subtotal 
per cent 
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